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The rising trend in marital instability and divorce is a topic of discussion nearly
world-wide. While divorce affects considerably fewer people in non-Western societies,
its rising trend and impact are quite alarming. Given the well established findings in the
West, it is useful to study divorce and marital instability in non-Western societies so that
prior findings from the West can be scrutinized and validated cross-culturally. This
study is necessary because the theories developed in the West may not be entirely
applicable to non-Western societies and cultural factors may in some cases be more
important than socio-economic factors.
By using the East Asian Social Survey (EASS), a three-society survey conducted
in China, Taiwan, and South Korea in the later part of the 1990s, this study investigates
the determinants of marital instability in three East Asian societies. Drawing insights
from three theoretical traditions, namely, socio-cultural context, resources, and gender,
the central goal of this study is to use comparable survey data and quantitative analyses

(i.e., ordered logistics regression) to explore the effects of resources, gender (marital)
roles, and gender beliefs on marital instability in the selected three societies.
Results from multivariate statistical analyses suggest that the effects of resources,
gender roles, and gender beliefs on marital instability vary not only by societies under
study but also by gender. While the findings lent limited support to the resources-based
theory, gender beliefs and to a lesser extent, gender roles, emerged as the most consistent
predictors of marital instability in all three societies. Data limitations and directions for
future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The rising trend in marital instability and divorce is a topic of discussion nearly
world-wide. There is a consensus among family sociologists that divorce and remarriage
have increasingly become part of the common life course transitions in Western
industrialized societies (Carter & McGoldrick, 1999; Kung, Hung, & Chan, 2004), or at
least that high levels of divorce seem to have become a standard part of family
experience in these societies (White, 1990). While divorce affects considerably fewer
people in non-Western societies, its rising trend and impact are quite alarming. Given
the well established findings in the West, it is useful to study divorce and marital
instability in non-Western societies so that prior findings from the West can be
scrutinized and validated cross-culturally. This intellectual exercise is necessary because
the theories developed in the West may not be entirely applicable to non-Western
societies and cultural factors may in some cases be more important than economic
factors.
Drawing insights from three theoretical traditions, namely, socio-cultural context,
resources, and gender, this study investigates the determinants of marital instability in
three East Asian societies: China, Taiwan, and South Korea. The central goal of this
study is to use comparable survey data and advanced quantitative methods to explore and
1

model the effects of resources, gender roles, and gender beliefs on marital instability in
the selected three societies.

Significance of the Study
This study contributes to comparative family studies and gender literature in
several significant ways. By applying existing socioeconomic and socio-political
structural theories on marital instability developed primarily in the West to the three East
Asian societies, the structural determinants of marital instability can be illuminated.
Extending Rodman’s work (1967, 1972), this study employs “big structures” and “large
processes” as described by Charles Tilly (1984) to show the relationship of differential
levels of socioeconomic development and political climates across the three societies to
marital instability at the macro level.
This study also examines the cultural determinants of marital instability in
societies that have been historically and contemporarily influenced by Confucianism.
Despite cultural resistance to Confucianism and the rise of Korean cultural identity in
Korea, marriage and family lives in all three societies have been affected, if not dictated,
by Confucian family ideologies. Confucian cultural legacies such as filial piety,
patrilineage, and gender hierarchical principles remain strong even under China’s state
socialism. Because of this shared cultural tradition in Confucianism, it becomes possible
in this study to investigate cultural roots of marital (in)stability and examine them
through the lens of gendered marital roles and gender beliefs in the different societies.
The cultural analysis is framed in terms of gendered marital roles and gender beliefs. In
so doing, the many understudied cultural nuances, either Chinese, Taiwanese, or Korean,
2

can be analytically compared and contrasted within the unified framework of cultural
analysis.
Last but not least, this study adopts a holistic structural-cultural approach under
which socio-cultural specific analyses are retained. For example, in contrast to previous
studies which have grouped China and Taiwan together, it is argued here that they should
be studied individually. Each is characterized by a distinctive history, pathway of socioeconomic development, and resulting variations in patterns of marital instability. Along
the same line of reasoning, special attention is given to China, a state socialist society
under reform. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Blocks,
comparative family studies involving state socialism are rare. This study is timely in that
it investigates a society at a historical cross-road. China is trying very hard to hold onto a
socialist political system at the same time that it is undergoing a profound capitalistic
economic transformation. At this historical juncture, a study such as this is sociologically
and historically significant.

Why China, Taiwan, and South Korea?
China, Taiwan, and South Korea are ideal research sites for a controlled/quasi
experimental study that allows for a critical test of sociological theories on marital
instability, including divorce. A China-Taiwan comparison facilitates an investigation
and comparison of how structural forces, such as socio-economic factors, shape marital
instability when the common cultural origin is held constant. It is well known that
China’s state socialism systematically affects social and family lives in ways that differ
markedly from capitalist societies. This includes, but is not limited to, opportunities of
3

education, employment, income, political participation, and gender equality (Tang &
Parish, 2000). Though transition from a central-planned economy to a free-market
economy has begun to alter these patterns, the political regime in China remains
predominately state socialist. In sharp contrast, the rapid transformation of Taiwan’s
market-based, export-driven economic growth has produced a much higher level of
prosperity in that Taiwan’s escalating gross national product is twenty-eight times that of
China. As Tang and Parish (2000) correctly point out, China is beginning to emulate the
economic growth that Taiwan has experienced and this could arguably foretell China’s
subsequent development.
A Taiwan-Korea comparison provides insight into how marital instability is
influenced by different cultural traditions under a similar socio-economic system. As
with Taiwan, South Korea has experienced significant economic development during the
second half of the twentieth century. Transformed from an impoverished, war-ravaged
nation to one of the most successful economies in East Asia, South Korea has emerged
as a vibrant democracy after decades under the rule of an authoritarian military regime
(Armstrong, 2002).
Lastly, a China-Korea comparison is also useful in shedding light on how both
structural (especially political) and cultural forces jointly affect marital instability in
different socio-political contexts. Although Taiwan, South Korea, and more so, China,
vary in the form of their socioeconomic structure, the state has wielded similar control
across all three societies in that they share a history of domination by authoritarian rule.
In the 1950s, China, Taiwan, and South Korea were dominated by state owned and
controlled enterprises. Then, after forty years of martial law from 1947 to 1987, Taiwan
4

became a democracy in 1996 (Armstrong, 2002) and South Korea’s hard-fought
democracy also emerged in 1993 after the upheaval of revolution, war, division, decades
of military dictatorship (1961-1987), and sharp political struggles (Armstrong, 2002).
While both Taiwan and South Korea experienced democratic breakthroughs in the
1990s, China remained, by and large, in state socialism. It is this intersection,
overlapping, and divergence of socioeconomic, political, and cultural systems that make
China, Taiwan, and South Korea ideal research sites to study marital instability in East
Asia.
Another reason for a tripartite comparative study is that divorce is a growing
phenomenon in East Asia. Before 1980, divorce was quite rare in both urban and rural
areas in China (Tang & Parish, 2000). While divorce has been culturally rejected for
centuries (Honig & Hershatter, 1988; Li, 1985; Parish & Whyte, 1978; Whyte & Parish,
1984), the divorce level has been rapidly increasing since the economic reform (Zeng,
Schultz, Wang, & Gu, 2002). It has been observed that the general divorce rate in China
has increased from 2.01 per thousand married couples in 1982 to 2.86 in 1990, an
increase of 42% in eight years and it further increased to 3.13 in 1995 (Zeng, Schultz,
Wang, & Gu, 2002; Zeng & Wu, 2000). Similarly, China’s crude divorce rate increased
from .42 per 1,000 in 1982 to .70 per 1,000 in 1990 and it increased to .87 per 1,000 in
1995 (Wang, 2001). Though unexceptional by U.S. and European standards, these rates
are exceptional when country benchmarks are examined. While the Unites States’ crude
divorce rate decreased from 4.3 in 1997 to 3.6 in 2006 (United Nations, 2007), the
average non-Muslim country at China’s level of development has a divorce rate of .15
per 1,000 (Goode, 1993; Parish, 1995; United Nations, 1991). In comparison, China
5

now has a relatively high divorce rate and an unprecedented level of marital instability
(Tang & Parish, 2000). In fact, the increase in divorce rates in China since 1978 is 500%
(Sheng, 2004).
Similar to the trend in divorce that characterizes much of modern Chinese
society, Taiwan and South Korea are also reporting increases in the rate of divorce.
Thornton, Lin, and Lee (1987) (as cited in Thornton & Fricke, 1987) reported that the
divorce rate in Taiwan tripled from 1970 to 1990. Though rather low in comparison
with other developed societies, Taiwan’s crude divorce rate was 1.57 per 1,000 in 1995
(Statistical Yearbook of Taiwan, 1997). South Korea’s crude divorce rate has also
increased from .39 per 1,000 in 1979 to 1.3 per 1,000 in 1994 (Wang, 2001), and 1.5 per
1,000 in 1995 (National Statistical Office, 1998): 600% in 30 years (Lee, 2004). In
2006, China’s crude divorce rate per 1,000 was 1.5 (United Nations, 2007); Taiwan’s
was 2.8 (Taiwan Yearbook, 2008); and South Korea’s was 2.6 (United Nations, 2007).
Given these increasing trends in divorce, a three society comparison can help better
understand the relationship between socio-economic and cultural dynamics and marital
instability. Unfortunately, direct studies on divorce are largely not feasible because not
enough divorced respondents can be interviewed via large-scale random or probability
surveys.

Brief Description of Each Chapter
Chapter two identifies the key factors that have influenced marital instability,
especially divorce, in China, Taiwan, and South Korea. In particular, it examines marital
instability within the framework of socio-cultural context, resources and gender relations.
6

Under the umbrella of socio-cultural context, this chapter first describes each society in
terms of cultural roots and changes, including cultural traditions, religion, foreign
influence or “Westernization,” and associated changes in these societies; it then explores
the possible links to marital instability. As to social-structural forces, this chapter
investigates how the socio-political system, the socio-economic system, economic
transformations, including industrialization and urbanization, and gendered resources
have impacted marital instability in China, Taiwan, and South Korea. With reference to
resources, this chapter discusses how income, education, and employment have impacted
marital instability in China, Taiwan, and South Korea. Where gender relations are
considered, this chapter examines how gender roles and gender beliefs affect marital
instability in these societies. Finally, research hypotheses are formulated.
In chapter three, the methods used in this study are described. Data came from
the East Asian Social Survey (EASS), a three-society survey conducted in China,
Taiwan, and South Korea in the later part of the 1990s. The survey used multistage
probability sampling technique and was deemed representative of the adult population in
China, Taiwan, and South Korea. The dependent variable, marital instability, and
independent variables are identified and explanations are provided regarding their
conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement. The questionnaire items used
for analyses include, but not limited to, gender, age, marital duration, minor children in
residence, previously divorced, family structure, urban or rural residence, religious
membership and participation, income, employment, education, decision-making power,
housework, gender beliefs, and marital instability. Control variables are also discussed.
Finally, the statistical methods that are used are described. Four multivariate ordered
7

logistic regression models are developed and estimated to examine both the independent
and partial effects of the key independent variables, along with control variables, on
marital instability. The gender specific regression models are also estimated separately
for each of the three societies.
In chapter four, descriptive findings of the sample are provided. The results of the
four multivariate ordered logistic regression models are reported. The effects of relative
resources, gender roles, and gender beliefs on marital instability are delineated and
discussed for each society. A summary of gender differences derived from the gender
specific regression models are highlighted and discussed.
Chapter five entails the interpretation and evaluation of the findings in the study,
particularly as they pertain to the hypotheses. Research limitations are also discussed.
And finally, implications and directions for future research are addressed.

8

CHAPTER II
MARITAL INSTABILITY IN CHINA, TAIWAN, AND SOUTH KOREA

China, Taiwan, and South Korea have each experienced increasing trends in
marital instability in the latter half of the twentieth century. In some cases, increasing
rates are associated with changes brought about by industrialization. In other cases,
increasing rates are associated with social transformations that have resulted from both
industrialization and urbanization. In still other cases, rising rates are the result of a
confluence of both cultural and structural changes. This chapter identifies the key
factors that have influenced marital instability (e.g., divorce) in China, Taiwan, and
South Korea. Specifically, it examines marital instability within the framework of sociocultural context, resources and gender relations. Under the umbrella of socio-cultural
context, this chapter first describes each society in terms of cultural roots and changes,
including cultural traditions, religion, foreign influence or “Westernization,” and
associated changes in these societies; it then explores the possible links to marital
instability. As to social-structural forces, this chapter investigates how the sociopolitical system, the socio-economic system, economic transformations, including
industrialization and urbanization, and gendered resources have impacted marital
instability in China, Taiwan, and South Korea. With reference to resources, this chapter
discusses how absolute and relative income, education, and employment have impacted
9

marital instability in China, Taiwan, and South Korea. Where gender relations are
considered, this chapter examines how gender roles and gender beliefs affect marital
instability in these societies.
While economic growth, increases in education, changes in population structure,
rural-urban migration, and the influence of Western culture and its focus on
individualism are deemed important in explaining family change and marital instability
(Goode, 1963, 1982; Michael, Fuchs, & Scott, 1980; Ogburn & Nimkoff, 1955; Shorter,
1975; Thornton & Fricke, 1987), political and legislative changes are vital in
understanding marital instability as well, especially under China’s state socialism
(Wang, 2001). Therefore, of central importance in this study is to recognize and
examine the locus of control from the state for each society. When the state’s authority
declines, many fundamental individual activities and interpersonal relationships and
processes shift from state controlled family and work settings to other social institutions
(Thornton & Fricke, 1987). Figure 1 provides a “road map” of the cultural and structural
determinants of marital instability in China, Taiwan, and South Korea as discussed in
this chapter.

10
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Theoretical Considerations
Drawing insights from different theoretical traditions, this comparative study
uses an integrated theoretical framework that unites three important perspectives. They
are: cultural or social context advanced by Rodman in the 1960s; resource theory that
was first developed by Blood and Wolfe in 1960; and multifaceted gender theory that
was synthesized recently by a large number of gender and family scholars. In the pages
that follow, this tripartite framework is briefly described.
Influences from political, economic, and social institutions and their relationship
on marital instability vary across societies where cultural norms and values are
embedded. Thus, a socio-cultural context is paramount for this study as China, Taiwan,
and South Korea are compared. These three societies are characterized by different
structural and/or cultural characteristics, including socio-economic systems and gender
relations, specifically, the legacy of socialist egalitarianism in China versus traditional
patriarchy in Taiwan and South Korea.

Cultural Context
According to Rodman (1967, 1972), cultural context can shape and constrain
individuals’ resources and gender beliefs, which in turn can further affect marital
relations beyond the impact of structural resources (Xu & Lai, 2002). The importance of
cultural context has been further demonstrated by Goode (1993) in his seminal study of
“World Changes in Divorce Patterns.” The crucial importance of cultural context
recognizes the existence of ideological or cultural forces that are embedded in the family
system and in the society (Blumberg & Coleman, 1989; Ferree, 1990; Scanzoni &
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Szinovacz, 1980; Vogler, 1998). Neglect of these factors renders research findings in
comparative studies on marital instability inadequate.
Culture can be seen as a human process of meaning-making, generating artifacts,
categories, norms, values, practices, rituals, symbols, worldviews, ideas, ideologies, and
discourses (Spillman, 2007). It is argued that a worldview is central to a cultural system
from which values and norms are produced (Kraft, 1980). The cultural background in
China, Taiwan, and South Korea is deeply influenced by Confucianism, albeit to
different degrees. Confucianism is a philosophy stressing quasi-religious or religious,
ethical, moral, political, and social values developed from the teachings of Chinese
philosopher Confucius. As a worldview or ideological system, Confucianism is both a
prescription for an ideal social life and a cultural system used to perpetuate relations of
inequality. Confucianism establishes hierarchies between older and younger, male and
female, and ruler and ruled. Seniors are more valued than juniors, males are more
valued than females, juniors defer to seniors, women defer to men, and the ruled defer to
the rulers (Koo & Nahm, 1997). The ruler is seen as the father of the state, and filial
piety is regarded as the key to social stability. Confucianism has long been viewed as a
powerful means of maintaining a stratified social order and creating societal solidarity
(Koo & Nahm, 1997). Confucian educational institutions based on teachings of
Confucius have been established and Confucian teachings have been adopted
ideologically by the people.
Some consider Confucianism to be a philosophy. Others view it as a state
religion because of governmental promotion of Confucian values. Still others view
Confucianism as a religion “…because spiritual cultivation brings a person to oneness
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with the universe in sensing a suffusion of goodness” (Bellah, 1957, p. 77; DeVos, 1998,
p340). In fact, when the Choson dynasty, Korea’s last and longest lived imperial
dynasty (1392-1910), took Confucianism as the state ideology: Confucianism was
embraced as a form of religion in Korea by incorporating ancestral veneration (Koo &
Nahm, 1997). In China and Taiwan, Confucianism is not a religion in the Western
sense but a philosophy or worldview. It has been the foundation for Chinese society and
government since the sixth century B.C., and spread to Taiwan with the migration of
Chinese settlers over the past four centuries. As such, it has been a major influence on
the everyday values of the Chinese and Taiwanese.
In this study “traditional Confucianism” is frequently referenced as it represents a
widely shared image of traditional society. As suggested by Koo and Nahm (1997),
Confucianism, as the ruling ideology, was easier to preserve as “tradition” precisely
because it was invested with power and because it was and remains documented (p.
283).
One of the major tenets of Confucianism, filial piety, is found in the Book of
Rites whereby the three bonds and five relationships are defined. The three bonds refer
to unchangeable relationships. These relationships grant authority to the sovereign over
the subject, the parent over the child, and the husband over the wife. The five
relationships outline a code of conduct. The relationship between sovereign and subject
should be based on righteousness (loyalty); the relationship between father and son
should be based on closeness (filial piety); the relationship between husband and wife
should be based on difference (separation of duties); the relationship between elder and
younger should be based on order; and the relationship between friend and friend should
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be based on trust (Joe, 2000). Although Confucianism defines specific relationships, it
privileges the sovereign-subject and parent-child relationship. Under Confucianism, the
conjugal bond between a husband and wife is less important than sovereign-subject
relationships and the parent-child relationship, especially the relationship between
parents and their sons (Pimentel, 2000). Because the line of descent was more important
than individual family relations, marriages were utilitarian, for the purpose of having
children and perpetuating the paternal line (Pimentel, 2000). Although the power of the
dominance and subservience of the three bonds has substantially weakened over time,
the hierarchies of age and gender prevail in family ethics in all three societies. That
being said, Confucianism is by no means the only religious or cultural factor influencing
marital (in)stability.
Despite the many policies invoked to restrict or eradicate religion by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) upon taking power, religions have survived and to certain
degree are thriving in China (Yang, 2006). The ideology of the CCP is that atheism is
preferred because religion is often viewed as illusory and nonscientific, thus a dangerous
narcotic and troubling political ideology that goes against the CCP regime. However, in
order to get people to support programs of economic development, the new leadership of
the CCP replaced eradication with toleration and allowed a limited number of religious
sites of the major five religions to reopen (Yang, 2006). The major five faith traditions,
namely, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism, were thus allowed to
establish as national associations between 1954 and 1957 due to their respective
diplomatic values to the regime. By 1982, the five major religions were legalized as
“patriotic” associations, but no others (Yang, 2006, p. 101).
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The regime’s antireligious policy of the 1950s and the restrictions imposed upon
religious groups caused believers to create underground groups. Because so many
believers are “underground,” estimates of religious adherents are difficult to obtain. In
the early 1990s, a careful study suggested that the total number of Protestants in both the
legal and underground was 20 million or more (Hunter & Chan 1993). By the end of the
1990s, another province by province study was conducted based on direct observation
and interviews with local church leaders. It estimated that there were 50 million
Protestants (Bays, 2003) with four out of five being in the underground (Yang, 2006). It
has also been reported that the underground Catholic Church is well organized, including
an underground Catholic Bishops Conference within the China Catholic patriotic
Association. Recent estimates of the Catholic population are 12 million: four million
with the officially condoned Catholic Church and six to eight million with the Catholic
underground church (Madsen, 2003). No adequate estimates exist for underground
Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims (Yang, 2006).
For Taiwan and South Korea, estimates are more easily retrieved since both of
these societies have greater religious pluralism and freedom. According to the Taiwan
Yearbook (2006), the major faith traditions fall into the following categories: 35.1% of
Taiwanese report to be Buddhist; 33% report to be Taoist; 18.7% report to be
nonreligious; and 3.9% report to be Christian. As stated by the South Korean National
Statistical Office (2005), 46.5% of South Koreans report no religious preference, 29.3%
report to be Christian, and 22.8% of South Koreans report to be Buddhist.
There is a legacy of traditional Confucian heritage that has been challenged in
each of the three societies. Toward the end of WWI, traditional Chinese culture fell
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under attack by many Chinese intellectuals who blamed traditional culture for the
dramatic and rapid fall of China into a subordinate international position. These
intellectuals argued that China's cultural values prevented China from matching the
industrial and military development of Japan and the West (Gentzler, 1977). This led to
the "May 4th Movement" or "New Culture" movement, a massive popular protest that
took place in China in May 1919. The way out of China's problems, many believed, was
to adopt Western notions of equality and democracy and to abandon the Confucian
approach which stressed hierarchy in relationships and obedience. Science and
democracy became popular catch phrases (Gentzler, 1977). The movement was
successful in bringing women into the labor force, but by 1930, had died down and the
focus had changed. It was not until the 1950s that challenges to hierarchy would
resurface. Prior to 1949, the Chinese were taught that women were inferior to men and
their responsibilities were to families. In the 1950s, women were said to be “holding up
half the sky” and their responsibilities included contributions to the socialist construction
via work in the labor force and divorce was allowed (Honig & Hershatter, 1988).
Traditional Confucian ideals and the official socialist ideology were obviously at odds
with one another.
With the open-door policy announced and implemented in the late 1970s,
Westernization has had a direct impact on China. Before that time, China's door was
closed to foreign countries. Chinese leaders thought that in order to move in the direction
of modernization, reforms should be taken initially in the economic sector. Four
southern cities with geographic proximity to overseas Chinese communities and overseas
connections opened their doors to the rest of the world. Trading rights among countries
18

were recognized, foreign investment was encouraged, and new factories (both domestic
and foreign) were established in these areas. As a result of this new wave of
Westernization, Chinese men and women have been pervasively exposed to Western
companies, ideas, and a culture that emphasizes individualism and personal autonomy
(Wang, 2001). Under traditional Confucianism, family was seen as maintaining the
social order, thus divorce was condemned and rare. Though marital decisions under the
Communist regime were at least in theory relegated to a matter of individual choice
(Pimentel, 2000), family relations continued to be emphasized and parents remained
influential in their children’s marriages. In spite of this continuity in Chinese marriages,
scholarly research suggests that Westernization is a strong contributing factor to the
rising divorce rate in China (Wang, 2001).
For Taiwan, after WWII, association with the West was accelerated and
Taiwanese society was brought into contact with many Western values. Traditional
Confucianism and the family collective were competing with individual and private
interests. In an attempt to find a balance of the competing views, traditional values are
an explicit part of the school curriculum and media programs (Thornton & Lin, 1994).
Nonetheless, there are new models of thinking and behavior that greatly affect
Taiwanese marital relationships, including marital (in)stability.
After South Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945, the U.S.
occupation and the devastating Korean War (1950-1953), occupying America was seen
not only as military support and foreign aid, but also as the bearer of cultural influences
(Kendall, 1996). Much of South Korean society traded in their traditional heritage for
the pursuit of economic stability. In the early phases of South Korea’s modernization,
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traditional Confucianism was seen as a force which perpetuated resistance to progressive
social change for a less authoritarian, less stratified, and less sexist society (Koo &
Nahm, 1997). Marriages and divorces were increasingly seen as individual choices, void
of familial influence. As suggested by Song and Moon (1998), the growth of
individualism and the decline of the traditional family collective values appear to have
contributed to the rising divorce rates in South Korea. A cultural tension exists in South
Korean society over the simultaneous embrace and rejection of traditional Confucian
heritage.
In summary, while traditional Confucianism remains as an ideological and
cultural legacy in the three societies under study, each of these societies is characterized
by unique cultural beliefs, including the extent to which traditional Confucianism is
embraced or rejected, the extent to which other religions are adopted and practiced, and
the extent to which family and/or individual values are influenced by the West. As such,
each society must be painstakingly examined within its cultural context. But this by no
means suggests that social forces are not important. To the contrary, the twin forces,
cultural and social, must be simultaneously considered in this comparative study of
marital instability in China, Taiwan and South Korea.

Structural Context
Socio-structural context involves placing elements of society in their context
within complex patterns of social relationships and social arrangements that endure
through time and space. By identifying and analyzing both cultural and structural
influences, over-generalizations about either cultural or structural processes can be
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avoided. By incorporating structural context into sociological analysis of marital
instability, both structure and agency can be effectively delineated (Spillman, 2008).
Though prior studies have linked macro-level changes (e.g., modernization and
development) to family change and disruption (Hareven, 1976; Lee, 1982; Nimkoff,
1965; South, 1988; South & Trent, 1988), marital instability should not be merely
explained by “grab bag” concepts such as industrialization and urbanization (Thornton &
Lin, 1987, p. 770). Careful attention must instead be given to multifaceted mechanisms
and processes through which marital instability is affected. With this spirit, this study not
only stresses the importance of sociopolitical and socioeconomic systems, but prevailing
cultural values as well. To this end, a theoretical perspective that synthesizes both
cultural and structural forces is developed and used as a guiding framework for this
comparative study on marital instability in China, Taiwan, and South Korea. In addition
to cultural context as reviewed previously, the following section focuses on specific
structural aspects of this integrated perspective.

Resource Theory
Sociopolitical and socioeconomic developments are a structural force entrenched
in resource theory both at the macro and micro levels. The resource theory put forth by
Blood and Wolfe (1960) suggests that marital relationships are reflective of the resources
that each partner contributes to the marriage. At the micro level, individuals’ income,
educational attainment, and employment status are defined as structural resources. As a
gender-neutral approach, this theory implies that as the amount of resources attained by
wives reach the same levels as that of their husbands, inequity in power and housework
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will vanish, otherwise, a sense of injustice will be provoked in both parties (Zuo & Bian,
2001). Whoever has greater resources than their spouse may use their economic
advantages to secure decision-making authority, avoid household labor, and discourage
spouse’s independence. The basic premise of this argument is that the benefits of
marriage rely on task specialization and division, and that such benefits decline when
women gain greater resources (Kalmijn, De Graaf, & Poortman, 2004). If women have
their own incomes, jobs or careers, they are in a better position to leave an unhappy
marriage and are less motivated to work on marital problems (Cherlin, 1979). On the
other hand, a husband may feel more inclined to leave an unhappy marriage if he knows
his wife can support herself (Kalmijn, De Graaf, & Poortman, 2004). Additionally,
marital instability may be increased when men are not able to provide stable income
through stable employment (Cherlin 1979; South & Spitze, 1986). Therefore, couples
with greater resource discrepancies would tend to have greater marital instability and
increased likelihood of divorce.
The above micro-level resource based argument appears to be consistent with the
macro level explanations for marital instability. For example, women’s employment and
equality has been viewed to promote divorce in market societies (Cherlin, 1992;
Edwards et al., 1992). If socialist states accelerate tendencies toward women’s
employment and lower birth rate, freeing women from family dependency and giving
them financial autonomy and the ability to abandon tortured marital relationships, then
resource theory could provide an explanation for marital instability in socialist states as
well as market societies. However, South (1985) found that the effect of prosperity only
slightly reduces the likelihood of divorce. While prosperity makes divorce more
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feasible, this effect is outweighed by the positive effect on personal relationships (South
1985). Greenstein (1990) found that when wives’ earnings and share of family earnings
are greater, divorce is less likely. Several studies have found that female labor force
participation increases divorce (Booth, Johnson, White, & Edwards, 1984; Rank, 1987;
Spitze & South, 1985), while others have found that women’s labor force participation
reduces marital instability (Greenstein, 1990; Smith & Meitz, 1985; South & Spitze,
1986). Therefore, this chapter examines the background and valuation of women’s
obtainable resources and resource discrepancies within marital units in socialist China as
opposed to market societies in Taiwan and South Korea.
Under the socialist system in China, egalitarian efforts were promoted by the
state in order for women to work and contribute to the economy. Equal opportunities for
education, near universal employment, and women’s rights, including the right to
divorce came under the umbrella of socialist equality. As husbands and wives reached
the same levels of resources, inequity in power and housework should eventually have
vanished or provoked a sense of injustice and likelihood of marital instability (Zuo &
Bian, 2001). In Taiwan and South Korea, women were encouraged to work only when
men were not available to fill the labor void in the pursuit of economic development and
women as a result supplied much of the low-paid, unskilled workers. During South
Korea’s financial crisis, women were the first ones to be laid off. Women in Taiwan and
South Korea are less likely to make up a higher percentage of workers in an occupation,
and wives in Taiwan and South Korea have significantly smaller income shares as
compared to their Chinese counterparts (Tang & Parish, 2000). Therefore, in Taiwan
and South Korea, couples are more likely to have employment and income discrepancies
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than are their Chinese counterparts. With Taiwan’s higher levels of urbanization and
higher gross national product, urban education levels were higher in Taiwan than in
comparable Chinese cities. Further, much of the education growth in Taiwan applied to
people in the countryside, unlike China where there was a “bamboo wall.” Therefore, by
the 1990s, there is still less fluidity in lower-status occupations in China (Tang & Parish,
2000). As implied by resource theory, Taiwanese and South Korean husbands with
greater resources than their spouse in fact may use their economic advantages to secure
decision-making authority, avoid household labor, and discourage spouse’s
independence which leads to marital instability.
The aforementioned implications of resource theory suggest that structural
resources at the macro level including levels of socioeconomic development and sociopolitical systems, influence micro-level structural resources that are part of the dyadic
allocation of resources within the marriage. These cross-societal differences in
socioeconomic resources suggest that the relationship between resources and marital
instability vary not only by societies under study but also by gender and cultural
influences.
Although economic development is commonly seen as improving the economic
status of women in several ways through increased women’s absolute income, education,
and awareness regarding women’s status in general (Meng, 1998), it does not mean that
women occupy a less disadvantaged economic position in highly developed economies.
This clearly indicates that socioeconomic development is not the only factor that affects
women’s status. While economic development may increase women’s absolute
resources, it does not necessarily improve their positions relative to men. If traditional
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attitudes are deeply rooted in a society, it may take a long time for change to occur in
women’s subordinate positions. This is particularly true for Asian societies because they
generally have a long history of male domination which is ingrained in many aspects of
Asian life (Meng, 1998). These issues, absolute and relative resources, traditional
attitudes, and marital power would of course have bearing on marital instability.
Differences between male and female wages provided an excellent example of
how both structural and cultural factors intersect. The gender wage gap does not seem to
have an obvious relationship to economic development; rather, it relates closely to
government policy and cultural influences as stated by Gunderson (1994):
The earnings gap tends to be smaller in counties with centralised
collective bargaining that emphasise egalitarian wage policies in
general. It tends to be largest in countries that emphasise a
traditional non-egalitarian role for women in the labour market or
that have decentralized, market-oriented wage determination
with enterprise-level bargaining” (Gunderson, 1994 cited in Meng,
1998, p16).
This appears to be the case for China, as a society with centralized collective bargaining
and emphasis on egalitarianism, and Taiwan and South Korea described as societies that
emphasize traditional roles or have decentralized, market characteristics. Women in
Taiwan and South Korea earn less relative to men than their Chinese counterparts. In
1990, female earnings in Taiwan were 61% of male earnings (Taiwan DirectorateGeneral of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 1992); female earnings in South Korea
were 54% of male earnings (ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1990) and in 1987,
female earnings in China were 86% of male earnings (ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics,
1987). Upon closer examination of the wage differential, Byron and Manaloto (1990)
found a differential of 9% in China’s urban sector and Meng (1992) found a 20%
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differential in China’s rural industrialized sector. Because the Chinese government
endorses an equal opportunity policy for political and ideological reasons, gender wage
discrimination is less in China’s state enterprises than in the rural industrialized sector
(Meng & Kidd, 1995). China’s newly developed decentralized sector has company
managers setting wages rather than government, thus cultural influence is important and
has led to gender bias (Meng, 1992). While these findings do not take occupational
segregation into account, it nonetheless appears that culture and political institutions play
important roles where gender wage differentials are concerned. Once again, the
examination of marital instability needs to not only incorporate resource theory, but
cultural context and gender theory as well.

Gender Theory
In Taiwan and South Korea, the act of women going to work was in contrast to
traditional values of what is best for the family. In South Korea, major institutions work
to reinforce or perpetuate gender inequality (Park, 1993). Though the state has given
women legal equality, the persistence of discriminatory practices has kept equality from
becoming a reality. As a pillar of family structure, traditional gender role preservation in
modern Korea remains (Bedeski, 1994). In contrast, Chinese women balanced their
traditional ideas of family with being told that they were “holding up half the sky” and
that going to work was for the good of the state, society, and the family. The legacy of
socialism and its emphasis on egalitarianism continued to improve women’s chances for
equality in China. As Tang and Parish (2000) found, women under socialist China are
more successful in getting their husbands to contribute to household chores, suggesting
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that women’s near income equality with their husbands provides a bargaining leverage
over chores and family decision-making. Thus, both in the market and at home, there is
more gender equality in China than in Taiwan (Tang & Parish, 2000).
There is also a legacy of traditional Confucian heritage in the three societies, but
more so in China and Taiwan. In South Korea, occupying America was seen as the
bearer of cultural influences. In the early phases of South Korea’s modernization,
traditional Confucianism was criticized as a hindrance and obstruction to change. In
societies where much emphasis is placed on traditional values, the result in attitudes
and/or behaviors would be more traditional. Gender egalitarianism as well as traditional
Confucianism remains as a structural, ideological, and cultural legacy, that is
consequently absorbed in gender theory.
According to gender theory, gender must be placed within a context whereby
gender is created, transformed, enforced, and maintained (Spade & Valentine, 2004).
Going beyond mere childhood socialization, gender theory emphasizes “doing gender” as
a processes through everyday interactions that shape definitions of male and female
work, thus the definitions carry different meanings across gender (Ferree, 1990, 1991;
Hochschild, 1989; Hood, 1986; South & Spitze, 1994; West & Zimmerman, 1987).
Hochschild (1989) wrote about what she dubbed, the “economy of gratitude,” whereby
recognition and appreciation for what one does hinges more on role identity than on
resources one contributes to the marriage. The gender system sets boundaries for
attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s gender category, thus individuals are held
accountable for behavior that follows, or fails to follow culturally approved norms for
each gender (Zuo, 2003). In this way, gender also operates as an ideological device that
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produces, reproduces, and legitimates behavior and activities in accordance to gender
(West & Zimmerman, 1987; Zuo, 2003). Hence, the “hidden power” of gender ideology
reduces the bargaining power for women who might seek a more equitable division
(Ferree, 1990, p. 876). Nevertheless, the construction of gender and gender boundaries
involve negotiations between men and women and are subject to changes and challenges
under certain social arrangements and circumstances (Ferree, 1990; Hood, 1986; Zuo,
2003). Definitions of what is feminine and masculine depend on specific social locations
in which interaction takes place, and it is therefore constructed in institutional and
cultural contexts (Zuo, 2003).
The many dimensions of gender theory, including egalitarian beliefs and attitudes
and marital roles such as marital power sharing and marital independence are examined
in relation to marital instability. Though limited, studies conducted in the United States
(Amato & Booth, 1995; Kaufman, 2000), China (Pimentel, 2000, 2006) and Taiwan (Xu
& Lai, 2004) do show systematic and significant relationship between gender roles,
gender beliefs, and marital instability.
Cultural norms and values play a part in the consideration of a divorce, and
attitudes about marital roles are important in this respect. Women with egalitarian views
put greater prominence on self-sufficiency so that they are more likely than traditional
wives to believe in their abilities to establish independent households (Kalmijn, De Graaf,
& Poortman, 2004). Egalitarian women are less likely than traditional women to believe
it is ethically wrong to abandon a husband and unhappy marriage, and egalitarian-minded
women are more tolerant of diverse family forms than traditionally-minded women
(Lueptow, Guss, & Hyden, 1989; Lye & Biblarz, 1993). Additionally, women’s
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egalitarian attitudes may contribute to tension between spouses because women with
these attitudes will more often discuss family and household tasks with their husbands
rather than to take traditional roles as assumptions (Amato & Booth, 1995; Greenstein,
1995; Lye & Biblarz, 1993).
Kalmijn, De Graaf, & Poortman (2004) found that women in the Netherlands
with traditional value orientations toward family roles are less likely to divorce than are
women with egalitarian values, even after taking into account differences in market
resources. More importantly, they found that although wife’s labor force participation
increases the probability of divorce for women with traditional value orientation, there is
no destabilizing effect of wife’s work for women with more egalitarian attitudes
(Kalmijn, De Graaf, & Poortman, 2004). This means that the effects of women’s labor
market resources depend on cultural values.
More so China, but also Taiwan, and South Korea have experienced changes
toward egalitarian attitudes, particularly among women. The normative role of women
as subordinate has lost popularity and has given way to ideals of gender equality and
women’s greater independence. As gender systems evolve alongside an increasing
divorce rate, one must consider cultural shifts in norms and values an important factor in
the rise of divorce. In this study the link between gender roles and marital instability,
and gender beliefs and martial instability are examined.
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China: Cultural Context

Tradition
Before Liberation, the Chinese term for the 1949 revolution, marriages were
arranged and divorce was rare (Honig and Hershatter, 1988). However, during the
Communist regime, women’s inferior status was challenged and women’s rights and
divorce started receiving attention. Supporters of the May Fourth Movement of 1919
invoked the unequal status of women in the Confucian family as a symbol of everything
in Chinese culture that kept the nation weak against Western imperialism (Honig and
Hershatter, 1988). This made sense when considering how Confucianism is viewed in
Chinese society. According to Tu, “Confucianism, a generic Western term that has no
counterpart in Chinese, is a worldview, a social ethic, a political ideology, a scholarly
tradition, and a way of life” (1998, 3).
One of the fundamental Confucian values is filial piety. Filial piety is seen as not
only the first step to moral excellence, but as an essential way of learning to be human.
The Book of Rites defines the five basic relationships: ruler-minister, father-son, elder
brother-younger brother, husband-wife, and friend-friend. The five relationships of
Confucian philosophy, in descending order of importance, demonstrate the value of
conjugal relations (Pimentel, 2000). Although the family unit has long been the basic
unit of Chinese society, the conjugal bond, that of husband and wife, took a distant
second place to parent-child relationships, especially that of sons (Pimentel, 2000).
China’s patrilineal kinship system traces family lines through men, both the ancestors
and descendents. Because the line of descent was more important than individual family
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relations, marriages took place to ensure the family line rather than to benefit the
individuals involved (Baker, 1979). Therefore, the quality of marital relations was not
necessarily a salient concept in Chinese society. An arranged marriage and patrilocal
residency facilitated family reproduction and kept conjugal bonds inferior to that of
intergenerational ties (Pimentel, 2000). The husband, remaining with his family, had
closer family ties to his parents; the wife, who was an outsider, placed her hopes on her
sons. In this cultural and historical context, marriage was nothing but utilitarian,
conducted for the purposes of having children and furthering the larger family group
(Pimentel, 2000).
The word nation in Chinese consists of “guo” (country) and “jia” (family); hence,
the country is the family and the family is the country (Kung, Hung, & Chan, 2004, 34).
By applying the family metaphor in the Book of Rites to community and to country as in
referring to the emperor as the son of Heaven, the king as ruler-father, and the magistrate
as the father-mother official, they assume that implicit in the family-centered taxonomy
is a political vision (Tu, 1998). Thus, taking care of family affairs is involvement in
politics; family ethics is not a private personal matter because the public good is realized
by and through it (Tu, 1998). Further, it is apparent that family is important in the
maintenance of social order. As such, divorce was condemned and extremely rare.
During the 20th century, there have been many changes in the Chinese marriage
and family system as women and youth began demanding more freedom and family
control (Baker 1979, Lang 1946). The Communist Party instituted change directly
through explicit reforms in the marriage laws, and indirectly through methods such as
the women’s movement into paid employment. The Communist regime shifted control
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over marital decisions from extended family to individuals, and they promoted love and
mutual companionship as criteria for mate selection (Pimentel, 2000). In the 21st century
parents increasingly expect their children to be independent. Although obedience and
respect is still desirable, they recognize that filial piety may not have a place in their
children’s success (Adams, 2004).

Foreign Influence, Individualism, and “Westernization”
Most macro-explanations regarding marital instability and divorce focus on
societal changes. Sheng (2004) stated that the growing awareness of independence
among women, increasing social interaction, accelerating of employment mobility, and
introducing of Western values toward marriage and divorce have contributed to the
increasing marital instability as a result of the marriage laws and the introduction of the
market economy. Wang (2001) reports that westernism and its focus on individualism
has also contributed to the rising divorce rate in China. The new economic system has
provided exposure to democratic ideas and foreign culture which has encouraged people
to place a greater emphasis on seeking personal happiness (Wang, 2001). Since the
1980s, Chinese men and women have been provided opportunities to establish private
businesses, to change jobs, to relocate from one city to another, and to work for foreign
companies. These opportunities emphasize a value on the individual, individualism, and
personal autonomy. Thus, while the major reasons for divorce in the 1960s and 1970s
were primarily political, later divorce grounds were expanded to include conflict over
division of chores, the existence of love affairs, unsatisfactory sex life, differing career
goals, and working in two different cities (Wang, 2001). Gao and Liu (1988) (as cited in
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Linlin, 1993) report other reasons for divorce: hasty marriage, maltreatment of wives,
economic family disputes, extramarital relationships, conflicting personality and
interests, disputes over the division of domestic chores, in-law problems, different
ideologies toward life, and sexual incompatibility. Quality of sex life, an embarrassing
topic just a few years ago, has now become a standard measurement to evaluate the
success of a marriage (China Today, 2002). Slightly over one-third (34.7%) of recent
divorces are attributed to an incompatible or unsatisfactory sex life (China Today, 2002).
A majority of reasons for divorce can be grouped together under the umbrella of what
Wang (2001) described as the influence of individualism and Western culture.
There is a long tradition in family theory connecting social and economic
changes to global family patterns toward a nuclear family system characterized by the
companionate marriage, low fertility, high divorce, and greater spousal equality (Goode,
1963; Inkeles, 1980; Pimentel, 2000; Thornton & Lin, 1994). Goode (1963) contends
that the Western companionate marriage, with the emphasis on the spousal relationship,
would develop from radically different marriage and family systems. Others argue that
family changes are a product of cultural characteristics, thus cultural forces are just as
plausible to explain family change as is “modernization” (Pimentel, 2000). While it does
appear that most macro-explanations regarding divorce and marital instability that focus
on societal changes are similar among Chinese and Western societies, they are
characteristically different as well. Pimentel (2000) found that divorce is still infrequent
enough that most Chinese couples do not expect that their marriages will end in divorce.
Also, Chinese marriage and family systems historically emphasized extended family
relations at the expense of the conjugal bond, and thus, parents are still an influential
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factor in marriage, marriage quality, and marital instability. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to examine whether “Western-style” factors of marital instability have indeed become
salient and important factors to Chinese couples, which would indicate a convergence
toward some aspects of the Western model of marriage and marital instability.

China: Structural Context

Socio-Political Systems
In China, the legal system is very closely related to and influenced by the
political system in that marital instability has not only been affected by law but also by
the ways the government and political authorities interpreted the law (Wang, 2001). For
many decades divorce was highly constrained by China’s extensive legal barriers which
tied couples to relationships (Whyte & Parish, 1984). Until the twentieth century,
Chinese women could not initiate divorce as it was prohibited by law and custom,
however husbands could divorce their wives using one of the “Seven Outs.” The “Seven
Outs” were grounds or cause for divorce. As Honig and Hershatter (1988) pointed out,
these grounds included: barrenness, wanton conduct, neglect of parents-in-law,
garrulousness (gossip), theft, jealousy, and incurable disease. In the event that a divorce
was granted by the state controlled legal system, the woman was left with only one
recourse. As she had no social position or resources, and any children born of the
marriage were awarded to the husband, her only recourse was to return to the home of
her parents (Honig & Hershatter, 1988).
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In 1921, the founders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) advocated the
liberation of women. But by 1930, their focus changed to rural organizing. Women’s
rights were subordinate to other CCP goals although the Party did succeed in bringing
women into the paid labor force (Honig & Hershatter, 1988). It was not until 1950 that
women obtained the right to request divorce and to choose their own marriage partners
via the Chinese Communist Party’s implementation of the new Marriage Law (Honig &
Hershatter, 1988). The CCP’s implementation of the new law was shaped by the need to
minimize conflict and maximize production. The CCP did not want to lose the support
of men and wanted to gain women’s contribution to socialist construction by working
(Honig & Hershatter, 1988).
In the 1950s, restraints governing divorces were loosened. According to Honig
and Hershatter (1988), the government used the ease of divorce to substantiate belief that
the new system offered more freedom. With the enactment of the new Marriage Law in
1950, large numbers of women used the opportunity to end their arranged marriages. It
should be noted that prior to the Communist Revolution in 1949, women were taught
from childhood that they were inferior to men and that they should sacrifice their own
interests for their families’ interests. After the Communist Revolution, for the females
who grew up in the 50s and 60s when women were said to be “holding up half the sky”
by the Communist party, gender equality meant assisting the careers of husbands and
sons while participating in the paid labor force (Honig & Hershatter, 1988). The ability
to end an arranged marriage was viewed as one of the measures used to liberate women
and encourage them to help build a new socialist society. However, as it turns out, in the
1950s the threat to the traditional family and marital structure was too great. Therefore,
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the state embarked on a specific program for reducing the divorce rate by terminating the
new Marriage Law (Goode, 1993; Honig & Hershatter, 1988).
By the 1960s and 1970s, the government once again tightened the regulations
governing divorce, making marital dissolution more difficult (Wang, 2001). In the
1980s, the legal system became independent from the Communist Party and rules for
divorce were liberalized, making divorce easier to obtain. The loosening of restrictions
against divorce once again resulted in increases in divorce (Wang, 2001). Honig and
Hershatter (1988) put forward that in the late 1970s, the Chinese reform movement once
again focused its attention on divorce. This time attention was centered on the
relationship between divorce and its connection with love, courtship, and extramarital
affairs. Attention also focused on criteria for divorce, ethics of divorce, and problems
with divorce. This renewed attention led to the enactment of a new marriage law. The
new Marriage Law of 1980 was different from the earlier 1950 law that mandated
mediation prior to a possible marital dissolution. The new law spelled out grounds for
divorce which included political differences as well as an absence of love and affection.
In cases where mediation failed, the law stated a couple should be granted a divorce.
Honig and Hershatter (1988) suggest several reasons that underlie the change in divorce
criteria. First, marital discord interferes with learning and work and is thus, harmful to
children, families, and society. Second, the changes to the law may have been part of the
attempt to dismantle the ideology of the Cultural Revolution. Third, the law could have
been part of an overall strengthening of the legal system which included the
transformation from a feudal family system to a system that protects its citizens. This
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was regarded as a major step toward the creation of a modern society (Honig &
Hershatter, 1988).
With the exception of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the
leaders of China emphasized family values that will enable the institution of the family
to persist and function in a manner which they regard as socially useful (Palmer, 1986).
With the post-Mao legal reforms of the late 1980s which granted women greater access
to divorce, women accounted for more than two-thirds of divorce applications (Bullough
& Ruan, 1994; Liu, 1992; Zhou, 1992).
Since the passage of the new Marriage Law of 1980, Palmer (1995) contends that
divorce has become a more frequent part of Chinese life, especially among urban
residents. Although gender equality is now a well-established feature of Chinese law, it
will be many years before one can assume that it has also become a compelling social
reality. In short, on the one hand, modern China family law has shown that it can
prescribe the forms of gender equality; on the other hand, the continued importance of
custom means that gender equality still has a way to go before it is fully practiced.
Explicated by Palmer (1995), there is ambivalence in official attitudes on many
issues of family law, including the attempt to reduce family size and the operation of
“freedom of divorce,” among other issues. In terms of “freedom of divorce,” the
Women’s Federation thought this development could be abused to discard old wives
(Palmer, 1995). The Party feared that women would again “rush to divorce” as they had
after the 1950 Marriage Law (Palmer, 1995, p. 123). During the mid-80s, Ren Jianxin,
President of the Supreme People’s Court, revealed the ambivalent attitude regarding
“freedom of divorce” as a welcomed step, however too many divorce petitions resulted
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from hasty marriages or from meddling third parties (Palmer, 1995). This ambivalence
was also reflected by authorities who encouraged remarriage or the restoration of
previously divorced couples. While the principle of “freedom of divorce” has been
ambivalent among officials, it also reflects a concern to control and use the family so
that it promotes the program of “modernization” to which China is now firmly
committed (Palmer, 1995).
Since the 1980 Marriage Law, people’s ideas were changing regarding family
relations, thus the need for revision was apparent. The Committee of Legislative Affairs
of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee put forward the proposed
Draft Revision of the Marriage Law in August 2000 (Beijing Review, 2001). The draft
of the new marriage law continues to incorporate the original Party idea of gender
equality and additionally attempts to improve the position of women in modern Chinese
society by protecting women’s rights.
The law added stipulations on bigamy, domestic violence, invalid marriages, and
a system of dividing a couple’s belongings. Divorce and protection of senior citizens’
rights and interests have been made more definite. The Draft revision of the Marriage
Law passed in 2001, since forth, it is referred to as the 2001 Marriage Law (Beijing
Review, 2001).
With regard to the section on divorce, the 2001 Marriage Law states that divorce
can be granted under the following conditions: 1) bigamy or cohabitation with another,
2) domestic violence, maltreatment or desertion, 3)gambling or drug addiction, 4)
separation for two years caused by incompatibility, and 5) circumstances causing
alienation of mutual affection. The 1980 Marriage Law stated that a divorce could be
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granted if mutual affection no longer exists. The 1980 law stated that the spouse of a
soldier had to get the soldier’s consent to divorce. The 2001 law added “except that the
soldier commits a serious fault” (All-China Women’s Federation, Marriage Law 2001,
Chapter IV, Article 33). The 2001 Marriage Law grants visitation rights for the noncustodial parent to visit his or her children. Further, the 2001 law states that … “if one
party performs more duties in rearing their children, looking after their elders and
assisting the other party in work, he or she shall have the right at the time of divorce to
request compensation from the other party who shall make the compensation” (AllChina Women’s Federation, Marriage Law, 2001). Omitted from the 1980 law is the
phrase that debts incurred separately by the husband or the wife shall be paid by the
party who incurred them (All-China Women’s Federation, Marriage Law, 2001).
With these changes, public perception regarding divorce has changed as well.
While the Chinese still respect their traditional doctrine and value peaceful coexistence
very much in married life (Linlin, 1993); they also believe that “a divorced woman now
is less likely to be regarded negatively; fewer and fewer people regard divorce as wrong”
(Zeng & Wu, 2000, p. 215). In 1991, respondents were presented with a survey question
of what a couple should do when they are emotionally incompatible.
“Eighty-four percent of young wives said the couple should
divorce or separate. Even among older wives, 67% said the couple
should divorce or separate. In short, across all age groups, most
people thought divorce or separation was an appropriate response.
… By the early 1990s, two-thirds of all young people – who were
the most likely to divorce – either thought that divorce could have
beneficial effects for the adults involved or were uncertain about
whether the effects would be positive or negative” (Tang &
Parish, 2000, p. 264-265).
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In short, public opinion regarding divorce has agreed with official policy.
Following a reversal in government policy and propaganda, public pressure to
remain married had weakened significantly by the 1990s. Socialist institutions
and ideals seem to have laid the groundwork for this change, although it was not
until the relaxation of administrative controls that the divorce rate exceptionally
increased (Tang & Parish, 2000).

Socio-Economic Transformations
Following the Communist victory in 1949, Mao believed that the mobilization of
an empowered people could be more effective than either technological advances or
innovative managerial styles. His strategy for economic development was successful.
The labor force increased rapidly using both a centralized and regional planning strategy.
By relying on the power of the people, Mao thought China could surpass major
industrialized countries in a short time. People were told that if everyone contributed,
China would make a great leap forward into Communism whereby no one would have to
worry about not having enough material goods. This movement, known as the Great
Leap Forward, included the recruitment of all able bodied women into the urbanized
labor force (Tang & Parish, 2000). In this sense, the Great Leap Forward produced
significant and long term impacts on Chinese urbanites, namely the achievement of
gender equality in paid work in urban China (Zuo, 2003).
In an attempt to keep socialism on a populist track, Mao’s Cultural Revolution
began in 1966 and ended in 1976. As a reaction against the inevitable bureaucratization
of the Soviet model of development, anything related to hierarchy and traditional
40

authority was attacked, including not only bureaucratic leaders and their organizations
but also Confucian values, literature, art - anything seen as impeding China’s march
toward a utopian revolutionary future (Tang & Parish, 2000). The Cultural Revolution
achieved many of its intended effects in the short run. It provided opportunities for
political newcomers; many blue-collar workers, peasants, and soldiers became top-level
managers resulting in greater upward mobility; and a high level of social and economic
equality had been achieved. However, these effects were not enough to prevent the
popular backlash against the hyper-politicized Cultural Revolution. In the long run, only
some legacies remain, “…including a longing for egalitarianism and the sense of
permanent loss among middle-aged people whose education and careers were sacrificed
on the altar of revolutionary utopianism” (Tang & Parish, 2000, p. 22).
In 1978, the China Communist Party’s decision to strive for economic
modernization paved the way for several stages of reform. Following a few years of
successful reform in agriculture, the party set into motion the urban reforms (19841989). The urban reform, known also as the second period of reform, led to sweeping
changes not only in enterprise structure, prices, finance, banking, housing, labor markets,
welfare, pensions, and wages, but also in the bureaucracy, polity, and mass media
availability (Tang & Parish, 2000).
In the third period of reform (1989-1992), state control of the economy was
strengthened and political freedom was weakened, thus, the period of post-Mao reform
(1992-1997) emphasized renewed efforts at market reform and political control (Tang &
Parish, 2000). Throughout the reform era Chinese urban life experienced many changes,
and is quite different now than it was even twenty years ago.
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Explained by Tang and Parish (2000), beneath the changes in political and
economic policy that helped define one era from another, lies another change that
substantially altered the nature of Chinese life for most people. In the 1950s, Chinese
planners created an urban labor aristocracy. Though urban worker salaries were highly
constricted, urban workers in the formal state sector had access to many subsidized
benefits, such as, almost cost-free housing, medical care, pensions, subsidized staples
that made urban incomes nearly double nominal take home pay (Tang & Parish, 2000).
In the mid to late 50s, peasants poured into the cities particularly during the 1958-61
Great Leap Forward when agriculture collapsed (Tang & Parish, 2000).
By 1958, planners passed a law establishing the “bamboo wall” separating those
of agricultural background and those of urban backgrounds. The background was
defined by one’s position in 1954 when the unified grain purchasing and marketing
mandate was enacted. If one was from the nonagricultural side of the bamboo wall, one
was entitled to several urban benefits, including attending urban schools, being part of
the urban job assignment process, subsidized housing, subsidized grain, and hardship
allowances (Tang & Parish, 2000). Typically those in the urban job assignment process
got a job in the state sector, which brought with it additional benefits as aforementioned
– free health care, disability insurance, pensions, and other allowances (Tang & Parish,
2000).
When Chinese planners realized the excessive expense of these entitlements,
several administrative adjustments were made. Tang and Parish (2000) point out the
following. First, starting in 1962 was the enforcement of the 1958 migration law, which

42

allowed migration into cities only after a long approval process. Very few people were
allowed to either move into cities or to gain urban entitlements. Second, starting around
1963 revenue was taken away from towns and small cities, forcing them to return to
nearly rural status. Because of 15 years of stagnation, by 1978, these cities were dreary
places with growing discontent among their inhabitants. Third, 16 million youth were
sent “down” to the countryside as youth unemployment began to be a problem by the
mid-60s. While this helped reduce the growth of urban expenses, the relocation of urban
youth angered many urban parents. Fourth, rural industrialization was encouraged so
that peasants would remain in their rural homes yet change occupations. By 1978,
public pressure to change these administrative measures was tremendous, particularly
toward the first three (Tang & Parish, 2000).
According to Tang and Parish (2000), migration was controlled via the 1958
migration law because China’s neighborhoods and work units were tightly organized
under the government. Every person was organized by neighborhood and each
neighborhood had a neighborhood committee and police office that worked closely
together. Each neighborhood committee had a residents’ council that supervised birth
control, cleaning the sidewalks, and mediating neighbor and family conflicts. Other
functions include taking care of the elderly without pensions, the sick, handicapped, and
mentally ill. Another important function was crime prevention (Tang & Parish, 2000).
In addition to neighborhoods, the work unit was very important in most people’s
lives since virtually all adult males and females work. Each work unit played a vital role
in almost every aspect of one’s life.
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It provided employment for offspring under the replacement
system (dinjti), medical insurance, labor protection, pension,
housing, and direct subsidies. The work unit acted as parent,
caretaker, mediator, and even matchmaker. During much of the
past several decades, it had not only assigned housing to its
employees, and provided gloves, hats, shoes, soap, meat, rice and
cooking oil, but also granted permission to get married, to get
divorced, and to have a child….Besides being an economic and
social unit, a work unit was also a political unit where government
policy was implemented, loyalty to the party was promoted,
political mobilization was carried out, public opinion was
collected, and voting took place (Tang & Parish, 2000, p. 29).
Living in cities was reserved for those who were legal members of a
neighborhood and work unit. Although in practice, due to the shrinking state budget,
rationing was gradually abandoned, the peasant markets returned to cities in the 1990s,
and citizens began living in cities without a legal permit. As officials either gave
temporary work permits or ignored what was going on, the bamboo wall was not so
closed (Tang & Parish, 2000). While the urban-rural barrier was officially in place, it
had begun to weaken (Tang & Parish, 2000)
Pursuant to the economic reform and rapid economic growth experienced by
China, many young adults found themselves hastily marrying in order to take advantage
of the availability for a state subsidized apartment (Wang, 2001). Extremely restricted
housing conditions and the lack of a viable housing market restricted the feasibility for
divorce.
With the development of a housing market in the 1980s, many people began to
consider a divorce as an option, since the availability of housing reduced their fears over
where to live after ending a marriage (Wang, 2001). Platte (1988) concurred and
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suggested that socioeconomic development could be expected to contribute to a rising
divorce rate in China.
The importance of work units began to fade as more state sector workers were
being laid off (Tang & Parish, 2000). Assuming continued growth of the private sector,
housing markets, socialized labor insurance and medical care, and multiple income
sources, the importance of work units should continue to decline, thus being a member
of the entitled urbanites no longer had the same meaning or importance it once did (Tang
& Parish, 2000).
Tang and Parish (2000) clarify that in Chinese cities, through the mid-1990s, the
male to female gap in non-farm jobs was minimal. Moreover, there is a new class of
private entrepreneurs and workers who are not dependent on the usual benefits from the
state. In order to create more employment opportunities, the private sector was restored
to legal status. These changes contribute to a radically different picture than existed
prior to 1978 when virtually the entire labor force was organized in state or collective
work units (Tang & Parish, 2000).
Tang and Parish (2000) predict that China’s private sector will grow and
transition from a socialist redistributive economy (an administratively determined
system) to a system that is market and class determined. The Chinese economy as a
socialist redistributive economy with an emphasis on strategies of equality can best be
described by Nee (1992):
“In a redistributive economy, central decisions distribute goods and
services through a vertical hierarchy (Polanyi, 1957). What characterizes
redistribution at each level of this hierarchy is the structured centricity of
economic transactions. Whether at the local, provincial, regional, or
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national level, the circulation of goods and services in a state socialist
redistributive economy involves complex resource transfers from the firm
to state agencies, which in turn allocate factor resources back to firms and
distribute output to consumers. Within this system, the redistributive firm
(whether a collective or a state-owned enterprise) operates as an
appendage of the state, responding to commands sent down from the
central ministry, provincial bureau, or local government” (Nee, 1992,
section The Marketized Firm).
If the prediction by Tang and Parish (2000) is realized, China will follow the path
taken by both Taiwan and South Korea in which an increasingly formalized private
sector overwhelmed what was once a dominant state-enterprise sector (Amsden, 1985;
Ranis, 1992).

Demographic Changes
China’s economic growth affected the population structure and family structure
which also influenced the rate of divorce in China (Wang, 2001). The 1960’s baby
boom increased the marriage eligible population; the 1980s were characterized by
increasing numbers of marriages and subsequently, divorces (Wang, 2001). With a
steady increase in the elderly population, there have been a number of remarriages, but
many of those marriages also end in divorce (Wang, 2001). Liao and Heaton (1992)
report that arranged marriages run a higher risk of divorce; they theorized that this is due
to the lack of an emotional base. However, when regional effects were explored by
Zeng, Schultz, Wang, and Gu (2002), they found that prior to 1985 in less developed
regions where arranged marriages and young marriages are more likely, higher divorce
rates were also found. However, after 1985, more advanced regions had the higher
divorce rate.
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Liao and Heaton (1992) report that higher divorce rates are observed among
younger women. Zeng, Schultz, Wang, and Gu (2002) found that women 15-19 years of
age had the highest divorce rates of any other age category. According to data collected
in the late 1980s (Wang, 2001), more than 60% of divorces were granted to people under
the age of 35; among those divorcing, most had been married less than six years. Zeng,
Schultz, Wang, and Gu (2002) found that the period of highest risk of divorce occurs in
marriages under 5 years in duration and the peak divorce rate occurs at the three year
point of marriage. Further, the average length of marriage duration for women who
divorce is 7.7 years. They theorized this is a consequence of a relaxed social, familial,
and legal atmosphere and childlessness (Zeng, Schultz, Wang, & Gu, 2002).
In terms of children, Zeng, Schultz, Wang, and Gu (2002) found that women
with no children have the highest divorce rate. The complete analysis revealed that the
more children a couple have, the lower the likelihood of divorce. They theorize that this
may be due to those in more stable marriages have more children or have them earlier in
the marriage. While the civil and legal authorities may be less inclined to grant a divorce
if the marriage has produced multiple children; another point is that marital difficulties
may be present prior to divorce resulting in a low frequency of intercourse or separation
thus result in a smaller number of children (Zeng, Schultz, Wang, & Gu, 2002). It
appears that the causation between fertility and divorce may not be clear, however the
association is strongly evident (Zeng, Schultz, Wang, & Gu, 2002). Another possibility
not mentioned by the authors is that couples with a greater number of children may have
fewer resources with which to seek a divorce or to thrive afterwards.
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Marital Instability and Resources in China
Tang and Parish (2000) summarized that under Soviet influence, China
established a system of bureaucratic organization in the 1950s. This centrally planned
economic system set economic development goals in five-year plans. It emphasized
heavy industry over light industry and industrial development over agriculture. The
majority of state investment went toward heavy industry, fuel industry, and the machine
building industry. Agriculture received only about one-twentieth of total capital
construction investment, thus most investment funds went into cities. As a result, the
country experienced increased industrialization, rapid economic growth, and burgeoning
economic opportunities in urban employment (Tang & Parish, 2000). Thus, there was
little reason to endure a bad marriage as families changed from economically producing
and consuming units to simply consumers (Adams 2004).
Vincent (2000) stated that the “family working in common” is disappearing,
leaving couples with “more brittle bonds” (p. 168). Toth and Somlai (2004) note that one
of the reasons for an accelerated divorce rate lies in economic changes, including
women’s entry into employment on a mass scale and social and geographic mobility.
Sheng (2004) states that as a result of the market economy in China, awareness of
independence among women, increasing social interaction, acceleration of employment,
and different values regarding divorce, had a place in the increasing divorce rate. Of the
couples that Zuo and Bian (2005) interviewed, over 75% were collectivized families, or
families working in common. In China, the state promoted move to near universal
employment undermined men’s traditional provider role and paved the way to women’s
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economic independence; however, lower wages created a mutual dependency of working
couples in their efforts to raise a family (Zuo & Bian, 2005).
Zeng, Schultz, Wang, and Gu (2002) also found that controlling for all other
factors, the risk of divorce for urban women is 48% higher than for their rural
counterparts. This can be understood from both social and economic aspects.
Customary Chinese tradition is weaker in urban areas where senior family members are
less likely to interfere in the divorce affairs of their junior family members (Zeng,
Schultz, Wang, & Gu, 2002). Women in urban areas are more likely to be more
economically independent than women in rural areas, and urban women generally have a
better capacity to survive after divorce and thus they are less likely to remain in an
unhappy marriage (Zeng, Schultz, Wang, & Gu, 2002). Platte (1988) reports similar
findings stating that urbanization can be expected to accelerate an increase in divorce in
China.
In a recent survey, the Shenyang Civil Affairs Bureau examined the city’s
marriage and divorce registrations over the past ten years (China Today, 2002). The
results indicate diverse reasons for divorce. With greater access to education and
therefore, higher income, more women are taking the initiative in suing for divorce.
Statistical data bears this out and indicates that China’s divorce rate has continued to
increase since a sharp rise in the 1990s. Consistent with explanations that suggest
women’s employment and equality promote divorce in market societies, (Cherlin, 1992;
Edwards et al., 1992) posits that socialist societies accelerate the tendencies toward
women’s employment and lower birth rates, freeing women from family dependency and
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giving them financial autonomy and the ability to abandon tortured marital relationships.
Interestingly, the majority of divorce court proceedings in China are instigated by
women (Bullough & Ruan, 1994; Linlin, 1993; Liu, 1992; Zhou 1992).
While some researchers have found no significant impact of education and
occupation on divorce (Liao & Heaton, 1992; Zeng, Schultz, Wang, & Gu, 2002), others
have found some evidence to support the idea that women with higher education,
especially those residing in urban areas, experience higher divorce rates (Liao & Heaton,
1992). However, according to the Beijing Review published in 1989, the highest divorce
rate is among people with lower educational levels (Linlin, 1993).

Marital Instability and Gender Relations in China
While trends in gender relations in socialist societies may be puzzling on the
surface, Tang and Parish (2000) argue that the underlying patterns are simple and
familiar ones. Once women gain near equality with men in the areas of education, work,
and income, and once rapidly falling birth rates reduce the burden of raising children,
what follows is a typical set of dilemmas for women in industrial societies. Women
experience a greater freedom of choice in marriage and marriage partners, greater
emphasis is placed on marital companionship, and husbands and wives exercise more
equality in their decision-making. At the same time, conflicts over household chores
increase. Marital satisfaction for some women declines and marriage becomes unstable
(Tang & Parish, 2000).
Tang and Parish (2000) suggest that in China, the legacy of socialism and its
emphasis on egalitarianism continued to improve women’s chances for equality in the
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areas of education, jobs, income, and the sharing of family chores. Further, they suggest
that women’s near income equality with husbands provides a bargaining leverage over
chores and family decision making. This near equality with men leads to a set of raised
expectations and additional assertiveness among women that contributes to a rising
divorce rate (Tang & Parish, 2000).
In terms of egalitarianism, Pimentel (2000) found that urban Chinese men and
women are happier in marriages when they have an egalitarian outlook. Chang (1999)
found that Chinese women are significantly more egalitarian than men in work and
family values. Being egalitarian in one area does not have to lead to egalitarian values or
behaviors in other domains (Chang, 1999), additionally, behaviors may not be consistent
with attitudes (Pimentel, 2006). Inconstancies of one’s own attitudes, behaviors, and
perceptions of fairness, compounded with inconsistencies of one’s spouse’s, may have
serious implications for marital instability.

Gender Roles
Lu, Maume, and Ballas (2000) stated that “urban Chinese husbands spend
significantly more time on household labor than rural Chinese husbands. Urban
husbands who contribute more household labor absolutely and/or relatively are those
with employed wives, those with higher education levels, and those whose earnings are
closer to their wives” (p. 210). Yet, the uneven distribution of household labor in urban
China has persisted (Honig & Hershatter, 1998; Whyte & Parish, 1984) although 90%
of married women are in the labor force and nearly equally share economic resources
with their husbands (Bian, Shu, & Logan, 2000; Wolf 1984). Wu (1987) found that 92%
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of men in their sample indicated that they wanted a wife who would be aggressive in her
career while 96% of the men also hoped for a virtuous wife who would do most of the
household chores. Zuo and Bian (2001) found that husband’s breadwinner role and
wife’s housekeeper role has retained its primary place in the family, thus enabling the
husbands to release the obligation to share housework equally, and the wives from an
equal responsibility of breadwinning. Also, through women’s household
responsibilities, they have power in the bargaining process, thus providing some women
incentives to maintain the unequal distribution of housework (Zuo & Bian, 2001).
Further, Pimental (2006) found that urban Chinese couples with nonegalitarian patterns
of decision making report significantly higher marital disharmony than couples with
integrated decision making.
Equity theory, rooted in resources and dependency models, focuses on rules of
economic exchange in the distribution of housework and decision-making.
Consequently, a wife’s greater dependence on her husband’s economic support allows
for the perpetuation of the unequal exchange relations in favor of the husband (England
& Kilbourne, 1990). An attempt to negotiate a more equitable division maybe countered
with the threat of divorce, which would be detrimental to the wife’s standard of living
(Zuo & Bian, 2001). Therefore, women who are more dependent on marriage tend to
view the distribution of housework and power as fair, and even appreciate when
husbands “help” with the chores (Lennon & Rosenfield, 1994). Subsequently, women
with greater independence may be more likely to divorce as opposed to women where
the husband has greater earnings, thus discouraging wives’ independence.
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Gender Beliefs
With the Maoist ideology requiring that both men and women work for equal
pay, the traditional ideology of male provider and female homemaker has been
transformed into a neo-traditional, post-revolutionary version whereby the husband is the
main provider and wife is the main homemaker (Zuo & Bian, 2001). “Husbands are
found to be more devoted to paid work than are their wives, although both spouses are
active in the labor market. Moreover, both wives and husbands prefer the husband to be
the main or obligatory provider and the wife to be a family-committed career seeker”
(Zuo, 2003, p. 314). Among the interviewees in Zuo and Bian’s (2001) study, both men
and women told stories about their friends, whose role reversal led to “marital conflict,”
“family disharmony,” and “divorce.”
In China, a women’s studies symposium concluded that “compared with men,
women face many more obstacles in becoming talented people. Including their
traditional thinking and habits; women’s psychological reliance on others, their narrow
mindedness, and their weaknesses; the burden of marriage, childbirth, and household
chores; and the gap between men and women in physique and intelligence” (Zhu, 1989,
p. 26). “At puberty, women were said to develop a ‘closed psychological aesthetic
structure’ of ‘self-appreciation’ that affects their thinking and intelligence and narrows
their horizons” (Pimentel, 2006, p. 345). While the validity of these assertions can be
questioned, nonetheless, these assumptions have serious consequences for the division of
labor, both inside the home and outside of it. Inside the home, women may be seen as
better suited for tedious, repetitive tasks, such as, housework (Pimentel, 2006). Outside
the home, women are often discriminated against in work allocations because of female
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inferiority, but also because of liabilities accompanying their gender, such as, maternity,
child care, and other household matters (Pimentel, 2006).
During the Mao era (1949-1976), the “same work, same pay” policy greatly
raised women’s social and economic standing relative to men’s (Tan, 1994). Thus, the
traditional female “virtuous wife and good mother” role was undermined by collective
ideologies and practices (Zuo & Bian, 2001, p. 1125). However, some wives are willing
to do more housework and forego their own career in support of their husband’s. While
this releases the wives of breadwinning responsibility, they also expressed a sense of
entitlement to their husband’s higher earnings and social status – “His money is my
money”; “his success is my success and reflects my contributions” (Zuo & Bian, 2001,
p. 1129).
Although Chinese wives continue to shoulder the majority of household
responsibility, few couples see it as unfair (Feng, Anderson, Wang, & Zhang, 1995;
Zheng, 1997). Zuo and Bian (2001) additionally found that while the uneven
distribution of housework did not invoke a sense of unfairness, the failure to perform
culturally prescribed roles did. Therefore, the work of a man of “failed aspirations” or
the work of a woman of “excessive” career orientation is viewed as a debt to their spouse
because they have breached gender boundaries (Zuo & Bian, 2001). Thus, men are
reluctant to participate in household work even if their breadwinner status has
diminished; by the same token working women assume a greater household workload
without feeling deprived (Zuo & Bian, 2001). Most women in Zuo and Bian’s sample
said that they did not expect their husbands to share chores with them equally, that
husband’s primary responsibility to family was through work outside the home, and that
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husbands who over-engaged in housework were seen as “unmanly” and “nonambitious”
(2001, p. 1127). According to the Chinese Women’s News (1986), nearly one half of the
women surveyed wanted men to share chores more and saw a more equal division of
labor as crucial for the development of equality between men and women (Pimentel,
2006).
Both marriage and having children remain nearly universal in China, despite
tremendous declines in family size (Banister, 1987), and that having children does affect
the marriage (Pimentel, 2000). For women, increased gender stereotyped behaviors and
interactions between the husband and wife yield greater marital discord as a result of the
presence of young children. Men, on the other hand, reported a decline in marital
closeness as they felt they lost their wives’ attention (Pimentel, 2000).

Taiwan: Cultural Context

Tradition
The population of Taiwan is relatively homogenous, mainly composed of Han
Chinese who migrated to Taiwan from mainland China in the 17th and 18th centuries
(Shen, 2005). Before becoming a Japanese colony in 1895 until the end of World War
II, Taiwan was one of China’s frontier provinces. The predominant Taiwanese
population is just one of many minor cultural variants of larger Chinese civilization. A
shared culture was strengthened after 1945, when the Japanese returned Taiwan to China
and even more so after 1949 when the National Party (Kuomintang, KMT) fled to
Taiwan. Along with the KMT was an accompanying influx of mainlanders from various
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parts of China. The changes resulting from the return of Taiwan to Chinese rule and the
end of the KMT included the reinforcement of an educational system in which Mandarin
was designated as the language of instruction and texts emphasized and celebrated
traditional Confucian values. While the Taiwanese educational system mirrored or
reflected China’s educational system, new settler elites also attempted to create a
uniform “national” Chinese culture (Wilson, 1970). The emphasis on traditional values
was supported through customary practices in Taiwan, such as school and media
emphasis of the Confucian values of family respect, elder honor, and respect for
authority.
Like its mainland counterpart, an ideological focus about moral human behavior
in historical Taiwan was filial piety (Slote & DeVos, 1998), which is the subordination
of a son to his father. This also applies to the emotional relationship of a son to his
mother, a daughter toward her parents, and of a daughter-in-law to her husband’s parents
(Slote & DeVos, 1998). Francis Hsu (1970) describes filial obligation as the most
important cultural ideal whereby support of the parents comes before all other
obligations, and it is not limited to economic support. For example, a son might take the
place of a parent who has gone to prison or a good son would not hesitate to think about
divorce if the parent was displeased with their daughter-in-law (Hsu, 1970). Filiality is
direct action toward a parent and the display of submission and nurturance to elders.
Moreover, filial piety encompasses a system of values that must be instilled in children
(Slote & DeVos, 1998). In traditional formal education, two texts are devoted
specifically to the instruction of children in the ways of filial piety. In addition, there are
countless references to these influential and widely distributed works in other children’s
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books, both traditional and modern (Slote & DeVos, 1998). Explicit education for
filiality is also found in proverbs, theatrical performances, songs, and even on temple
murals where moral heroes noted for filial piety are celebrated. The symbolism and
ritual associated with weddings and funerals stress filial obligations, as do individual and
collective rites to ancestors (Slote & DeVos, 1998).
While China and Taiwan share the same cultural ideals and traditions, Taiwan’s
divorce rate is higher than that of China’s. In the early 1900s, the high divorce rate in
Taiwan contrasts sharply with the low levels of divorce of other Chinese populations
(Freedman, 1966). Evidence suggests that divorce was rare or nearly nonexistent in the
areas/regions of Fukien and Kwangtung (Freedman, 1966). It is speculated that the high
divorce rate in the early 1900s in Taiwan may have been due, in part, to the influx of
men in the population via the entry of the KMT army, which also enhanced the
independence of women and increased their chances of remarriage (Freedman, 1966,
Guttentag & Secord, 1983). Additionally, Thornton and Lin (1994) noted that
matrilocal, uxorilocal, and minor marriage were common in the early 1900s.1 Since
these marriage forms were very susceptible to divorce, their prevalence may have
contributed to the high divorce rates of the early 1900s (Freedman, 1966; Pasternak,
1983; Wolf, 1975; Wolf & Huang, 1980; Thornton & Lin, 1994). Margery Wolf (1972)
points out that for matrilocal and uxorilocal marriages, the reasons for instability lay in
the extent to which they countered the entire thrust of traditional, normative patrilineal

1

Matrilocal marriage is when the groom lives with his wife’s parents. Uxorilocal marriage is
when a contract negotiates the husband’s responsibilities for parents-in-law, the number of
offspring to wife’s family line, and which of the husband’s rights to his paternal line will be
sacrificed. Minor marriage involves the adoption of a minor child as a future daughter-in-law by
the son’s parents.

57

orientation. Wolf and Huang (1980) suggest that minor marriages were susceptible to
instability because of the close association between the spouses in their years of
socialization as brother and sister.
The high rates of marital dissolution combined with the near universality of
marriage made remarriage both a common and rapid event among divorced or widowed
men and women during the colonial period of the early 1900s (Barclay, 1954; Barrett,
1985). Since remarriage rates for the divorced were very high, relatively little time was
spent divorced (Thornton & Lin 1994). Thornton and Lin (1994) noted that fully 42% of
the marriages in 1906 included either a bride or a groom who had been previously
married (Barclay, 1954). As a result, many people experienced what we now refer to as
blended families.

Foreign Influence, Individualism, and “Westernization”
Prior to industrialization, an individual’s beliefs and values were determined
largely by one’s local environment, specifically one’s family (Thornton & Lin, 1994).
Throughout an individual’s life, access to alternative ideas was greatly limited by the
restrictions of contacts with individuals and information outside the kinship network.
New ideas were both received and evaluated within the context of family. The family’s
monopoly on ideas and information was significantly altered in the 20th century in
Taiwan. Brought on by economic development, increased contact with outside cultural
influences bred an interest in individualism and Westernism which led to the
development of Taiwan’s impressive national system of transportation and
communication including railroads, highways, telephones, radio, television, magazines,
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and movies. The result of this transformation was that individuals were connected with a
network of information and ideas that could only partially be controlled by family
leaders (Thornton & Lin, 1994).
Contacts with the West, particularly with the United States, accelerated after
World War II. The result of that contact has exposed Taiwanese to many values
different from those predominant in Taiwanese society in the past. Thornton and Lin
(1994) posit that given the view of the West as a model to be emulated, Taiwanese
society has been open to the adoption of a wide range of Western cultural patterns. Out
of the infiltration of Western values in Taiwanese mass media, there grew a conflict
between filial piety and individual interest, in all strata of society. The real possibility of
evaluating and acting on one’s own desires emerged. The Western focus on individual
and private interests is at odds with historical Chinese/Taiwanese emphasis on the family
collective. The result of this conflict has been the incorporation of historical values
explicitly in the national school curriculum and in certain media programs (Thornton &
Lin, 1994).
From the new family ideas not previously emphasized in Taiwan there came a set
of alternative images and messages, and a new set of models of behavior that could be
adopted or balanced with the historical values (Thornton & Lin, 1994). The new models
of behavior probably validate behaviors concerning dating, forming relationships,
making decisions regarding marriage, and divorce.
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Taiwan: Structural Context

Socio-Political Systems
Although Taiwan was occupied by the Japanese from 1895 to 1945, many
propositions made their way from mainland China to Taiwan via the KMT as reform
platforms intended to raise the status of urban women. These reforms found their way
into the Family, Kinship and Succession Books of the 1931 KMT succession code
(Stacey, 1983). The succession codes adopted in Taiwan were a compromise between
western values and Confucian authoritarianism (Thornton & Lin 1994). However, they
reinforced male authority over matters of family (Thornton & Lin 1994). Following
World War II and the exodus of the Japanese, the Constitution of the Nationalist
Government of 1947 departed from Confucian tradition in many significant respects.
Women in Taiwan gained the right to vote, run for public office, inherit property, obtain
education, and to enter into contracts (Spahn, 1998). However, it is easy to see how
family law and civil codes reinforced male authority and patriarchy. Even under the
current Family Law of 2002, which regulates relationships in marriage and in the family,
patriarchal ideology continues to influence the family. Article 1123 states that each
house shall institute a head. Article 1124 states that the head of a house shall be elected
from among the community of the relatives. If there is no such election, the headship
shall fall on the person who is the highest in rank [of relationship]; or where the ranks
are equal, on the person who is senior in age. Where the person who is the highest in
rank [of relationship] or senior in age is unable or unwilling to manage the house affairs,
he shall designate a member of the house to act for him. Article 1125 states that the
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affairs of a house shall be managed by the head of the house, but he may entrust a part of
its affairs to be looked after by the members of the house (Civil Code Part IV Family,
2002).
During the 1990s, many social movement groups or “grassroots” networks have
become important social policy advocates (Peng & Wong, 2004). The interactions of the
state and its people in a new democratic politics have reshaped policy processes. For
instance, a landmark court decision in 1995 permits Taiwanese women the possibility of
retaining custody of their children following a divorce (Spahn, 1998, p. 3). Following
the court decision, the legislature amended the Civil Code to eliminate paternal
preferences in custody cases, and provided for equal distribution of assets in divorce
cases (Taiwan Report, U.S. Department of State, 1998; Spahn, 1998, p. 3). “Under the
prior Family Code law, a woman had no right to claim any property from her husband
and she lost the right for custody of her children in the event of a divorce. Other laws
forbid woman to file for a divorce without her husband's consent unless she could prove
his infidelity, or show evidence that she had been physically abused or provided
evidence that he had been charged and sentenced to a prison term of three years or
longer” (Taiwan Communiqué, 1995, 65 notes; Chen & Yi, 2004).
According to the statistics provided by the Judicial Yuan, among the divorce
cases in the family court, "desertion" cases remained the biggest category between 1997
and 2004. However, in 2005 and 2006, “other major cause” was the leader. In 2006,
1615 men and 1928 women filed for divorce using other major cause as their grounds;
2120 men and 875 women filed for divorce using desertion as their grounds; 33 men and
592 women filed for divorce using ill treatment by the other party as their grounds; and
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25 men and 299 women filed for divorce using sentenced to imprisonment as their
grounds. There has been a dramatic drop by women in using grounds of infidelity for
divorce. In fact, 19 men and 24 women used infidelity as their ground for divorce in
2006 (Judicial Statistics Yearbook, 2006). From 1997 to 2004, women were filing for
divorce more often than men, however in 2005 and 2006 slightly more men have filed for
divorce than women.

Socio-Economic Transformations
Taiwan’s economic development was government-directed and led by Japanese
political leaders who implemented a plan to transform Taiwan from a labor-intensive
agricultural economy to a prosperous, high-technology, industrialized society, which
largely succeeded (Goode, 1993; Thornton & Lin, 1994). This plan of industrialization,
initially implemented to promote the production and export of sugar and rice, included
improvements of agricultural techniques, building factories to transform raw materials
into products needed in Japan, extending and upgrading education to create a more
effective work force, and making shipping and transportation more efficient. While the
Japanese were focused on economic exploitation and political control, they had no
interest in improving the lives of the local inhabitants. In order to reach their economic
goals, they created new jobs and skills, new social and economic opportunities, and
widespread education. The plan of industrialization also embodied a new set of social
patterns: hiring, promotion, and mobility came to be determined by competence and
ability rather than family affiliation. As people became more dependent on jobs, more of
the economic rewards went to the individual rather than directly to the family. Under the
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traditional system, almost all economic opportunities had been in the hands of the family
elders, but with the implementation of this new system, the family elders lost some
power over the rising generation (Goode, 1993). Thus, it seems plausible that the
divorce rate was at least partially influenced by weakening familial controls under the
old family system.
Lin’s thesis (1995) cited by Tang and Parish (2000), states that after so many
Japanese-owned enterprises in Taiwan left with the Japanese after World War II,
publicly owned state enterprises dominated the Taiwanese economy in the 1950s. The
private sector began to outpace the public sector with the implementation of more
relaxed policies and the implementation to export-led development in the 1960s. The
private sector was dominated by small informal enterprises with frequent openings and
closings, although a few enterprises became larger and began to take on more formal
characteristics (Lin, 1995). The Taiwan economy was able to respond rapidly to changes
in international market demand because of its flexibility in production and ability to
increase supply, thereby producing one of the highest economic growth rates in the
world. As a result, many people went from farmer to urban worker to entrepreneur
within a generation. Although the state sector was supplying the vital oil, petrochemical,
cement, and other products consumed by the informal, small-scale sector, it became less
important in the total economy (Tang & Parish, 2000).
The government’s previous educational policy redesigned the education system
to facilitate industrial development. Academic curriculum was extended in early
education, and emphasis on high-level vocational training in secondary and higher
education provided manpower for the shift to more complex technologies (Thornton &
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Lin, 1994). With high levels of urbanity for jobs and education, both males and females
were qualified to assume new jobs in manufacturing and other sectors in an expanding,
export-led economy (Tang & Parish, 2000). The Taiwan data collected by Tang and
Parish (2000) is consistent with a labor force that puts less emphasis on seniority and
more on education and skills. Additionally, mobility could occur by working inter-firm
or inter-organizations, or people could exit jobs for entrepreneurship. At the onset of a
person’s career, over half of new job entrants were in white-collar jobs. The split
between blue- and white-collar remains largely constant until blue-collar workers began
to leave the labor force in their late fifties (Tang & Parish, 2000).
In the 50s and 60s, young, unmarried Taiwanese women worked but they quit and
returned home when they married and had young children. When the children were
older, women returned to the labor force, often in less well-paid jobs (Tang & Parish,
2000). Taiwan attempted to overturn this pattern because Taiwan’s small firms were
highly labor-intensive and employers were exhausting the supply of males and single
females. Therefore, greater flexibility in work demands and work hours became
prevalent in Taiwan and this was complemented by relatively weaker patriarchal values
in the family (Brinton, 2001). By the early 1980s employers had turned to married
women to staff stores and factories, although there were always sharp discrepancies
between single and married women’s labor force participation. In 1990, 90% of single
women worked; upon marriage the rate decreased to 45% (Tang & Parish, 2000).
Although patriarchal values were weakened, their presence was still known. Married
women were much less involved in the labor market for two primary reasons. First,
traditional cultural influences privileged family and childrearing roles. For many women,
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these roles included devoting themselves to their children, husband, and parents-in-law.
Second, many employers avoided hiring women because they perceived the employment
of women as less cost-effective. Specifically, employers believed women employees
represented additional health costs and a loss of labor. Employers wanted to avoid
perceived health costs related to maternity and child care. Additionally, competing
family demands might mean that women would spend less time or have less energy in
their jobs creating a loss of labor for the employers.
As Thornton and Lin (1994) point out, the many social and economic changes
modified family life through the proliferation of social structures outside the family.
Moving from a system whereby a person’s life course is managed within kinship groups
to one where individual experience is carried out within a broad range of social
institutions has substantial implications for the structure of personal interrelationships
and processes. Many fundamental individual activities have been shifted from familial
settings to other social institutions. Thornton et al. (1994) state that the Taiwanese now
spend a smaller fraction of their time in family activities with people who are relatives,
receive a smaller fraction of their information and ideas from family members, and
experience the authority of family leaders alongside that of organizations outside the
family. It may be argued that economic development and subsequent growth resulted in
a decline in extended kin groups influence on behavior.
National social and economic policy proved very proficient in addressing many
formidable issues facing Taiwan in order to create a volatile international economic
environment (Thornton & Lin, 1994). These successes, however, also brought forth
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many issues associated with rapid industrialization, such as increases in crime, traffic,
and higher divorce rates.

Demographic Changes
From 1990 to 2000, the proportion of three or more generation households in
Taiwan has declined from 25.1% of all households to 16.4% (Peng & Wong, 2004). At
the same time, the number of single person households has increased from 12.2% to
18.9% in those ten years, suggesting an erosion of traditional living arrangements
wherein elderly people live with and are cared for by their adult children (Peng & Wong,
2004).
Women are also having fewer children. The Taiwanese focused on transforming
itself “from a high-fertility, agricultural society with a small proportion of highly trained
people to an urban economy with advanced industries and infrastructure, a highly skilled
work force, and a comfortable and rapidly growing level of income. Fertility dropped
sharply from the late 1950s to the late 1980s, while expectation of life and other
measures of health continued to improve” (Thornton & Lin, 1994, p. 87). Although
fertility showed decline in the early 1950s, there was a remarkable decline after the
introduction of an island-wide family planning program in 1964 pursuant to interest in
limiting family size and acceptance of contraceptives (Thornton & Lin, 1994). Social
and economic transformations have been so rapid in Taiwan that it is likely that fertility
eventually would have declined with or without a family planning program, however
without the program, the fertility decline would have proceeded more slowly (Thornton
&Lin 1994). Because most couples have only two or three children and the first born
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occurs soon after marriage; childbearing tends to happen in a short time period following
marriage (Thornton & Lin, 1994). The concentration of small numbers of births in short
time periods means that the potential for volatility is greater (Thornton & Lin, 1994).
There was a long-term decline in voluntary marital disruption (divorce or
separation not as a result of death of a spouse) which extended from the beginning of this
century through the end of the 1960s. Goode (1993) suggests that the reduction in
divorce rates were a consequence of dramatic political and economic change that
undermined the existing family patterns that had been generating high divorce rates.
More specifically, the reduction of divorce during the first half of the twentieth century
may have been related to the decline in matrilocal, uxorilocal, and minor marriage during
those years (Barclay, 1954; Wolf & Huang, 1980). In the late 1920s and 1930s, young
marriageable graduates of the Japanese schools became able to resist their parents’
arrangements for minor marriage because the changes initiated by the Japanese gave
young people skills to take advantage of opportunities and to make an independent living
(Goode, 1993). During this time, the percentage of young men who had a betrothed
adopted sister had not decreased by much, but the number of such marriages that
occurred began to decrease. By the 1950s this form of marriage, minor marriage, had
become uncommon, and a far higher percentage of couples had some voice in the choice
of their spouse (Goode, 1993). Matrilocal and/or uxorilocal marriage decreased as well.
With the development of education, jobs, and general economic expansion, more young
men could afford to avoid the onerous terms of an uxorilocal marriage (Goode, 1993).
While matrilocal, uxorilocal, and minor marriages created stress for the couple
and were susceptible to divorce, the reduction of these types of marriages may have
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contributed to the reduction in divorce (Thornton & Lin 1994). Yet Goode (1993)
argued that the divorce rates in Taiwan were reduced because the socioeconomic
development undermined the existing family patterns that had been generating high
divorce rates, thus providing some explanation for the decrease in these forms of
marriages.
The long-term decline in voluntary marital dissolution which extended from the
beginning of this century through the end of the 1960s was reversed in the early 1970s
and divorce increased rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s (Thornton & Lin 1994). In the
two decades following 1970, the marital divorce rate tripled, across all age groups
(Thornton & Lin 1994).
The increasing trend toward divorce reduced the importance of remarriage. Lee,
Thornton, & Lee (1994) cite the Ministry of the Interior’s report (1980, 1990) to show
that by 1979, the number of marriages in which one partner had been previously married
had dropped to 7%, although the subsequent increase in divorce expanded this number to
11% by 1989. As a result of this long-term change in remarriage, there are now many
fewer reconstituted or blended families than in the early 1900s where 42% of marriages
involved at least one person who had been previously married (Thornton & Lin, 1994).
By 1990, at least 3% of all men and women between the ages of 30 and 50 were
divorced (Thornton & Lin, 1994).

Marital Instability and Resources in Taiwan
As discussed earlier, Taiwan experienced changes in family life as a result of
economic development. These changes include: increased number of jobs outside the
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family, mobility based on achieved characteristics, broadened formal education,
increased urbanization, increased income and material rewards, more participation in
mate selection, and higher levels marital instability (e.g., divorce). These changes affirm
the common dimensions of the effects of large-scale economic and social changes on
family structure and relationships (Thornton & Fricke, 1987).
Female jobs in the Taiwanese labor market consisted mostly of small, weakly
regulated firms which lead to female income inequality (Tang & Parish, 2000). Women
occupy half of all secretarial jobs and similar pink-collar clerical work, such as sales,
service, and the professional/technical jobs involved with human services (nurses,
teachers, etc). Compared with China, in all occupations but pink-collar jobs, women in
Taiwan are less likely to make up a higher percentage of workers in an occupation. In
addition to married Taiwanese women dropping out of the labor force, thus not being
proactive about careers, those in the pink-collar jobs are competing among themselves
for the same jobs, thus lowering the pay. The lower rates of pay of women led to
husband and wife income disparity. The mean gender earnings ratio between 1978 and
1992 continues at 65% despite improvements in women’s skills and educational
attainment relative to men’s (Zveglich, Van der Meulen, & Rodgers, 1997). Wives in
Taiwan have significantly smaller income shares as compared to their Chinese
counterparts as well (Tang & Parish 2000). According to resource theory those with
greater resource discrepancies would tend to have greater marital instability and increase
the likelihood of divorce. Also, those with greater resources may use their economic
advantage to secure decision-making authority, avoid household labor, and discourage
spouse’s independence. On the other hand, as the amount of resources attained by
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women reach the same levels as that of their husbands, inequity in power and housework
will disappear (Zuo & Bian, 2001).
If market societies accelerate the tendencies toward women’s employment and
lower birth rate, then it would be expected that this explanation is consistent with those
that suggest women’s employment and greater equality promote divorce in market
societies (Cherlin, 1992; Edwards et al., 1992). While women’s resources have
increased in Taiwan, they are certainly a far cry from being equal to men.
Goode (1993) suggests that processes of industrialization will likely reduce the
divorce rate in a high-divorce-rate system but that eventually the rate should rise again as
socioeconomic development proceeds. Consistent with Goode’s prediction, the decline
in the divorce rate in Taiwan continued for some decades, but by 1975, the increase in
divorce had begun and it has continued to climb. Thornton and Lin (1994) found that for
every year between 1970 and 1989, the primary years for the upswing in divorce, the rate
of voluntary marital dissolution was strongly related to residential location. However,
their analysis could only explain a small proportion of the overall increase in divorce. It
was during these years that all areas of Taiwan were being drawn into a more
metropolitan world which would include changes that could help to explain increases in
divorce (Thornton & Lin, 1994).
Couples living in Taiwan’s major cities divorced at a rate 58 to 85% higher than
the rates for people living outside the major urban areas (Thornton & Lin, 1994).
Researchers also found that the increase in divorce in metro areas was similar to the
increase in divorce in non-metro areas in that both were substantial. Therefore, the
analysis revealed that the shift from non-metro to metro residence can only explain a
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small proportion of the overall increase in divorce. Nevertheless, these findings are
consistent with Goode’s assertion that increasing rates of divorce are the consequence of
greater economic affluence, increased urbanization, and increases in migration to cities
and the simultaneous decline in extended kin group influence (Goode, 1993). Thus,
these changes converge to weaken marital stability and increase the likelihood of
divorce.

Marital Instability and Gender Relations in Taiwan
Many notable changes pertaining to gender inequality have taken place over the
past century in Taiwan: women’s income and educational attainment have steadily
increased, more women have increasingly participated in the paid labor force (Chou,
1994; Lu, 1984; Tsai & Yi, 1997; Xu & Lai, 2004), and both men and women, especially
the younger generation, have gradually moved away from Confucian family values
(Chia, Allred, & Jerzak, 1997; Farris, 1994; Tsai & Yi, 1997). As Taiwanese women
become less traditional in gender beliefs than Taiwanese men (Xu & Lai, 2004), they are
more likely than their male counterparts to report higher levels of marital instability.
Like Western industrialized societies, gendered domestic behaviors have also begun to
alter toward gender egalitarianism, albeit at a slow pace.

Gender Roles
According to the Report on Women’s Status in Taiwan (1998), the amount of
time women spend on housekeeping is five times what men spend and about 34% of
married women quit their jobs to take care of their families (Frontier Foundation 1999).
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However, Xu and Lai (2004) found that the gendered division of domestic labor across
gender is statistically insignificant for marital discord (i.e., instability). With regard to
decision-making power, egalitarian marital power was found to be negatively related to
marital discord and that there was no substantial difference across gender (Xu & Lai,
2004). In another study, it was found that overall the wife’s higher education was an
important determinant in her sole or joint decision-making power. Moreover, the wife’s
higher level position of employment increased her likelihood of making sole or joint
decisions as well (Xu & Lai, 2002). However, through comparative resource analysis
the same study also reported that the husband’s advantages in occupation and education
tip marital power to his favor (Xu & Lai, 2002). Xu and Lai (2002) also found that
Taiwanese husbands are more likely to share power with their wives if the decisions are
traditionally within wives’ realms and less likely if the decisions are customarily made
by men. While Xu and Lai (2002) argued that marital power in Taiwanese marriages is
in transition, Yi and Yang (1995) concluded that marital power in Taiwanese marriages
is increasingly negotiated with an apparent gradual shift toward egalitarianism. In light
of the degree in which traditional Confucian ideals permeate Taiwanese society, these
findings are quite remarkable (Xu & Lai, 2002).
Many family scholars contend that women’s greater accessibility to education,
work, income, and lower birth rates have, to a certain extent, reduced the burden of
raising children, freed women from family dependency and given them greater financial
autonomy as well as the ability to abandon tortured marital relationships (Cherlin, 1992;
Edwards et al., 1992). However, in the case of Taiwan, equality has yet to be seen. The
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Report on Women’s Status in Taiwan (1998), reported that even in those occupations in
which women are the majority, such as the service industry and administrative staff, on
average men earn about ten thousand dollars more than women, and the gender gap is
even bigger for those who have a low educational level (Frontier Foundation, 1999). In
spite of these gender inequalities, Xu and Lai (2002) suggested that wives use their
resources they bring into the family as a pathway to their own autonomy and
independence.

Gender Beliefs
According to Xu and Lai’s recent study (2004), the direct effects of gender
beliefs on marital discord are statistically insignificant for both married men and women.
In more traditional societies such as Taiwan, married women’s gender beliefs have little
impact on their marriage quality directly regardless of whether they endorse
egalitarianism or not. Because of the dominant patriarchal family relationships, women
may have lower expectations to fulfill (Xu & Lai, 2004).
Peng and Wong (2004) reported that the divorce rate in Taiwan rose from 14% in
1980 to 23.8% in 2000. They attribute this increase to changes in public attitudes toward
marriage and divorce, particularly among younger people, as well as attitudes regarding
the burden of familial care in the case of divorce among older couples (Peng & Wong,
2004). Marriage rates have declined from nearly universal marriage at the beginning of
the last century to many spending a significant part of their adulthood as single persons
at the end of the century (Xu & Lai, 2004). Chen and Yi (2004) observed that in
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Taiwan, on average, married women preferred four children in 1965 but twenty years
later, this number decreased to 2.4. Likewise, the preference for sons also decreased
(Chen & Yi, 2004).
Another shift in attitudes regarding gender relations is that the employment rate
among married women in Taiwan has risen, indicating that attitudes about gender
relations in the household and gender relations to the labor market may have changed, but
to what degree is unclear. As stated earlier, women earn much smaller income shares
than their male counterparts despite improvements in women’s skills and educational
attainment relative to that of men (Zveglich, Van der Meulen, & Rodgers, 1997).

South Korea: Cultural Context

Tradition
In traditional Korean society, men and women married as a way of continuing the
patrilineal family line and to obtain a daughter-in-law to serve the parents (Song &
Moon, 1998). The main purpose of marriage was to benefit the family, specifically the
husband’s family. Under the influence of Confucianism, the role of mothers was highly
regarded and rewarded. Women were valued for their capacity to produce sons. This
emphasis on producing heirs and successful descendents directed women to focus their
attention on their husband’s family and lineage (Song & Moon, 1998). Therefore, as
marital dissolution was primarily related to ancestors, parents, or members of the family,
as opposed to the personal relationship between a husband and his wife which was of
secondary importance (Iu, 1982). In traditional Korea prior to the 20th century, most
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divorces were initiated by the husband’s family, effectively giving the right of divorce
solely to men. There were several sanctioned reasons, referred to as the Seven Deadly
Sins that a husband could use to expel his wife. These included (1) failure to perform
filial duties to parents-in-law, (2) failure to produce a son, (3) infidelity, (4) jealousy, (5)
chronic illness, (6) garrulity, and (7) a habit of theft (Bae, 1973). Among these, a
rebellious attitude of a woman toward parents-in-law or childlessness was generally
considered to be the most serious offense (Rhee, 1998).
According to Kendall (1996), the psychocultural dynamics of the Confucian
family lies neither in the complex interaction between the authoritarianism of the three
bonds (ruler over minister, father over son, and husband over wife) nor the benevolence
of the five relationships (father-son, ruler-minister, husband-wife, old-young, and friendfriend) but in the complex interaction of the two, namely the particular pattern of
authority informed by hierarchy, age, and gender. The family has been perceived by the
Confucian state as a vitally important political unit. Although the pattern of domination
underlying the three bonds has lost much of its persuasive power, the significance of
hierarchy, age, and gender in family ethics remains important (Kendall, 1996). As a
religion in Korea, Confucian teachings which fused with Buddhism and Taoism,
included the ideals that every man had his place, human beings were not inherently
equal, and in order for society to be stable there must be harmony (Koo & Nahm, 1997).
According to Armstrong (2002), during the Chosen dynasty (1392-1910), Korea was the
most thoroughly Confucianized state in Asia, surpassing Japan, Vietnam, and perhaps
even China itself in its adherence to Confucian institutions, rituals, and values.
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Foreign Influence, Individualism, and “Westernization”
Social and cultural changes in South Korea have led to conflicts between
traditionalism and modernization. Traditional South Korean culture emphasized
“wholesome family rituals” which were long a matter of state policy and government
directive. Rites and issues of morality have long been considered an appropriate concern
of the state (Kendall, 1996, p. 81). This has given rise to much anguish and turbulence
due to conflicts emerging from the rise in industrialization. In order to understand the
causes of these conflicts, a brief address of Korea in recent times is prudent. Korea was
liberated from Japanese colonialism in 1945, then divided by two occupying armies of
the United States and the Soviet Union, and then devastated by the Korean War (19501953). Following the war, South Korea was an impoverished rural society for two
decades. The promise of industrialization in the 1960s drew numbers of people to the
labor force. The political regime initiated an ambitious five-year plan that would
ultimately result in Korea’s success in an industrial market. During this “development”
stage, occupying America was not only seen as military support and foreign aid, but was
also the bearer of cultural influences (Kendall, 1996). This was a time in which much
social phenomena, from worker’s rights to women’s status were open to public
discussion, and Korea’s success was mounting. The 1980s was a decade marked by
prosperity, consumerism, and intense national pride. This, in turn, led to the questioning
of whether the pursuit of economic stability and comfortable standard of living, cost
Korea too much of their own heritage having been surrendered or corrupted by Western
influences (Kendall, 1996).
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Popular sentiment in South Korea seems to be changing. The Korean War and
Cold War generations remain anti-communist, anti-North Korea, anti-Japan, and pro-US;
this is in opposition to the post-democracy generation which is ambivalent about North
Korea, Japan, and skeptical of the US (Lie & Park, 2006). Younger South Koreans’
sense of national pride is quite different from earlier generations. The post-Cold War
generation is quickly becoming the dominant force, a group that has not known bonechilling poverty or war scars but that takes prosperity and democracy for granted (Lie &
Park, 2006).
Along with affluence, democracy, technology, and media saturation has come the
de-traditionalizing of the Korean family. The fertility rate has lowered significantly
while the mortality rate is rising, and the divorce rate has escalated so much in the last
decade that South Korea’s divorce rates now surpass European Union countries and
Japan (Lie & Park, 2006). This transformation hints at the challenges of a postindustrial, post-democratic society.
Newspaper editorials and personal accounts of the early 20th century suggest that
divorce and marriage based on free choice provoked intense anguish among kin (Kim,
1977; Pahk, 1954; Kendall, 1996). Perhaps this is because “match-made” versus “for
love” marriages are more or less serious rituals of negotiation to demonstrate the power
of family rights over the person concerned (Kendall, 1996). In other words, arranged
marriages are negotiated events in which familial power is exercised, whereas marriages
of individual choice are void of familial power and influence. The intersection of
traditional ideas about women and marriage with modernization and its emphasis on
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individualism are competing.

For example, men value “beauty” in a wife, whereas

family traditionally has not, and the wise mother, good wife, the most important criterion
ever in the 1960s, has lost her popularity (Kendall, 1996).
The divorce rate in Korea has been steadily rising over the last decades (Lee,
1988). Growing economic independence of women, the growth of individualism, and
the decline of traditional collective values appear to contribute to the rising divorce rates
in Korea (Song & Moon 1998). This is similar to the assessments offered by Tang and
Parish (2000), Thornton et al. (1994), and Wang (2001) regarding foreign influence as it
pertained to China and Taiwan, respectively.

South Korea: Structural Context

Socio-Political Systems
Other than Taiwan, few places in the world can match South Korea for the speed
and depth of political and social change in recent decades. South Korea underwent a
dramatic transformation from military government to civilian democracy after nearly
forty years of virtually continuous authoritarian rule, punctuated by brief moments of
democratic upheaval. The democratic breakthrough of the 1980s shows signs of
permanence. Ten years of democratization has not only transformed political leadership,
but also has nurtured a vibrant, active set of civic associations, independent from and
often critical of the ruling government. These types of civic associations constituted
what many Koreans called “civil society,” often seen as the key element of Korea’s
maturing democracy in the 1990s (Armstrong, 2002).
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“Throughout the 1990s, South Korea witnessed the growth of
intermediate, voluntary associations which influence the political process
but are not of it: citizens’ groups, environmental movements, religious
organizations, new kinds of student, worker, and farmer organizations, and
the movement for local political autonomy – in short, the general
emergence of new and diverse forms of association in a revitalized ‘public
sphere’” (Armstrong, 2002, p. 2-3).

The closest comparable case is Taiwan, which shares many striking parallels with
South Korea. Both societies had similar timing in their “democratic breakthroughs” in
the late 1980s after decades of authoritarian rule. They each had rapid economic
development in the 1970s and 1980s, a large and highly educated middle class, a
proliferation of social associations that have emerged with democratization, and a
Confucian cultural heritage (Armstrong 2002).
Emerging out of Japanese colonialism in the late 1940s, Armstrong (2002) posits
that South Korea was determined to construct a strong state as an answer to foreign
domination, military weakness, and economic “backwardness.” However, a road block
to the state’s goal of economic growth was the country’s inability to absorb or suppress
civil society. The limits of the authoritarian state in South Korea allowed civil society,
however constrained, to develop in opposition to the state, which eventually led to the
authoritarian state’s demise. The relative strength of the state has continued to lessen
since the late 1980s in relation to social forces, as the Republic of Korea has been
weakened both by democratic pressure from within and by the demands of globalization
from without. South Korea became a democracy in 1993 but only after the upheaval of
revolution, war, division, decades of military dictatorship (1961-1987) and sharp
political struggle (Armstrong, 2002).
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After South Korea’s independence from Japanese rule, the state introduced
“legal” equality between the sexes in their constitution. This constitutional guarantee,
however, has not produced enhanced social status (Park, 1993). The Korean Civil Code
was enacted in 1958 and has been revised several times since then. Originally, property
law and family law were within one civil code. When the Civil Code was enacted,
legislators were conscious of creating a code that differed from the Japanese Civil Code
which had been in effect since 1912. Additionally, the Civil Code was also created with
a family-centered, agricultural economy in mind as the model of society (Kim, 2000).
The state failed to respond promptly to the changes in Korean society as rapid
industrialization developed into the current society, and instead dealt with the changes
piecemeal (Kim, 2000). Although the Code was based in individualism like the
Japanese Civil Code, the state created a code that embodied the traditional spirit of
community and achieved originality for the Korean legal culture (Kim, 2000).
An amendment to the Korean Civil Code separated property law and family law.
This was due to the patriarchal content and was thus contrary to the spirit of gender
equality. In addition, there had been strong demands from women’s organizations (Kim,
2000). Family law was amended in 1962, 1977, 1990, and most recently in 2005.
Family has contained many male-dominant provisions in marriage, divorce, and
inheritance. The 1977 version of the law maintained the patrilineal family system
designating the eldest male as the head of the family, regardless of age (Park, 1993). In
other words, a two-year old boy could become the head of a family. The law also
defined relationships with husband’s and wife’s families and limited a wife’s role in
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adoption proceedings, parental authority, division of property, and divorce. In 1987,
thousands of Confucian protesters gathered at the National Assembly to oppose another
revision of the Family Law Bill that was supported by the Women’s Union for Family
Law Revision (Bedeski, 1994). However, the 1990-91 law was revised and it permits a
woman to claim a share of the property according to her contribution in gaining the
property, and to claim custody of children, which used to be awarded automatically to
the husband (Park, 1993). The 2005 revision abolished the male-oriented family
registration system which allows only men to head households. Further, a child may
now adopt his or her mother’s name or step-father’s name in the case of remarriage
(Korea Times, 2005).
The origins of the Korea Civil Code reflect Korean society as an agricultural
economy with a patriarchal family system. As a result of economic development in the
mid 1960s, the Korean society transformed itself into an industrialized, urbanized, and
nuclear family system. In political aspects, the authoritarian military regime has
changed into a democratic civilian government which improved the guarantee of human
rights and allowed citizens to more freely engage themselves in activities in various
spheres (Kim, 2000). While this may appear to signify a victory for women, the nearly
five decades of struggle indicates a strong legacy of Confucianism.
In terms of divorce, Kendall (1996) points out that the husband-wife relationship
is contractual, therefore, revocable (unlike the ruler-minister or father-son relationship).
The Confucian believers acknowledge divorce as an unhappy eventuality in some
marriages. Confucius himself is said to have divorced (or separated from his wife) three
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times. Rules for or against divorce are specific and based on social conventions
designed to preserve family harmony (Kendall, 1996). In the judicial system in Korea,
Rhee (1998, p. 157) cites Lee (1988) as stating “…a divorce can be affected only
through mutual agreement between the husband and wife or lawsuit of one party against
the other on grounds of a legal cause for divorce.” This means that in order for a divorce
to be in effect, it is essential to show a mutual consent to divorce by the two parties or
the legitimate cause for divorce such as an act of infidelity or spousal maltreatment
(Rhee 1998).
However, Song and Moon (1998) state that the underlying family relationship in
contemporary Korean society is still characterized by a tradition of male dominance in
which the husband leads and the wife follows. For instance, institutionalized
discrimination against women creates barriers for them to divorce. These barriers
include issues regarding the division of property, nonexistence alimony even when the
wife has no marketable skills, and perhaps most importantly, legal and physical child
custody arbitrarily awarded to the father. Each of these reflects the tradition of the
patriarchal family and marital structure (Song & Moon 1998).

Socio-Economic Transformations
Since 1945, South Korea has become highly industrialized. By concentrating on
an export driven strategy, South Korea was able to rebuild following a war-torn
infrastructure. While there is a great deal of government ownership of the infrastructure,
such as rail, power, and steel, the South Korean economy is a capitalist economy (Koo &
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Nahm, 1997). It was the combination of a strong state and market forces that pushed
South Korea’s economy forward. The insecurity of poverty, military insecurity, and
insecurity of national identity were the driving forces (Bedeski, 1994). South Korea’s
extensive international trade amounts to 75% of the gross national product (Koo &
Nahm, 1997). Starting in 1962, the political regime initiated ambitious five-year
development plans that transformed South Korea into an industrial market within three
decades (Kendall, 1996).
The maturing of the developing economy was not without difficulties. In
addition to inflation and instability, social welfare was largely ignored until the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the isolation of North Korea (Bedeski, 1994). The collapse of
the Soviet Union strengthened the argument that market economies, not rigid central
planning which were subject to political changes, were the key to prosperity (Bededki,
1994). In 1989, President Roh Tae Woo declared an imbalanced tax system to alleviate
the loss of competitiveness that was a product of wage increases (Bedeski, 1994),
making income inequalities a blatant reality.
After the 1980s, in order to overcome being caught in the middle of advanced
industrial economies and the new tiers of export economies, large-scale manufacturing
firms strove to move up the technological ladder in world production. Escalating wage
costs and the growing power of trade unions in Korea were major contributing factors to
the capitalists’ endeavor to move beyond the low-wage-based mass production system
and into the realm of world production (Armstrong, 2002).
To maintain competitiveness, the government and employers argued for low
wages which led to labor and wage disputes, and contributed to foreign businesses
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leaving South Korea for cheaper labor elsewhere (Bedeski, 1994). At the same time,
China’s reforms were allowing China to compete in low-cost manufacturing and even
some South Korean firms were exporting some of their business to China. Another
problem was South Korea’s likely labor shortage if growth continues to expand at the
current rate (Bededki, 1994).
Social stratification of sectors in South Korea is linked to economic inequalities.
According to Bedeski (1994), at the top are big businesses – Samsung, Hyundai, etc. –
and big financial institutions. Many South Koreans see these conglomerates as capitalist
predators that control industry and important sectors of society and are responsible for
the misdistribution of wealth. Agriculture, once the mainstay of Korean society, is now
losing power, importance, and social class. While South Korea is experiencing an
increase in small and medium sized businesses, they are not emerging as they are in
Taiwan (Bedeski, 1994).
Despite rapid modernization, South Koreans adhere to many traditional mores
which include gender inequities. Far fewer women are able to succeed in the South
Korean male-dominated world than in many other industrialized societies (Bedeski,
1994). Although female representation in high level jobs has increased, social attitudes
are against women’s economic independence. As suggested by Standing (1989), the
long term trend is likely to be a further substitution of women for men to fulfill needed
labor voids. In conservative South Korea, becoming a western copy comes with too high
of a price,“…the western phenomena of radical individualism, gender equity, and
feminism are associated with the break-down of the family – including divorce,
illegitimacy, and single-parent families – which is correlated with other pathologies such
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as juvenile delinquency, drugs, and crime” (Bedeski, 1994, p.96). The conservative
Confucian ideals that preserve traditional gender roles, act as a brake for social change
particularly for women.

Demographic Changes
Between 1980 and 2000, the proportion of three or more generation households
in Korea has declined from 17% to 8.4%, while single person households increased from
4.8% to 15.5% (Korean National Statistics Office, 2003 in Peng & Wong, 2004, p. 11).
As in Taiwan, this suggest an erosion of traditional living arrangements wherein elderly
people live with and are cared for by their adult children (Peng 2004; Peng & Wong,
2004). The increase in the number and proportion of single mother families closely
parallels the increases in their respective divorce rate (Peng & Wong, 2004). South
Korea has gone from a family size of 5.29 in 1955 to 3.51 in 2004 (Lee, 2004).
Lee (1988) analyzed the 1985 court records of divorce by mutual agreement filed
in the Seoul Family Court and found that the length of marriage prior to divorce ranged
from less than 1 year to 33 years, with a mean of 8.1 years. The average age at the time
of divorce was 37.6 years for husbands and 33.5 years for the wife (Song & Moon,
1998). These numbers are attributed to changes in public attitudes toward marriage and
divorce, particularly among younger people (Peng & Wong, 2004). Another significant
finding with respect to the average age at time of divorce can be found in the 1990
Annual Report issued by the Korean Supreme Court as cited by Song and Moon (1998).
According to the report, young-age divorce has steadily increased for the
past few years. As high as 38.7% of the total number of divorcing men
and women who obtained judicial divorces in 1989 were under age 30….
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These figures suggest that divorce, in general, takes place among
relatively young couples in Korea. Divorce before age 30 reflects a
growing awareness of self among well-educated females who tend to
value their own accomplishments and aspirations instead of passively
accepting the traditional expectation of sacrificing their lives for the
family (Song & Moon 1998, p. 155).
The exodus of young people from rural areas to urban centers has significantly
impacted rural family organization. By 1990, South Korea was 75% urban (Koo &
Nahm, 1997). Today, all rural families have at least one family member who has
relocated to an urban area and few families have all members living together. In
contrast, the typical urban family is nuclear, smaller, and more isolated than rural
families in the past. This shift from extended family to nuclear family is a new
occurrence not only found in urban areas but also rural areas with increased frequency
(Slote & DeVos, 1998).

Marital Instability and Resources in South Korea
Since WWII, South Korea has experience rapid changes to its socio-economic
structure, especially with the rapid industrialization of the 1960s (Song & Moon, 1998).
Under the motto of “rehabilitation for the country,” the government’s economic plan led
to the development of new urban and industrial centers by establishing heavy industries
in urban areas (Slote & De Vos, 1998). The most direct impact of industrialization was
the increased migration from rural to urban centers. Between 1945 and 1983 the rural to
urban ratio increased from 3:7 to 7:3, a trend related to the increasing industrialization
promoted by the governments’ emphasis on industrial development; this trend has
continued through the present (Slote & DeVos, 1998). One consequence of increasing
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industrialization is the exodus of young people from rural areas to urban centers. Platte
(1988) reports that urbanization can be expected to accelerate an increase in divorce in
China. The same can be expected for South Korea in this regard – as women in urban
areas are more likely to be independent than women in rural areas, and women in urban
areas generally have better resources in which to survive an unhappy marriage (Zeng,
Schultz, Wang, & Gu, 2002).
Economic growth with relative equity in terms of income distribution was an
intentional design of the postwar developmental state (Peng & Wong, 2004). In the
early phases of recent modernization, traditional Confucianism was criticized as a
hindrance and obstruction to change, for Confucianism emphasized the hierarchal or
vertical structure of relationships and that authoritarianism was considered to be at odds
with the lateral or horizontal structure of a democratic society. Confucianism was seen
to manifest unconditional obedience and nepotism in politics and economics rather than
being conducive to a democratic emphasis on individual freedom and equality (Slote &
DeVos, 1998). However, some now argue that aspects of Confucian behavior and
attitudes have actually contributed to modernization, such as inducing a high
achievement motivation, a high valuation placed on education, a non-confrontational
approach for the sake of the group, and personal sacrifice for the prosperity of the family
(Slote & DeVos, 1998). Personal integrity in social relationships and an atmosphere of
trust have been connected to past Confucian scholars who valued honesty rather than
immoral compromise. The spirit of the Confucian scholar represents devotion, honor,
chastity, and honesty; this spirit could be labeled “Confucian Puritanism” just as Weber
posited the Christian ethics of Protestantism Puritanism and how it formed the backbone
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of the development of capitalistic society in the West (Slote & DeVos, 1998, p. 250). It
can be argued that some form of “Confucian Puritanism” provides the basic ethics of
modernization in Korea (Slote & DeVos, 1998, p. 250). That being said, it appears that
the relative equity, individual freedom and equality, primarily applied to men. Despite
rapid modernization, South Koreans adhere to many traditional mores which include
gender inequities. Far fewer women are able to succeed in the South Korean maledominated world than in many other industrialized societies (Bedeski, 1994). Although
female representation in high level jobs has increased, social attitudes are against
women’s economic independence and women’s employment is severely limited.
Since the mid-1980s, large-scale firms had to do something to save labor costs.
The firms began farming out an increasing proportion of their production process to
subcontract units, thus, the large manufacturing firms could reduce the number of regular
employees and instead hire a number of temporary, part-time, and home workers who
were contracted employees (Armstrong 2002). Not only did subcontract production
increase quickly in Korean manufacturing, it also worked to save labor costs as well as
discourage union formation (Armstrong, 2002). The major strategy of South Korea’s
economic development has become labor-intensive, export-oriented industrialization and
South Korea’s advantage in the world trade system lie in the abundance of cheap labor:
young people and women (Armstrong, 2002).
With a severe labor shortage occurring in the labor intensive sector since the late
1980s, a large number of married women were encouraged to enter the labor force, but a
majority of them found themselves working in those temporary, part-time positions. The
mobilization of large quantities of low paid, unskilled workers enabled South Korea to
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specialize in exporting labor-intensive manufactured products. The Asian financial crisis
of 1997-98 was terrible indeed, however frequently exaggerated and the reality of
recovery belatedly recognized (Lie & Park, 2006). The financial crisis in 1997 was a
result of a shortage of foreign exchange due to recessions that caused the value of
currencies and equities in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and other Asian countries to
fall dramatically, exacerbated by inadequate mechanisms for allocating capital in the
troubled Asian economies (Nanto, 1998). The crisis had a harsh impact on the female
labor force. In most firms women were the first to be laid off (Armstrong, 2002). As the
1997 financial crisis illustrates, while women’s status had improved in terms of
education and employment, women were still not equal to men.
Currently in South Korea the center of economic gravity has shifted from heavy
manufacturing to high-tech production in information technology and
telecommunications. Just as other high-tech societies, South Korea faces labor issues
and foreign competition. Government efforts to emulate the U.S. style market economy
have generated resistance from the strong South Korean labor movement. Labor unrest
has increased along with a widespread perception of rising economic inequality (Lie &
Park, 2006). The light industries, the mainstays of South Korea in the 70s, such as,
textiles, clothing, footwear, and food processing still command a significant part of
employment, trade, and investment. Yet, industries that benefit from having a low-paid
labor force are facing serious foreign competition, especially from China which threatens
to undermine South Korea’s economic strength (Lie & Park, 2006).
As suggested by Standing (1989), the long term trend in female labor force
participation is likely to be a further substitution of women for men to fulfill needed
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labor voids. In conservative South Korea, individualism, gender equity, and feminism
are associated with the break-down of the family (Bedeski, 1994). The conservative
Confucian ideals that preserve traditional gender roles not only limit married women’s
employment, but limit social change and possibly divorce. Nevertheless, the divorce rate
has escalated steadily and to great heights and the fertility rate has lowered significantly
(Lie & Park, 2006). Song and Moon (1998) attribute this to women’s growing
independence, individualism, self-actualization, and the decline of traditional family
collective values. Tang and Parish (2000), Thornton et al. (1994), and Wang (2001)
made similar assessments regarding China and Taiwan as it pertained to foreign
influence. However, in South Korea, the west, once a culture to be emulated, is now
seen as the impetus to family failings. Either way, it appears that there are women and
possibly men who are no longer passively accepting the traditional expectation of
sacrificing their lives for the family (Song and Moon, 1998).

Marital Instability and Gender Relations in South Korea
According to Song and Moon (1998), Korean women have considered divorce as
unacceptable, disgraceful, and shameful to the entire family. There are several factors
that account for this view toward divorce in Korea. First, traditionally, men have
resorted to extramarital affairs or concubinage to compensate for marital dissatisfaction.
Both extramarital affairs and concubinage were socially acceptable alternatives to
divorce within Korean culture. Second, many women chose to stay home after marriage,
never acquiring or maintaining acquired job skills that would enable them to be
economically self-sufficient. Third, courts consistently awarded fathers custody rights
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over minor children. The consequence of divorce is too painful for the mother to bear;
thus, she may choose to remain married. Fourth, due to various social restrictions and
cultural prejudices, divorced women have much less opportunity to meet suitable
partners after divorce than do men. And finally, the negative stigma attached to divorce
is very strong. It is no wonder that divorce may be considered the least preferable option
in resolving marital conflicts. However, some of these ideas are changing. As cited by
Rhee (1998), Shin (1984) pointed out that a husband’s extramarital affairs are the most
common reason for Korean women to divorce in Korea; and the 1990-91 Family Law
Revision permits a woman to claim custody of children, which used to be awarded
automatically to the husband (Park, 1993).

Gender Roles
According to Lee (1998), the domestic side of family life in South Korea has
undergone great changes. For the urban South Korean family, the husband as the bread
winner dedicates himself primarily to his work and spends most of his time and energy
outside the house. Work hours are from early morning to late at night, enabling him to
join gatherings of his colleagues to maintain good working relationships. Thus, the
husband has little time to fulfill his role as family head, whereas the wife must take that
role. The urban husband/father has lost his position of authority except when it is useful
for the wife/mother to call upon him symbolically to back up her wishes (Lee, 1998). In
South Korea, 74% of wives do not work outside the home, and they perform on average,
56 hours a week of household labor; wives, who are employed at least 35 hours per
week, spend 31 hours per week on household labor while husbands contribute 14 hours
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per week (Westley, 1998). Some of wives’ household labor is spent in educating her
children. There is considerable pressure, particularly on mothers to ensure their
children’s success in very competitive school systems (Westley, 1998). Many married
women enter the labor force solely to pay for expensive after-school education programs
for their children (Westley, 1998). Thus, marriage in South Korea is characterized by a
distinct division of labor, whereby wives are responsible for their children’s education
and the management of a large majority of household labor.
According to Lee (1998), the family in Korea has moved from a more vertical
structure dependent on formal authority toward a more horizontal interaction between
husband and wife, to a more wife-dominated situation. “It has moved from a family
centered on parents and property to one that is focused on child education...The high
value of education and a strong achievement motivation are directed toward the
prosperity of the family and establishing or maintaining a good family reputation - values
which reflect the old Confucian tradition in new forms” (Lee, 1998, p. 262). Lee (1998)
suggests that mixtures of traditional and modern modes of behavior in Korea reflect
conflicts in ideologies and values. Under the tradition of male dominance and
institutionalized discrimination against women, women are in a much more
disadvantageous position as compared to men not only in the divorce process, but also
after the divorce. Further, women are more likely to feel ambivalent about marriage if
they are expected to continue a heavier workload than their husbands (Westley, 1998).
At the same time, married women have a great deal of authority and autonomy within the
family.
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Gender Beliefs
Courtship and marriage ideals elicit cultural notions about the model “man” and
“woman,” “husband” and “wife,” “son-in-law,” and “daughter-in-law.” These
constructions are both reinforced and resisted in tandem to other cultural changes in
Korean society (Kendall, 1996). Major institutions in South Korea work to reinforce or
perpetuate gender inequality which affects gender relations.
Primary socialization agents emphasize different sex roles. For example,
school curricula offer business and industrial courses for male students
and home management courses for female students. The family
institution has perpetuated traditional patriarchy through a system based
on the male lineage. The legal system has banned women from certain
occupations. The wage system marginalizes wages for women on the
premise they are supported by male heads of household. Women’s wages
do not include the family, education, and housing allowances commonly
found in wages given to heads of households (Park, 1993, 140-141).
According to Westley (1998), in South Korea people are more likely to agree that
it is best for the family if the husband earns the living while the wife takes cares of the
home and family. Westley (1998) also found that men were more likely to support
traditional roles than women, and that women tend to be much less satisfied with
marriage than their male counterparts. While the state has given women “equality,” the
persistence of discriminatory practices reveals another story. The maintenance of
traditional gender roles and ideologies in modern Korean society remains a pillar of
family structure (Bedeski, 1994).
As stated earlier, the South Korean husband-wife relationship is based on
difference, however, the two different elements become one. Either of the two alone is
incomplete and unfinished, hence, a single man or single woman would not be
recognized as a whole person in Korean culture (Joe, 2000). The gender system in South
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Korea holds individuals accountable for behavior in accordance with culturally approved
gender norms by setting restrictions for attitudes and actions appropriate for one’s gender
category (Zuo, 2003). Therefore, gender serves as an ideological device that produces,
reproduces, and legitimates gender-based behavior and activities (West & Zimmerman,
1987; Zuo, 2003). While different, the duties of the husband and wife are deemed
equally important and integral to the other. The wife exercises authority in the home,
educates the children, and “follows” or submits to the husband, while the husband
represents the family to society and is the breadwinner (Joe, 2000). The wife’s
acquiescence to this ideology has been successful in large part because she is allowed a
great deal of matriarchal power in the home. For example, in the majority of Korean
households, the husband surrenders his salary envelope to the wife and he in turn, is
given a monthly allowance (Joe, 2000). If the husband should request additional monies,
which would be granted, this is done in peace and harmony (Joe, 2000). In light of the
rising divorce rate in South Korea, it is expected that Confucian ideals and individualism
are at odds with one another. Therefore, it is likely that non-traditional beliefs would
increase marital instability in South Korean families.

Research Hypotheses
From the foregoing review, several research hypotheses are formulated. First, it
is hypothesized that absolute resources will exert negative effects on marital instability
across the three societies regardless of cultural and economic differences. In other words,
as more resources are available to married individuals, the marriage will become
increasingly stable. In accordance with Greenstein (1990) who found that when wives’
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earnings and share of family earnings are greater, divorce is less likely, it is anticipated in
this study, that the magnitude of the effects of absolute resources will be weaker for
China than for Taiwan and South Korea as Chinese society is less stratified or more
economically homogeneous. In China, under the ideology of gender equity, generations
of men and women were provided with equal opportunities for education and near
universal employment. In Taiwan and South Korea, where women are encouraged to
work only when men are not available to fill the labor void, women in Taiwan and South
Korea are less likely to make up a higher percentage of workers (Tang & Parish, 2000).
While economic development may increase women’s absolute resources, it does
not necessarily improve their positions relative to men. Therefore, as an extension of the
first hypothesis, the postulated effects of relative resources are presumed to have an
effect on marital instability as well. Specifically, it is hypothesized that in East Asian
societies, the wife having higher resources than the husband is positively associated with
marital instability, whereas the husband having resources higher than the wife is
negatively associated with marital instability compared to the couple having equal
resources.
In China there is more income equality among husbands and wives and there is a
low level of gender segregation in the market (ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1990).
This means that as the amount of resources attained by wives reach the same levels as
that of their husbands, inequity in power and housework will vanish, otherwise, a sense
of injustice will be provoked in both parties (Zuo & Bian, 2001) resulting in marital
instability. In contrast with China, wives in Taiwan and South Korea who have
significantly smaller income shares experience a high degree of gender segregation in
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the market (Tang & Parish, 2000). In Taiwan and South Korea, couples are more likely
to have employment and income discrepancies. Therefore, the partner with greater
resources is able to use their economic advantage to secure decision-making authority,
avoid household labor, and discourage their spouse’s independence. In South Korea,
the traditional mores are against women’s economic independence and thus, women’s
employment is severely limited. If the benefits of marriage rely on task specialization
and division, and such benefits decline when women gain greater resources, then women
who have their own incomes, jobs or careers, would be in a better position to leave an
unhappy marriage, and less motivated to work on marital problems (Cherlin, 1979). On
the other hand, a husband may feel more inclined to leave an unhappy marriage if he
knows his wife can support herself (Kalmijn, De Graaf, & Poortman, 2004). Further,
marital instability may be increased when men are not able to provide stable income
through stable employment (Cherlin 1979; South & Spitze, 1986).
Second, it is hypothesized that egalitarian marital roles will negatively affect
marital instability; that is, if marital roles become less traditional, the marriage will
become more stable. But the effects are expected to be stronger in China than in Taiwan
and South Korea due largely to the legacy of socialism in China. As Tang and Parish
(2000) found, women under socialist China are more successful in getting their husbands
to contribute to household chores, suggesting that women’s near equality with their
husbands provide a bargaining leverage over chores and family decision-making.
Whereas in Taiwan, women spend five times what men spend on housekeeping and about
34% of married women quit their jobs to take care of their families (Frontier Foundation
1999). Xu and Lai (2002) reported that the husband’s advantages in occupation and
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education tip marital power to his favor, although Taiwanese husbands are more likely to
share power with their wives if the decisions are traditionally within wives’ realms and
less likely if the decisions are customarily made by men. Yi and Yang (1995) concluded
that marital power in Taiwanese marriages is increasingly negotiated with an apparent
gradual shift toward egalitarianism. Marriage in South Korea is characterized by a
distinct division of labor, whereby wives are responsible for their children’s education
and the management of a large majority of household labor, and husbands dedicate
themselves to work as they are responsible for breadwinning.

While South Korean

wives have a great deal of authority and autonomy within the family, they are expected to
continue a heavier workload than their husbands, thus it is probable that they are more
likely to feel unsure about marriage (Westley, 1998).
Third, it is also hypothesized that egalitarian gender beliefs will be positively
associated with marital instability, namely, those who endorse non-traditional gender
beliefs will display greater tendencies toward marital instability. However, the effects are
expected to be more robust for Taiwan and South Korea than for China. Because of the
stronger commitment to institutionalized gender egalitarianism in China, egalitarian
gender beliefs are believed to be more prevalent in China than in Taiwan and South
Korea. Along the same line of reasoning, it can be conjectured that the effects of
egalitarian gender roles and egalitarian gender beliefs on marital instability will also be
different across Taiwan and South Korea. As suggested by Bumpass and Choe (2004),
South Korea perhaps is one of the most conservative East Asian societies in terms of
attitudes toward marriage and family life. While traditional women who view their
workload as consistent with their ideology may not view the workload as unjust, it is
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expected that those who find the workload unjust are likely to have increased marital
instability.
Finally, in addition to the anticipated cross-societal differences and/or similarities,
it is surmised that the effects of relative resources, gender roles, and gender beliefs on
marital instability will differ by gender regardless of cultural and societal differences.
Consistent with the findings from Western industrialized societies, it is anticipated that
the effects will be stronger for women than for men as economically independent and
egalitarian-minded women will have higher levels of demand in marital relationships
which may lead to higher levels of marital instability.

98

CHAPTER III
METHOD

Data
The data for this study originated with the East Asian Social Survey (EASS), a
three-society survey conducted in China, Taiwan, and South Korea in the later part of the
1990s. Though the EASS was not designed to study family lives in these three societies,
it contains a section on marriage and family that provided sufficient information for these
analyses. The topics under the marriage and family section include, but are not limited
to, family structure, housework, marital power, gender beliefs, and relationship quality,
especially marital instability. The survey used multistage probability sampling technique
and was deemed representative of the adult population aged between 20 and 65 in China,
25 and 60 in Taiwan, and 25 and 60 in South Korea, respectively.2
To ensure comparability, the Chinese survey collected information primarily
from the more developed coastal areas along the east coast. As such, the survey is also
referred to as the 1997 China Coastal Survey which was conducted by the Sociology
2

Note that the Korean data come from two different sub-samples which were merged as one file.
In the first sub-sample small business and service workers were over-sampled by the research
team in order to study women and small business activities. The second sub-sample, on the other
hand, consists of adult persons who are representative of the total population in South Korea.
Unfortunately, the information (e.g., a variable that flags the two sub-samples) is not available in
the public use data to compare differences or similarities between the two sub-samples.
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Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1997. Since the regional
variations in Taiwan and South Korea are not as striking as they are in China, the EASS
Taiwanese survey was conducted by the Sociology Institute, Academia Sinica, as part of
the 1996 Taiwan Social Change Survey targeting the general population. In a similar
fashion, the South Korea survey was conducted by Yonsei University, South Korea in
1996-1997. Funding for the East Asian Social Survey was provided by Academia Sinica
in Taiwan and the National Science Foundation in the United States of America.
For China, the research team began the sampling process with a purposive sample
of coastal regions. Then, like its Taiwan and South Korea counterparts, a multistage
probability sampling technique was used to select samples through subsequent levels
within the coastal regions. More specifically, the levels began with cities (one large and
one medium-sized) from three costal regions: Northeast, East, and South China. Within
each of these locations, three to six districts were randomly selected reflecting the
population size of each location. Next, within each selected district, urban streets
(jiedao), towns, or rural townships (xiang) were further selected and within each a
neighborhood or village was chosen by a systematic sampling technique with equal
intervals. Furthermore, within the selected neighborhoods or villages, households were
selected with equal intervals (i.e., from a random starting point, every kth household was
chosen) in order to select approximately 20 people from each neighborhood/village.
Finally, one adult person aged between 20 and 65 with the birthday closest to July 1 was
selected within the chosen household for a face-to-face interview.
In addition to utilizing a similar multistage probability sampling technique, the
EASS also adopted a similar survey instrument in that a vast majority of survey questions
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are identical, and therefore comparable across the three societies.3 The survey
questionnaire was first developed in English and then translated into Chinese by a
doctoral student at the University of Chicago where the project activities were
coordinated by Professor William Parish. After several rounds of revisions in China and
the United States, the Korean version of the questionnaire was developed from the
Chinese and English versions.
The original survey data consist of 3,013 respondents from China, 2,831
respondents from Taiwan, and 3,570 respondents from South Korea. Of the original
respondents, the current study is restricted to sub-samples of respondents who were
married at the time of survey. After applying a listwise deletion procedure to the data,
the sub-samples for this study contain 2,420 married respondents from China, 2,184
married respondents from Taiwan, and 2,804 married respondents from South Korea.

Dependent Variable
Marital instability was gauged by a global measure and serves as the dependent
variable for this dissertation and is indicated by responses to the following question:
“Have you actually considered divorce after getting married?” Responses are divided
into three categories and are reverse-coded as 1 = “No” /stable, 2 = “Hard to Say,” and 3
= “Yes” /unstable.

3

To accommodate the differences in socio-cultural and political systems across the three
societies, some questionnaire items were allowed to vary modestly. Where this occurs, disclosure
is included in the text.
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Independent Variables

Resources
The measures that reflect both absolute and relative resources are the
respondent’s and their spouse’s employment, education, and income. Individual or
micro-level studies show a clear relation between measures of socioeconomic status and
divorce (Fergusson, Horwood, & Shannon, 1984; Greenstein, 1985; Martin & Bumpass,
1989; Smith & Meitz, 1985; South & Spitze, 1986). With regard to absolute resources
regarding employment, Kalmijn, De Graaf, & Poortman (2004) suggest that a wife’s
full-time employment is positively related to marital instability, whereas a husband’s
full-time employment is negatively related to marital instability. This finding supports
the idea that a traditional division of labor, with husbands gainfully employed and wives
staying at home, stabilizes marriage. Resembling micro-level studies, macro-level
research findings reveal that in societies where women’s employment can help free
women from economic dependency and bolster their financial autonomy, the level of
marital instability is also higher (Cherlin, 1992; Edwards et al., 1992).
In terms of relative resources, Zuo & Bian (2001) posit that couples with greater
resource discrepancies tend to have greater marital instability such as greater likelihood
of divorce. This is so because those who possess greater resources may use their
economic advantage to trade these assets for greater authority and less work at home
(Blood &Wolfe, 1960; England & Farkas, 1986; Lennon & Rosenfield, 1994; Zuo &
Bian, 2001).
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In the surveys, the respondent’s employment status is determined by whether the
respondent reported that he or she was currently working (as a measure of absolute
resources). Additionally, the respondent was asked to report his or her spouse’s
employment status as well. Using gender and employment, a relative resource measure
in employment was computed. Based on the computed differences, relative employment
was recoded as 1 = “husband employed, wife is not,” 2 = “wife employed, husband is
not,” and 3 = “both employed” (if both the husband and wife were employed at the time
of the study). In the statistical analysis, dummy variables were created with both
employed serving as the reference category.
The respondent’s educational attainment, representing absolute resources, is
indicated by the question, “What is the highest level of education you have attained?”
Additionally, the respondent was asked, “What is the highest level of education your
spouse attained?” In the Chinese and Taiwanese survey, responses to both questions
were coded as 1 = illiterate or barely literate, 2 = elementary school, 3 = junior high
school, 4 = senior high school, 5 = vocational school, 6 = vocational high school, 7 =
middle technological school, 8 = higher technological school, 9 = university, and 10 for
graduate school. In the South Korean survey, responses were coded as 1 = no formal
school, 2 = primary school, 3 = middle school, 4 = any type of high school, 5 = general
high school, 6 = vocational high school, 7 = two-year college, 8 = university, and 9 =
graduate school. In order to make the measure compatible, responses were recoded to
reflect similar educational characteristics. Thus, for each of the three societies, 1 =
illiterate, barely literate, or no formal school, 2 = elementary or primary school, 3 =
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junior high school or middle school, 4 = any form of high school (including any type of
high school, general high school, vocational high school, senior high school, vocational
school, and middle technological school), 5 = higher technological school or 2-year
college, 6 =university, and 7 = graduate school.
Using gender and educational attainment, a relative resource measure in education
is computed as the difference between the husband’s and the wife’s educational levels.
Based on the computed differences, relative education was recoded as 1 = “husband more
education” if the husband had a higher level of education than wife, 2 = “wife more
education” if the wife had a higher level education than husband, and 3 = “equal
education” if the husband and wife had equal educational levels. In the statistical
analysis, dummy variables were created with equal education serving as the reference
category.
Income in the Chinese survey is indicated by the response to the following
question: “Your current average monthly income including bonus income and other
allowances” (as a measure of absolute resources). Additionally, the following questions
were asked about the respondent’s spouse: “Approximately how much was his (her)
annual salary income last year? Approximately how much was his (her) annual bonus
income last year? Approximately how much was his (her) annual other income last
year?” The respondent’s monthly income was multiplied by 12 to give rise to a yearly
figure. To compute the spouse’s yearly income, several income sources were combined.
In the Taiwanese and South Korean surveys, respondents were asked their “annual
earnings for their current job” and “spouse’s earnings in the past year.” Once again, the
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gender and income variables were used to create a relative income variable by computing
the difference between the husband’s and the wife’s yearly income. This computed
variable was then recoded as 1 = “husband higher income” if the husband had a higher
income than wife, 2 = “wife higher income” if the wife had a higher income than
husband, and 3 = “equal income” if the husband and wife had equal income. Because of
the many missing cases in the income variables, the category of “income missing” was
retained and dummy-coded along with the two relative income variables with equal
income serving as the reference category.

Gender Roles
As indicated earlier, in the EASS the measures that reflect gender roles include
the division of housework, the sharing of marital power, and the extent of dependence in
certain decision-making. Consistent with the resources variables, whenever possible
relative measures in gender roles are created. These variables can help address gender
(in)equality issues within the family and the manner in which they are related to marital
instability. Gender roles are thought to affect marital instability in several important
ways. As stated previously, those with greater resources may use their economic
advantage to secure decision-making authority, avoid household labor, and discourage
spouse’s independence; gender role discrepancies thus may provoke feelings of injustice
and facilitate marital instability (Zuo & Bian, 2001). On the other hand, similarities in
men’s and women’s roles are thought to produce marital tension more so than
complementary roles (Becker, 1981; Schoen, et al, 1985). Hochschild (1989) found that

105

role identity pivots more on recognition and appreciation for what one does in the
marriage, rather than on the resources one contributes to the marriage. This study
examines roles pertaining to household labor, decision-making authority, and marital
(in)dependence.
Housework is indicated by several responses to the following questions: “Who is
responsible for the following household chores in your family? On average how long do
they spend doing them every week?” The South Korean survey asked, “Regarding
household chores, on average how many hours [does] each spend on each listed item
every week?” The six questionnaire items are 1) grocery shopping; 2) cooking; 3) dish
washing; 4) repairing appliances and other things in the house; 5) taking care of children
and elderly; and 6) laundry and daily cleaning. In the South Korean survey, “dish
washing” was not asked, thus, South Korea has a 5-item scale. Respondents were asked
to report how many hours and how many minutes each spent on each category of
household chores. Thus, the variables were coded according to type of chores, person,
and time. Hours and minutes were recoded into one variable by converting hours into
minutes and adding the two variables together. Minutes were then coded back into the
nearest whole hour. Thus, the total time that each person spent on a type of household
chores are the total of reported hours and minutes to the nearest whole hour. Moreover,
relative contribution to housework was calculated as the difference between the
husband’s and the wife’s time spent in household tasks. The result variable was further
recoded as 1 = “husband does more housework” if the husband spent more time doing
household chores than wife, 2 = “wife does more housework” if the wife spent more time
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doing household chores than husband, and 3 = “equal time spent on housework” if the
husband and wife spent an equal amount of time doing household chores. This variable
was dummy-coded in the statistical analysis so that “equal time spent on housework” was
used as the reference category.
Marital power in marital-family decision making is indicated by a series of
questions in the Chinese and Taiwanese surveys that began with, “Whose opinion is the
most important in making decisions about the following matters?” However, in the South
Korean survey, the question was worded differently: “Who decides the following matters
within the household?” The three questionnaire items are 1) allocation of family budget
(household expenses in South Korea); 2) buying a house and (or) moving; and 3)
purchase(ing) of high priced consumer goods. Responses were recoded into three
categories, myself, spouse, or equal (mutual decision). With these responses, three index
variables were created reflecting “husband more power,” “wife more power,” and “equal
power,” respectively.
The measure that echoes the extent of independence was indicated by three
questionnaire items. Respondents were asked, “Do you need consent in doing the
following things? 1) buying expensive clothes; 2) going on a trip for one or more days;
and 3) choosing a job or work place.” Responses were dummy-coded with 1 = “Yes” and
0 = “No.” A composite variable was created with higher scores indicating less
independence.
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Gender Beliefs
Cultural norms and values play an important part in the consideration of a
divorce, and attitudes about marriage, childbearing, and marital roles are essential in this
respect. Kalmijn, De Graaf, & Poortman (2004) found that women with non-traditional
beliefs put greater emphasis on autonomy so that they are more likely to believe in their
abilities to establish independent households than are wives with traditional beliefs.
Women with egalitarian views are more understanding of different forms of family than
women with traditional views, and traditional women are more likely than egalitarian
women to deem it morally wrong to leave a husband when the marriage is unhappy
(Lueptow, Guss, & Hyden, 1989; Lye & Biblarz, 1993). Moreover, egalitarian attitudes
held by women may lead to strain in the marriage because egalitarian-minded women are
less likely to take traditional roles for granted, and more often will negotiate family and
household tasks with their husbands (Amato & Booth, 1995; Greenstein, 1995; Lye &
Biblarz, 1993). On the other hand, husbands who are egalitarian are more likely to grant
their wives more authority despite a traditional patriarchal culture (Rodman, 1972).
Thus, gender beliefs can be related to marital instability in many different ways.
In this study gender beliefs are measured by the following questionnaire items: 1)
“For married couples, husbands should be in charge of matters outside the home while
wives are in charge of things in the home.” Responses are recoded into a new variable
indicating “disagreement with separate spheres.” 2) “By nature women are more suitable
for taking care of the family than men.” Responses are recoded into a new variable
tapping “disagreement with traditionally ascribed caretaker role.” 3) “The success of
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husband’s career is also success of the wife.” Responses are recoded into a new variable
reflecting “husband’s career success is not wife’s success.” 4) “If a wife has a job, the
husband should try to share the housework.” Responses were reverse-coded to indicate
“non-traditional gender role attitudes toward housework.” Furthermore, 5) an index
variable was created by using the following two questionnaire items: “Even without
marriage women can have a fulfilling life” and “Men can have a fulfilling life without
marriage.” These items were reverse-coded and summed to represent “non-traditional
views toward marriage.” Finally, two questionnaire items - 6) “women must have
children to have a fulfilling life” and 7) “men can have a fulfilling life without children”
were recoded and reverse-coded, respectively, into two new variables representing “nontraditional views toward childbearing for women” and “non-traditional view toward
childbearing for men.” All the variables were recoded on a 5-point Likert Scale with 1
for strongly agree, 2 for agree, 3 for neither agree or disagree, no opinion, 4 for disagree,
and 5 for strongly disagree. Therefore, higher scores in these variables indicate less
traditional gender beliefs.

Control Variables
The control variables in this study include gender, age, marital duration, marital
duration squared, resident minor children, divorce experience, family structure,
urban/rural residence, and religious membership and participation.4 Gender is measured

4

Marital satisfaction was not included as a control variable because the measures of marital
instability and marital satisfaction are highly correlated. Marital satisfaction is generally
recognized and analyzed, along with marital instability, as a dependent variable (Spanier, 1976;
Norton, 1983; Glenn, 1990; Bradbury, Fincham, & Beach, 2000).
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by a simple question to identify if the respondent is male or female, which was further
dummy-coded with female as the reference category. It is well documented that early
age at marriage increases the likelihood of divorce (South & Spitze, 1986; Martin &
Bumpass, 1989; Moore & Waite, 1981; Thornton & Rodgers, 1987). For this reason, the
respondent’s age, measured in years, is statistically controlled. Though empirical
research findings show that divorce is less likely when respondents and marriages are
older (Fergusson, Horwood, & Shannon, 1984; Thornton & Rodgers, 1987), two studies
reveal no significant results regarding long versus short marriages on divorce (Heaton,
Albrecht, & Martin, 1985; South & Spitze, 1986). Nevertheless, marital duration is
included in this study and calculated by subtracting the age at current marriage from the
respondent’s age. A quadratic function of this variable was created and included to
control for a possible non-linear relationship between marital duration and instability.
The presence of children seems to create a gradual pace at which dissatisfaction is
translated to divorce, but not to prevent it entirely (White, Booth, & Edwards, 1986),
however, childlessness is associated with higher divorce rates (Wineberg, 1988) and a
faster divorce process (White, Booth, & Edwards, 1986). For this reason the variable
“residential minor children” was computed by subtracting age at births from the
respondent’s age. If the respondent had children under 18 years of age, it was coded as 1
for yes (have children living at home) and 0 for no. Even though divorce becomes more
frequent in today’s East Asia, the EASS captured very few divorced respondents. It is
thus argued that people in remarriages carry with them the characteristics that raised the
tendency of their first marriages dissolving (Martin & Bumpass, 1989; Teachman, 1986).
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As such, a previously divorced variable was dummy-coded with not previously divorced
as the reference.
Family structure plays an important role in studying marital instability in East
Asian societies where extended family living arrangement is not uncommon. Still, the
proportion of three or more generation households has declined in all three societies
(Bumpass & Choe, 2004; Mason, Tsuya, & Choe, 1998; Thornton & Lin, 1994; Whyte &
Parish, 1984). It is thought that with the decrease of influence from extended family this
may in turn affect a couple’s marital (in)stability. As such, a family structure variable
was dummy-coded with nuclear family as the reference. Along the same lines, by
migrating to urban areas, greater isolation from extended family and more exposure to
new ideas may also affect marital (in)stability. Due to regional variations in family lives,
a dummy variable was created with urban residence as the reference category. In the
South Korean data, if the respondent lived in a small, medium or large city, it was coded
as urban residence and if the respondent lived in a rural township or county, it was coded
as rural residence. In the case of China and Taiwan, urban-rural residence was
determined by what type of household registration the respondent and spouse had as
reported by the respondent.
Religion is also postulated to play a vital role in the incidence of divorce. One
widely cited study reported that the frequency of religious attendance has a strong and
positive impact on marital stability. This is especially true when both spouses attend
religious activities regularly. These couples tend to have the lowest risk of divorce (Call
& Heaton, 1997). To control for this important cultural/structural effect on marital
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instability in this study, two religion measures are included. In the Taiwanese and South
Korean surveys, respondents were asked, “In the past 12 months, have you been a
member of a(n): temple, church, or other religious group?” And, “In the past 12 months,
have you participated in any activity with a(n): temple, church, or other religious group?”
Responses to the membership question were coded as 1 = “temple member,” 2 = “church
member,” and 3 = “other religious group member” if respondents indicated membership.
In the statistical analysis, this variable was dummy-coded with “other religious group
member” serving as the reference category. Responses to the participation question were
coded as 1 = “temple participation,” 2 = “church participation,” and 3 = “other religious
group participation” if respondents indicated religious participation. In the statistical
analysis, this variable was dummy-coded with “other religious group participation”
serving as the reference category.

Statistical Method
As delineated previously, the primary goal of this study is to asses how resources,
marital roles, and gender beliefs affect marital instability in a comparative context. To
achieve this goal, ordered logistic regression technique was used because the dependent
variable is rank-ordered (Long, 1997). Following Powers and Xie (2000), a latent
variable approach was employed. This approach assumes an underlying continuous
latent variable y* that is related to independent variables via a “structural” model,
namely, yi* = x’iE+ Hi, where H has mean zero and follows a symmetric distribution (i.e.,
normal or logistic) and E represents regression coefficients that are estimated. With this
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model, the dependent variable - marital instability - was regressed linearly on the selected
independent variables in SPSS.
Four multivariate ordered logistic regression models were developed and
estimated to examine both the independent and partial effects of the key independent
variables, along with control variables, on marital instability. The first regression model
was built to estimate the independent effects of resources on marital instability. The
second regression model assessed the net effects of gender role variables on marital
instability. The third regression model tested the independent effects of gender beliefs on
marital instability and, finally, the fourth model which is a full regression model
estimated the joint effects of resources, gender roles, and gender beliefs net of the control
variables. It is worth noting that interaction effects between gender and the key
independent variables were estimated, which can be used to test the final hypothesis as
delineated in Chapter II. These gender specific regression models were estimated
separately for each of the three societies and the similarities or differences were
highlighted and discussed.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Description of Sample
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample, demonstrating that Chinese
respondents are less likely to report marital instability. Only 4% of Chinese husbands
and wives reported that they had seriously considered divorce compared to over 10% of
Taiwanese and over 20% of South Korean husbands and wives. Subsequently, almost
91% of Chinese husbands and wives reported that they had never seriously considered
divorce compared to nearly 85% of Taiwanese husbands and wives and nearly 71% of
South Korean husbands and wives. It appears that Chinese marriages are more stable
than Taiwanese and South Korean marriages.
Table 1 also shows the characteristics of the sample with respect to independent
variables. Among the relative resource characteristics, it is employment that is the most
distinctive among the three societies. In China, fewer than 20% of husbands are sole
earners for their families compared to almost 39% in Taiwan and almost 55% in South
Korea. Just over 6% of wives are sole earners in China compared to 4% in Taiwan and
just over 2% in South Korea. The vast majority of Chinese couples work outside the
home; in this study just over 74% of husbands and wives are gainfully employed, where
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics by Society
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as in Taiwan, almost 57% are both employed, and in South Korea, just over 43% are both
gainfully employed, not even a majority of couples are dual earners in the family. Thus,
the majority of married couples in South Korea have a husband who is gainfully
employed and a wife who is not.
In terms of relative education, nearly 36% of Chinese husbands, over 41% of
Taiwanese husbands, and over 40% of South Korean husbands have more education than
wives. Just over 17% of Chinese wives, almost 14% of Taiwanese wives, and only 6% of
South Korean wives have more education than husbands. In this study, over 47% of
Chinese husbands and wives have equal education. In Taiwan, almost 45% of husbands
and wives have equal education, and in South Korea, almost 54% of spouses have equal
education. While South Korea has the largest percentage of spouses with equal education
among the three societies, there is a greater educational disparity at the extremes. The
South Korean educational disparity is followed by Taiwanese couples, and lastly Chinese
couples. In all three societies, husbands have greater education than wives, however the
disparity between the husband and wife is less in China and greatest in South Korea.
Nearly 37% of Chinese husbands, just over 28% of Taiwanese husbands, and over
13% of South Korean husbands earned greater incomes than wives. On the other hand,
just over 12% of Chinese wives, nearly 4% of Taiwanese wives, and just over 4% of
South Korean wives earned greater incomes than husbands. In this study almost 33% of
Chinese husbands and wives have equal incomes, where as in Taiwan, only 9% of
spouses earn equal incomes, and in South Korea, only 7% of husbands and wives earn
equal incomes. On average, men make a greater income than women in China, Taiwan,
and South Korea. Interestingly, there were many respondents who reported their or their
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spouse’s income as non-applicable or unknown, especially in Taiwan and South Korea.
In China, just over 18% of respondents reported income as unknown or non-applicable;
yet, nearly 60% of Taiwanese respondents and 76% of South Korea respondents reported
income as unknown or non-applicable. The income coded as missing from Taiwanese
and South Korean respondents is very high because many wives do not work out side the
home, thus, non-applicable. Further, many female respondents who are reporting their
spouse’s income may, in fact, not know how much their husbands earn.
On average, Chinese respondents are slightly more traditional in their gender
beliefs than are Taiwanese and South Korean respondents. That being said, on average,
respondents from China, Taiwan, and South Korea report slightly below the middle
position on all gender beliefs categories except for non-traditional gender roles in
housework, and in the case of South Korea, non-traditional views of childbearing for
men. Here, attitudes regarding housework are substantially less traditional for all three
societies, and non-traditional views of childbearing for men are apparent in South Korea.
In practice, however, gender roles in housework are anything but non-traditional.
In South Korea, over 96% of wives do more housework than husbands and 9% of
husbands do more housework than wives. In Taiwan, 92% of wives do more housework
than husbands and almost 5% of husbands do more housework than wives. In China,
over 80% of wives do more housework than husbands and almost 16% of husbands do
more housework than wives. In this study, 4% of Chinese husbands and wives share
household chores equally, whereas in Taiwan, 4% of spouses share the housework, and in
South Korea, only 3% of husbands and wives share the household chores equally. Thus,
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in China, there appears to be more sharing of the household chores as compared to
Taiwan and South Korea.
In terms of decision-making power within the household, husbands in China and
Taiwan appear to have the upper-hand slightly over their wives. However, in South
Korea, wives appear to have more decision-making power than their husbands. In all
three societies, major decision making is predominantly done on an equal basis (mutual
decision), although more so for China and South Korea than Taiwan. Turning to
independent decision making, in all three societies, respondents more often than not need
the consent of their spouse to make some decisions. Both Chinese and South Korean
couples need the consent of their spouse in decision making more than their Taiwanese
counterparts. Thus, for Taiwanese couples there appears to be greater independent minor
decision making.
Of the Chinese respondents, 49% are male; of the Taiwanese respondents, 51%
are male; and of the South Korean respondents, 47% are male. The mean age of Chinese
respondents is 43 years old, the mean age of Taiwanese respondents is 41 years old, and
the mean age of South Korean respondents is 41 years old. Among the respondents in the
China sample, the average number of years of being married to the current spouse is 18
years. In the Taiwan sample, the average number of years of being married to the current
spouse is 16 years. The average number of years of being married to the current spouse
in the South Korean sample is 15 years.
In the Chinese sample, nearly 65% reported having minor children living at home.
In Taiwan, 78% of respondents had minor children living at home, and in the South
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Korean sample, almost 74% had children under the age of 18 living at home. For China,
almost 2% of the respondents reported having been previously divorced. For Taiwan,
almost 1% of the respondents reported being previously divorced. For South Korea,
there were no reports of having been previously divorced. Among the respondents in the
China sample, over 76% reported living in a nuclear family; in the Taiwan sample,
almost 91% reported living in a nuclear family; and in the South Korea sample, 82% of
respondents reported living in a nuclear family. In the China sample, respondents were
asked about their household registration as well as their spouse’s, thus a relative measure
regarding urban residence is used. Only 6% of respondents reported that the husband had
an urban registration while the wife did not, and only 3% of respondents reported that the
wife had an urban registration while the husband did not. The overwhelming majority of
respondents (70%) reported that both they and their spouse had an urban registration. For
Taiwan and South Korea, only respondents were asked about their urban or rural
registration/residence. Of respondents in the Taiwan sample, just over 69% had an urban
residence; of the respondents in the South Korea sample, just over 78% had an urban
residence. Among the religious membership and participation items, Taiwanese
respondents reported that 10% were members of a temple and 26% participated in a
religious activity with a temple; while only 3% were church members and only 5%
participated in a religious activity with a church. South Korean respondents, on the other
hand, reported that 8% were members of a temple and 9% participated in a religious
activity with a temple; while 12% were church members and 15% participated in a
religious activity with a church.
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Ordered Logistic Regression Models
Tables 2, 3, and 4 present ordered logistic regression models of marital instability
on selected variables for each of the three societies. While Table 2 presents the
parameter estimates of the ordered logistic regressions for the Chinese sample on marital
instability, Table 3 and Table 4 feature the parameter estimates of the ordered logistic
regressions for the Taiwanese and South Korean samples on marital instability,
respectively. There are a total of four models in each table with control variables
included. The first model uses relative resources as predictors of marital instability5
which is followed by gender roles in the second model. The third model utilizes gender
beliefs as predictors and the fourth model includes all the variables, namely, control
variables, relative resources, gender roles, and gender beliefs as predictors.
Finally, Table 6 displays the full ordered logistic regression models for each of
the three societies, by gender. Along with the regression coefficients, the model chisquared statistics for each regression model is also reported so that model assessment can
be made. No marginal effects are reported unless stated otherwise.
_______________________
5

Models were also re-estimated with the absolute resource variables for the three societies
separately. However, the regression results show no statistically significant effects of absolute
resources on marital instability either in the resource model or in the full model for China and
South Korea. For Taiwan, only husband’s education was significant at the .05 level in the
resource model. As a result, absolute resources were no longer pursued.
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Relative Resources and Marital Instability in China
Regression Model 1 in Table 2 offers a test for relative resources on marital
instability. As shown in the table, when the wife is gainfully employed while the
husband is unemployed, the odds of marital instability tendency increase by 71% as
compared to couples who are equally employed (b=.538, p < .05). This result suggests
that wives as sole earners are positively and significantly related to the tendency of
marital instability. The effects of husbands as sole earners, having a better education and
income are not statistically significant at the .05 level in Model 1, nor do they show
significant effects in the full model (Model 4). A closer examination across the
regression models reveals that the effect of wives as sole earners washed out when other
independent variables are included. Therefore, relative resources are not empirically
supported concerning marital instability in China.
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Table 2. Ordered Logistics Regression of Marital Instability on Selected Variables (China)

Table 3. Ordered Logistics Regression of Marital Instability on Selected Variables (Taiwan)

Table 4. Ordered Logistics Regression of Marital Instability on Selected Variables (South Korea)

Gender Roles and Marital Instability in China
Regression Model 2 in Table 2 features a test for gender roles on marital
instability in China. The results suggest that the equal power sharing in major decisionmaking processes and marital dependency (needing consent from the other spouse
regarding some less major decision making) are both statistically significant in predicting
marital instability. As couples share more decision-making power (equal decisionmaking), the odds of marital instability tendency decrease by 54.5% (b= -.787, p<.05). In
addition, when couples are increasingly dependent on one another, or rather, need
consent from one another for less major decision making, the odds of marital instability
tendency decrease by 43.8% (b= -.577, p<.01). The effects of husband having more
power, wife having more power, and relative time spent doing housework are not
statistically significant at the .05 level in Model 2, nor do they show significant effects in
the full model (Model 4). Moreover, whereas the effect of equal power does not remain
significant when other independent variables are introduced, the effect of
interdependence persists in the full model (b= -.432, p<.05). Thus, the effects of gender
roles are partially supported concerning marital instability in China.

Gender Beliefs and Marital Instability in China
Regression Model 3 displayed in Table 2 estimates the relationship between
gender beliefs and marital instability. For respondents who believe less in the adage that
the success of the husband’s career is also the success of the wife, the odds of marital
instability tendency increase by 38% (b=.322, p<.001). For respondents who have more
non-traditional views toward marriage, i.e., belief that life can be fulfilling without
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marriage, the odds of martial instability tendency rise by 82.8% (b= .603, p<.01). For
respondents who believe more in women’s ability to have a fulfilled life without children,
the odds of marital instability tendency lower by 20.5% (b= -.229, p< .05). As expected,
some non-traditional views toward marriage are positively and significantly related to
marital instability. Non-traditional views regarding childbearing for women have the
opposite effect in that it is negatively and significantly related to marital instability. The
effects of disagreement with separate spheres and the traditional, ascribed caretaker role,
non-traditional views of gender roles regarding housework, and non-traditional views
regarding childbearing for men are not statistically significant at the .05 level in Model 3.
Upon examination of the full model (Model 4), it appears that the statistically
significant effects from previous models remain significant after other independent
variables are included. These results suggest that the gender belief hypotheses are
partially supported, especially concerning some non-traditional views toward marriage
such as viewing a husband’s career success as not necessarily that of his wife’s
(increasing the odds of marital instability tendency by 37.6% with b= .319, p<.001 and
believing that life can be fulfilling without marriage (increasing the odds of marital
instability tendency by 69.6% with b= .528, p<.01, and for non-traditional views of
childbearing for women (decreasing the odds of marital instability tendency by 19.2%
with b= -.213, p<.05). Thus, the hypothesis pertaining to gender beliefs is supported in
China.
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Relative Resources and Marital Instability in Taiwan
In Table 3, Model 1 tests how relative resources affect the tendency of marital
instability in Taiwan. The results reported in Table 3 suggest that the effects of relative
resources are uniformly insignificant at the .05 level in Model 1, nor do they show any
significant effects in the full model (Model 4). Therefore, the relative resource
hypotheses are not empirically supported concerning marital instability in Taiwan.

Gender Roles and Marital Instability in Taiwan
Regression Model 2 in Table 3 provides a test for the effects of gender roles on
marital instability in Taiwan. The results show that the equal share of marital power in
major decision-making processes is highly statistically significant in predicting marital
instability. All else being equal, as couples share more decision-making power, the odds
of marital instability tendency lower by 66.1% (b= -1.082, p<.001). However, the effects
of wife possessing more decision-making power, marital dependency, and relative time
spent doing housework are not statistically significant at the .05 level in Model 2, nor do
they show any significant effects in the full model (Model 4). Moreover, the effect of
husband having more decision-making power is not significant in the gender roles model
(Model 2), but it does have an effect in the full model (Model 4), namely, the odds of
marital instability tendency decrease by 47.9% (b= -.652, p<.05) if the husband has more
decision-making power. Also, the effect of equal power persists in the full model. As
couples share more decision-making power, the odds of marital instability tendency
lower by 69.1% (b= -1.173, p<.001). Given these results, it can be concluded that certain
aspects of marital power are statistically associated with marital instability in Taiwan.
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Gender Beliefs and Marital Instability in Taiwan
Regression Model 3 displayed in Table 3 assesses the relationship between gender
beliefs and marital instability in Taiwan. For respondents who believe less in the adage
that the success of the husband’s career is also the success of the wife, the odds of marital
instability tendency amplify by 29.3% (b=.257, p<.001). For respondents who have
higher levels of non-traditional views regarding housework, i.e., belief that husbands
should share the housework, the odds of marital instability tendency increase by 36.1%
(b= .308, p< .01). For respondents who have more non-traditional views toward
marriage, i.e., belief that life can be fulfilling without marriage, the odds of martial
instability tendency increase by 29.7% (b= .260, p<.001). Thus, some non-traditional
views toward marriage such as seeing a husband’s career success as not necessarily that
of his wife’s, believing that husbands should share in the housework, and believing that
life can be fulfilling without marriage are each positively and significantly related to
marital instability. The effects of disagreement with separate spheres, disagreement with
the traditional ascribed caretaker role, and non-traditional views regarding childbearing
are not statistically significant at the .05 level in Model 3.
Upon a closer examination of the full model (Model 4), the results reveal that the
statistically significant effects from previous models remain significant after other
independent variables are included. Therefore, the gender belief hypotheses are
empirically supported concerning having more non-traditional views toward marriage
such as seeing a husband’s career success as not necessarily that of his wife’s (increasing
the odds of marital instability tendency by 28.4% with b= .250, p<.001), having more
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non-traditional views of gender roles in housework (increasing the odds of marital
instability tendency by 37.9% with b= .321, p<.01), and believing more that life can be
fulfilling without marriage (increasing the odds of marital instability tendency by 28.4%
with b= .250, p<.001). Thus, gender beliefs are empirically supported concerning marital
instability in Taiwan.

Relative Resources and Marital Instability in South Korea
Regression Model 1 in Table 4 features a multivariate test for the effects of
relative resources on marital instability in South Korea. The results show that when the
husband is gainfully employed while the wife is unemployed, the odds of marital
instability tendency decreased by 21.7% compared to couples who are both employed
(b= -.244, p < .05). This result suggests that husbands as sole earners are negatively and
significantly associated with the tendency of marital instability. However, the effects of
wife as sole earner, relative education, husband having a higher income than wife, and
wife having a higher income than husband are not statistically significant at the .05 level
in Model 1, nor do they show effects in the full model (Model 4). A closer examination
across the regression models reveals that the effect of husbands as sole employed earners
(b= -.304, p<.01) remains after other independent variables are included in the full model.
Thus, the relative resource hypotheses are supported concerning husbands as solely
employed on marital instability in South Korea.
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Gender Roles and Marital Instability in South Korea
Regression Model 2 in Table 4 exhibits a test for the effects of gender roles on
marital instability in South Korea. The results suggest that marital interdependency
(needing consent from the other spouse regarding some less major decision making) is
statistically significant in predicting marital instability; that is, when couples are
increasingly dependent on one another, or rather, need consent from one another for less
major decision making, the odds of marital instability tendency decrease by 30%
(b= -.356, p<.01). Although the effects of relative power and relative time spent doing
housework are not statistically significant at the .05 level in Model 2, the effects of
husband having more power in decision-making has an effect in the full model.
Husbands who have more decision-making power are 2.547 times as likely to have
marital instability as are couples who equally share decision-making power (b= .935,
p<.05). Marital interdependency persists in the full regression model. When couples are
increasingly dependent on one another, or rather, need consent from one another for less
major decision making, the odds of marital instability tendency decrease by 28.3%
(b= -.332, p<.01). Thus, gender roles are empirically supported concerning marital
instability in South Korea.

Gender Beliefs and Marital Instability in South Korea
Regression Model 3 displayed in Table 4 explores the regression relationship
between gender beliefs and marital instability in South Korea. For respondents who have
more non-traditional views toward housework, i.e., belief that husbands should share the
housework, the odds of marital instability tendency increase by 15% (b= .140, p<.01).
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For respondents who have more non-traditional views toward marriage, i.e., belief that
life can be fulfilling without marriage, the odds of martial instability tendency also
increase by 23.4% (b= .210, p<.001). For respondents who believe more in a woman’s
ability to have a fulfilled life without children, the odds of marital instability tendency
increase as well, by 11.3% (b= .107, p< .05). The effects of disagreement with separate
spheres, disagreement with the traditional ascribed caretaker role, believing that the
success of a husband’s career is not necessarily that of this wife’s, and non-traditional
views regarding childbearing for men are not statistically significant at the .05 level in
Model 3.
Upon examination of the full model (Model 4), it becomes clear that the
statistically significant effects from previous models remain significant even after other
independent variables are included. In sum, the gender belief hypotheses are supported
concerning some non-traditional views toward marriage such as believing that husbands
should share in the housework (increasing the odds of marital instability tendency by
17.7% with b=.163, p<.001) and believing more in that life can be fulfilling without
marriage (increasing the odds of marital instability tendency by 23% with b= .207,
p<.001), both of which are positively associated with marital instability. Likewise, more
non-traditional views toward childbearing for women, i.e., believing in women’s’ ability
to have a fulfilled life without children (increasing the odds of marital instability
tendency by 10.3% with b=.098, p<.05) is also positively and significantly associated
with marital instability. Thus, gender beliefs are empirically supported concerning
marital instability in South Korea.
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Table 5. Research Hypotheses
China

Taiwan

S. Korea
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S(reduced)
ns

ns
ns

ns
S(reduced &

H1a: Absolute resources, more stable
H1b: Wife’s higher resources, less stable
Husband’s higher resources, more stable

Comparison

full)

Strongest for Taiwan and Korea
H2: Non-traditional marital roles, more stable

ps
S

(reduced)

S (reduced)
ps (full)

(Traditional marital roles, less stable)
Strongest for China

H3: Non-traditional gender beliefs, less stable

S

(full)

ps (reduced

S(reduced &

S(reduced &

& full)

full)

full)

ns

S

Least robust for China

H4: Results will differ by gender:
S
Relative resources
ns
Marital roles
S
Marital beliefs
ns
Strongest for women
S = supported; ps = partially supported; ns = not supported.

ns
ns
S
S

S
ns
S
S

Summary
Table 5 presents the first three research hypotheses and the extent to which each
hypothesis was supported or rejected. As can be seen from the table, the first hypothesis
that absolute resources will exert negative effects on marital instability across the three
societies regardless of cultural and economic differences was uniformly rejected by the
data. The regression results that were not reported in this chapter indicate that absolute
resources show no statistically significant effects on marital instability either in the
resource or in the full regression model for China and South Korea. For Taiwan, the
husband’s education was significant at the .05 level in the resource model only. Given
these null results, no further statistical analyses were conducted.
As an extension of the first hypothesis, the postulated effects of relative resources
were also critically tested. It was hypothesized that in East Asian societies the wife’s
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higher resources than the husband’s are positively associated with marital instability,
whereas the husband’s resources higher than the wife’s are negatively associated with
marital instability compared to the couple having equal resources. The regression results
indicate that this hypothesis was only partially supported. For example, in China, wives
as the sole employed are positively associated with marital instability versus those that
are both employed in the resource model; however, these results do not remain
statistically significant in the full model. Interestingly, in South Korea, husbands who are
sole earners are negatively associated with marital instability as compared to those that
are both employed. And this result stays significant in the full model. However, for
Taiwan, relative resources showed no effects on marital instability in the resource model
or full model. It was hypothesized that the magnitude of the effects will be weaker for
China than for Taiwan and South Korea as Chinese society is less stratified and more
economically homogeneous. This was only partially supported by the data in that the
effects are stronger only for South Korea.
The second hypothesis that non-traditional marital roles will negatively affect
marital instability; namely, if marital roles become egalitarian, the marriage will become
more stable are partially supported by the data for China, Taiwan, and South Korea. In
China, equal decision-making power is negatively associated with marital instability, i.e.,
equal decision-making is associated with greater stability which supports the hypothesis.
Needing consent/dependence on one another in less major decision-making is negatively
associated with marital instability and is the only factor that remains significant in the full
model. Like China, the non-traditional role of Taiwanese couples who have equal
decision-making power is negatively associated with marital instability (more stability)
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which supports the hypothesis. At the same time, but to a lesser magnitude, the
traditional role of Taiwanese husbands having more power than their wives in decisionmaking is also negatively associated with marital instability (more stable) which does not
support the hypothesis. There were no significant effects for wives having more
decision-making power for Taiwan. For South Korea, equal decision-making power had
no significant effects. However, the traditional role of husbands having more power than
their wives in decision-making is positively related to marital instability which supports
the hypothesis. In South Korea traditional marital roles are associated with marriage
instability which supports the hypothesis. The traditional role of needing
consent/dependence on one another in less major decision-making is negatively
associated with marital instability (more stable). In terms of marital decision-making
power, the hypothesis is supported. In China and Taiwan, equal decision-making is
associated with greater marital stability. And in South Korea, traditional marital
decision-making roles are associated with marriage instability. It was hypothesized that
the magnitude of the effects will be strongest for China due largely to China’s socialist
legacies. This was not supported by the data.
Third, it was also hypothesized that egalitarian gender beliefs will be positively
associated with marital instability, namely, those who endorse egalitarian gender beliefs
will display greater tendencies toward marital instability. The results concerning gender
beliefs are supported by the data for Taiwan and South Korea, and partially supported for
China. In China, having the non-traditional beliefs of husband’s career success is not
necessarily that of wife’s and that life can be fulfilling without marriage are both
positively related to marital instability, however the non-traditional belief that women can
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have a filling life without children is negatively related to marital instability. Thus, for
China, gender beliefs are partially supported by the data. For Taiwan, the non-traditional
beliefs of husband’s career success is not necessarily that of his wife’s, that husband
should share in housework, and that life can be fulfilling without marriage are each
positively related to marital instability. In South Korea, the non-traditional belief that
husband should share in housework, that life can be fulfilling without marriage, and that
women can have fulfilling lives without children are each positively related to marital
instability. Thus, for Taiwan and South Korea the hypotheses are supported, while for
China, the hypotheses are partially supported.
Additionally, the effects are expected to be more robust for Taiwan and South
Korea than for China. The results indicate this is so. Egalitarian gender beliefs are
believed to be more widespread in China than in Taiwan and South Korea because of the
stronger dedication to institutionalized gender egalitarianism in China. It can also be
inferred that the effects of egalitarian gender roles and egalitarian gender beliefs on
marital instability will be different across Taiwan and South Korea as South Korea is
thought to hold the most conservative positions regarding marriage and family life of any
East Asian society (Bumpass & Choe 2004). However, this study does not indicate a
substantial difference between Taiwan and South Korea in terms of the effects of
egalitarian gender beliefs on marital instability.

The Effects on Marital Instability by Gender
Using the full model, Table 6 reports regression results that show how relative
resources, gender roles, and gender beliefs affect marital instability either similarly or
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differentially by gender across the three societies. The section that follows immediately
interprets the regression findings separately for each society. Whenever feasible,
comparisons and contrasts are made as well.

China
The results for China reported in Table 6 suggest that having more non-traditional
views toward marriage are statistically significant for wives’ reported marital instability.
That is, for Chinese wives having more non-traditional views toward marriage increases
the odds of marital instability tendency by 82.6% (b= .602, p<.05) while the other
variables in the model are held constant.
For Chinese husbands, on the other hand, having a wife as the sole employed are
3.228 times as likely to have marital instability than are couples who are both employed
(b= 1.172, p<.05). Also for Chinese husbands, having a wife with higher income
decreases the odds of marital instability tendency by 81% compared to husbands and
wives who earn equal income (b= -1.683, p<.05). These results indicate that wives as
sole employed earners unstablize the marriage, whereas wives who earn higher incomes
the belief that a husband’s career success is not necessarily that of the wife’s is
significant for men. Further, the effects of relative resources, namely wife as sole
earner/employed and wife having higher income than husband on marital instability are
significant for males as well. Therefore, in China, the effects of relative resources and
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Table 6 Ordered Logistics Regression of Marital Instability on Selected Variables by Gender

gender beliefs on marital instability differ by gender (while resources are relatively more
important for men than for women, gender beliefs are relatively important for women
than for men) and are empirically supported by the data.

Taiwan
The results for Taiwan reported in Table 6 suggest that for wives, having more
equal power with husbands in the decision-making processes are statistically significant
for wives’ reported marital instability. For wives, having more equal power decreases the
odds of marital instability tendency by 69.2% (b= -1.178, p<.01) while the other variables
in the model are held constant. In terms of gender beliefs, for wives who have more nontraditional views of gender roles regarding housework, i.e., belief that husbands should
share the housework, the odds of marital instability tendency increase by 46.4% (b= .381,
p< .01). And for wives who have more non-traditional views toward marriage, i.e., belief
that life can be fulfilling without marriage, the odds of martial instability tendency
increase by 30.3% (b= .265, p<.05).
For Taiwanese husbands, having equal power with wives in the decision-making
processes are statistically significant for husbands’ reported marital instability. For
husbands, having equal power, decreases the odds of marital instability tendency by 74%
(b= -1.346, p<.01). Also for husbands in Taiwan who believe more in a husband’s career
success is not necessarily a wife’s success, the odds of marital instability tendency
increase by 39.2% (b= .331, P<.05).
Unlike their mainland counterparts, for Taiwan, the effects of gender roles as they
relate to having equal power in decision-making are significant for both Taiwanese
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husbands and wives in the expected direction. The effects of gender beliefs, specifically
non-traditional views of gender roles as they pertain to housework and non-traditional
views of marriage on the tendency of marital instability are significant for women. The
effects of gender beliefs, specifically the belief that a husband’s career success is not
necessarily that of the wife’s is significant for men. Therefore, in Taiwan, the hypotheses
that the effects of gender beliefs on marital instability differ by gender are empirically
supported by the data. While gender roles pertaining to decision-making power are
statistically significant, no obvious gender differences were detected.

South Korea
For South Korean wives who have more non-traditional views of gender roles
regarding housework, i.e., belief that husbands should share the housework, the odds of
marital instability tendency increase by 32.6% (b= .282, p< .001). Moreover, for wives
who have more non-traditional views toward marriage, i.e., belief that life can be
fulfilling without marriage, the odds of martial instability tendency increase by 17.8%
(b= .164, p<.01). Also, for wives who have more non-traditional views toward
childbearing for women, i.e., belief that a woman’s life can be fulfilling without children,
the odds of martial instability increase by 12.4% (b= .117, p<.05). However, for South
Korean husbands, having more education than one’s wife increases the odds of marital
instability tendency by 35% compared to those having equal education with their wives
(b= .302, p<.05). This suggests that husbands with higher education than their wives are
positively and significantly related to the tendency of marital instability. Thus, having
husbands with higher education than wives has increased marital instability compared to
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those couples with equal education. Additionally, for husbands in South Korea who
believe in more non-traditional views of marriage, i.e., the belief that life can be fulfilling
with out marriage, the odds of marital instability tendency increase by 29.2% (b= .256,
P<.001). These results are positively and significantly related to the tendency of marital
instability.
It is interesting to note that unlike their Chinese and Taiwanese counterparts, for
South Korea, the effects of relative resources, specifically husband having higher
education than wife is significant for men. However, the effects of gender beliefs, such
as non-traditional views toward gender roles pertaining to housework and non- traditional
views toward childbearing for women are significant for women. And finally, the effects
of gender beliefs, namely, non-traditional views toward marriage are significant for both
men and women. Each of these effects increases the tendency of marital instability in
South Korea. Therefore, in South Korea, the effects of relative resources and gender
beliefs on marital instability do differ by gender and the hypotheses are supported by the
data.

Summary of Gender Differences
In addition to the anticipated cross-societal differences and/or similarities that
have been reported earlier in this chapter, it was further surmised that the effects of
resources, gender roles, and gender beliefs on marital instability will differ by gender
regardless of cultural and societal differences. Indeed, consistent with the findings from
Western industrialized societies, it was anticipated that the effects will be stronger for
women than for men as economically independent and egalitarian-minded women will
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have higher levels of demand in marital relationship which may lead to higher levels of
marital instability. While effects were stronger for women than men in terms of gender
beliefs; the effects were stronger for men than women in terms of relative resources. For
men, wife as sole employed while husband is unemployed (China) and husbands having
higher education than their wives (South Korea) increase marital instability. Also for
men, having a wife who earns higher income than her husband decreases marital
instability, or rather stabilizes the marriage (China).
Another interesting finding is that the effects of gender roles were exactly the
same for men and women in Taiwan. Having non-traditional gender roles such as having
equal decision-making power made marriages more stable according to both Taiwanese
men and women’s reports. But, there were expected societal differences. For example,
in both China and South Korea, among men and women, gender role effects did not
impact marital instability. In contrast, for Taiwan gender roles affect marital instability
for both men and women.
It was further inferred that the effects of gender beliefs on marital instability will
differ by gender regardless of cultural and societal differences. In other words, it was
expected that the effects of gender beliefs were stronger for women than for men. With
this in mind, the only consistent item across all three societies is for women believing that
life can be fulfilling without marriage, which increased the likelihood of marital
instability, whereas each non-traditional gender belief increased the likelihood of marital
instability for both men and women regardless of society. For women, the belief that
husbands should share housework (Taiwan & South Korea), and the belief that women
can have a fulfilling life without children (South Korea) increased the likelihood of
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marital instability. For men, the belief that life can be fulfilling without marriage (South
Korea), and the belief that a husband’s career is not necessarily that of his wife’s (China
& Taiwan), also increased the likelihood of marital instability. In light of these findings,
it is concluded that the effects of gender beliefs on marital instability do not uniformly
differ by gender. There are more unanticipated nuances that will be further discussed in
next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Using data from the East Asian Social Survey (EASS), a three-society survey
conducted in China, Taiwan, and South Korea, I have analyzed selected determinants of
marital instability among married Chinese, Taiwanese, and South Korean respondents. In
what follows, I will revisit my principal hypotheses and corresponding survey results,
discuss the theoretical implications of my research, indicate the limitations of my study,
and suggest directions for future research.

Hypotheses and Survey Results
Hypothesis 1A: Absolute resources will exert negative effects on marital
instability across the three societies regardless of cultural and economic differences. In
other words, as more resources are available to married individuals, the marriage will
become increasingly stable.
My findings lend limited support to the dominant resource theory for explaining
marital instability in Western societies. Contrary to resource theory, however, increased
absolute economic resources had no significant effect on marital instability in China,
Taiwan, or Korea. Thus my first hypothesis that absolute resources will exert negative
effects on marital instability was not supported by my data in any of the three societies
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surveyed. The effects of spouses’ resources relative to each other(relative resources),
however, did produce some significant but complex findings, as summarized next.
Hypothesis 1B: Wife’s higher resources than the husband’s are positively
associated with marital instability, whereas the husband’s resources higher than the
wife’s are negatively associated with marital instability compared to the couple having
equal resources. It was speculated that the magnitude of the effects of relative resources
would be weaker for China than for Taiwan and South Korea as Chinese society is less
stratified and more economically homogeneous.
My results for China show that when the wife is employed and the husband is not,
marital instability increases compared to couples who are both employed. Yet when
examining differences by gender, the results also show that for men, when wives have
higher incomes than their husbands, marital instability decreases. These results suggest
that wives as sole employed earners destabilize the marriage, whereas wives who earn
higher incomes than their husbands stabilize the marriage. If the results were in the same
direction, a strong argument for relative resource theory could be made. In light of these
results in China, it appears that both structural and cultural forces are at work here. In
accordance with Greenstein (1990), when wives’ earnings and share of family earnings
are greater, marital instability is less likely. Somewhat similarly, South (1985) found that
though the effect of prosperity makes divorce more feasible, this effect is, however,
outweighed by the positive effect on personal relationships. In the case of China, when
the wife is the sole employed, the findings of Zuo and Bian (2001) suggest that the failure
to perform culturally prescribed gender roles invokes a sense of unfairness. The work of
a man of “failed aspirations” or the work of a woman of “excessive” career orientation is
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viewed as a debt to their spouse because they have breached gender boundaries (Zuo &
Bian, 2001). As such, gender is constructed in institutional and cultural context (Zuo,
2003). Thus, a compilation of structural and cultural perspectives, as well as resource
and gender theory serve to best explain these results in China.
In South Korea, when husbands are employed and their wives are not, marriage
becomes more stable as compared to couples who are both employed. The difference in
men and women’s employment in South Korea illustrates the convergence of both
structural and cultural forces. Only 27% of married women in South Korea participate in
the paid labor force. Those who are in the paid labor force earn less relative to their
male counterparts. From both structural and cultural perspectives, it has been argued
that Confucianism has aided modernization by placing valuation on motivation for high
achievement, education, non-confrontation to maintain group harmony, and personal
sacrifice for the success of the family (Slote & DeVos, 1998). Confucianism then,
provides the basic ethics of not only modernization in Korea (Slote & DeVos, 1998, p.
250), but also of family life. Men fulfill traditional ideals and aid in modernization by
excelling at work and being the provider for the family. Women, on the other hand,
fulfill traditional ideals and aid in modernization by managing a household and being
responsible for educating their children, thus supplying a valued resource for the future.
Both members of the couple consider their individual contributions as fundamental to the
marriage and as complementing each other, explaining why 73% of married women are
not in the workforce, and why husband’s sole employment decreases martial instability.
When delineating by gender, it was found that women in South Korea who
reported their income as non-applicable or who did not know their spouse’s income are
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more likely to experience marital instability than those who had equal income with their
spouse. Considering the previous discussion regarding employment, it appears that
being unemployed is not the destabilizing factor, rather not having an income, or not
having access to income leads to marital instability. Here, a few scenarios are possible.
The wife may acknowledge that her contributions rest in household management and
children’s education, yet the lack of additional income coming into the household is
problematic. Or, the wife may acknowledge that her contributions are essential, yet her
lack of access to an income is a problem. Or, lastly, the wife values the separate
contributions, however, she does not know what specifically his contribution is, thus
implying an issue of disconnection, mistrust, or a denial of her household managerial
role.
Men in South Korea who have higher educations than their wives were more
likely to experience marital instability than those husbands whose wives had equal
education. The family in South Korea that once focused on parents and property now
focuses on children’s education. Values which reflect the old Confucian tradition in new
forms, such as the high value of education and a strong achievement motivation, are
directed toward the prosperity of the family and establishing or maintaining a good
family reputation (Lee, 1998). It is not surprising then, with education so valued and
linked to reputation, that husbands want their wives to be more educated. When
reputation and status are at stake, it appears that marital stability is as well.
The hypothesis that the effects of relative resources would be stronger in Taiwan
and South Korea than in China was only partially supported because the effects were only
stronger in South Korea. Unlike in China where egalitarian efforts and equality were
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promoted by the state, thus insuring near universal employment, South Korean political
and economic climate encouraged women to work only when men were not available to
fill the labor void. But when cheap labor was no longer needed, it was women who were
the first to be laid off (Armstrong, 2002). Thus, women in South Korea are less likely to
be employed and less likely to make up a higher percentage of workers in an occupation.
As a result, structural resources at the macro level including levels of socioeconomic
development and socio-political systems, influence micro-level structural resources such
as employment within a marriage. Women’s lack of workforce participation creates
financial dependency on their spouse that would certainly curtail divorce as an option.
Hypothesis 2: Egalitarian marital roles will negatively affect marital instability;
that is, if marital roles become less traditional, the marriage will become more stable. Put
differently, if marital roles become more traditional, the marriage will become less stable.
It was predicted that the effects of egalitarian role expectations would be stronger in
China than in Taiwan or South Korea, due largely to China’s socialist legacy.
As expected, in China and South Korea dependence in terms of spouses needing
consent for less major decision-making was negatively associated with marital
instability. Thus, men and women in China and South Korea who need the consent of
their spouse for making certain decisions as an indicator of marital interdependency,
experience less marital instability. If needing consent is seen as traditional for women,
then it is construed that needing consent is seen as non-traditional for men. Additionally,
men and women in China who share equal decision-making power, experience less
marital instability. When analyzing the data separately by gender, no significant gender
differences emerged. This indicates that if both marital partners are dependent on one
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another in marital decision making, the marriage tends to becomes more stable. This is
particularly understandable in the case of China where the egalitarian legacy of socialism
lingers.
While results are the same for South Korea in terms of interdependence among
couples, the speculated reasoning must be different as South Korea does not have a
legacy of socialist egalitarianism. To the contrary, South Korea has had a greater
exposure to Western culture since WWII as compared to China. To make matters even
more complex, the results show that as husbands have more decision-making power, the
marriage becomes less stable. To explain the case of South Korea, a brief description of
marital roles is in order. In the case of urban South Korea, the husband dedicates himself
primarily to his role as breadwinner and spends most of his time and energy outside the
house with long work hours. The South Korean wife is responsible for their children’s
education and the management of a large majority of household labor. As Lee (1998)
argued, the wife has taken on the role as family head because the husband cannot fulfill
that role. Therefore, the urban husband has lost his position of authority except when the
wife calls upon him to back up her requests. Consequently, in South Korea married
women have a great deal of authority and autonomy within the family, although there is a
very distinct division of labor whereby couples “do gender” as a process through
everyday interaction. When the wife’s authority is challenged as a result of a husband
exerting his decision-making power, marital instability is bound to increase. When minor
decisions need to be made, it appears that consent is mutually needed. Perhaps this is
where the wife calls on the husband to back up her wishes symbolically. As reported
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previously, when the data were analyzed separately by gender, no effects were significant
for men or women in South Korea.
Most of the support for the hypothesis that non-traditional marital roles will make
marriage more stable, however, is provided by Taiwan. The statistical analyses reveal
that having equal power in decision-making is highly significant, not only in the gender
role model and the full model, but also in gender specific models. Equal decision-making
power does tend to stabilize marriages in Taiwan. The effect of egalitarian marital power
as a stabilizing factor in marriage is expected because egalitarian involvement in marital
decisions will moderate marital disagreements and conflicts (Xu & Lai, 2004). As such,
the findings support the idea that having non-traditional gender roles decreases the
tendency of marital instability. However, Xu and Lai (2002) found that Taiwanese
husbands are more likely to share power with their wives if the decisions are traditionally
within wives’ realms and less likely if the decisions are customarily made by men. These
results corroborate previous studies suggesting that marital power in Taiwanese
marriages is in transition (Xu & Lai, 2002) and that marital power in Taiwanese
marriages is increasingly negotiated with an apparent gradual shift toward egalitarianism
(Yi & Yang, 1995). This finding also appears to be consistent with Blumstein and
Schwartz’s (1983) notion of “peer marriage” in that a marital relationship is based on
principles of equity and equality. As such, equal decision-making power would be
emphasized by both parties in a marital relationship. Consequently, marital stability
would be expected. Indeed, Schwartz (1994) and Risman and Johnson-Sumerford (1997)
found that these egalitarian couples most valued an intense companionship and were less
likely to experience marital instability. It must be noted here that the finding from
149

Taiwan by no means suggests that Taiwanese marriages are “peer marriages” and
marriage partners are equal intimates. It does, however, demonstrate that marital
egalitarianism in decision-making process can benefit marriage by strengthening the
marital bond.
Hypothesis 3: Egalitarian gender beliefs will be positively associated with marital
instability, namely, those who endorse non-traditional gender beliefs will display greater
tendencies toward marital instability.
My findings provide general support for this hypothesis, including the proviso
that the effects of egalitarian gender beliefs on marital instability would be more robust
for Taiwan and South Korea than for China. In China, where there is a stronger devotion
to institutionalized gender egalitarian principles, it is understood that egalitarian gender
beliefs are more extensive than in Taiwan or South Korea. Along the same line, South
Korea is thought to be one of the most conservative East Asian societies regarding
marriage and family perspectives (Bumpass & Choe 2004), thus, the effects of egalitarian
gender roles and egalitarian gender beliefs on marital instability will be different across
Taiwan and South Korea as well.
In the case of Taiwan, though the effects of egalitarian marital power decreased
marital instability tendency as discussed above, the effects of egalitarian gender beliefs,
however, increased marital instability tendency. This is an indication that gender
egalitarianism is at odds with traditional Confucian family ethics. Non-traditional
women who view their marital roles and workload as consistent with their ideology may
view unequal roles and workloads as unjust, thus creating increases in marital instability.
As Xu and Lai (2004) suggested, egalitarian gender beliefs may lead to greater marital
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instability unless it can be successfully translated into egalitarianism in role
performances.
In both China and Taiwan, the belief that a husband’s success is not necessarily
that of the wife’s is positively associated with marital instability. However, gender
specific analysis shows that the results are only significant for males, which means that
for men in China and Taiwan, the belief that husbands’ success is not necessarily that of
their wives’ increases marital instability. This finding makes sense in the case of China
because during the Mao era (1949-1976), the “same work, same pay” policy in China
greatly raised women’s social and economic standing relative to men’s (Tan, 1994).
Thus, the traditional female supportive role and the traditional male breadwinning role
were undermined by collective ideologies and practices (Zuo & Bian, 2001, p. 1125).
While Confucian family values of traditional gender roles were challenged as most
wives worked outside the home in China, marital instability is heightened when
husbands do not acknowledge their wife’s role in their success.
Confucian family values of traditional gender roles were challenged as most
wives work outside the home in China. Yet, the family collective values were
reaffirmed. Thus, marital instability is heightened when husbands do not acknowledge
their wife’s role in their success. In more traditional societies such as Taiwan, married
women may endorse egalitarianism but do so under the prevalence and persistence of
patriarchal family relationships (Xu & Lai, 2004). Despite improvements in women’s
skills and educational attainment relative to men’s, the mean gender earnings ratio
between 1978 and 1992 continues at 65% (Zveglich, Van der Meulen, & Rodgers, 1997).
Moreover, when Chinese or Taiwanese wives are willing to forego their own career in
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support of their husband’s, which can release their earning responsibility, they can also
develop and express a sense of entitlement to their husband’s higher earnings and social
status – “His money is my money”; “his success is my success and reflects my
contributions” (Zuo & Bian, 2001, p. 1129). In accordance with Hochschild (1989), role
identity relies more on recognition and appreciation for what one does in the marriage,
rather than on the resources one contributes to the marriage. Thus, when husbands in
China and Taiwan believe that their success is not necessarily that of their wives’,
marital instability increases.
From the Taiwanese and South Korean data, results indicate that having the
belief that husbands should share in housework is positively associated with marital
instability. Upon examining the results separately by gender, the effects persist for
women in Taiwan and South Korea, but not for men. As stated earlier, in more
traditional societies such as Taiwan and South Korea, married women may have
egalitarian gender beliefs, however, because of established patriarchal family
relationships, they may have lower expectations to fulfill, thus resulting in their gender
beliefs having little impact on their marriage quality directly (Xu & Lai, 2004). In this
study, the effect of gender attitudes toward housework was found to increase the
tendency of marital instability in both Taiwan and South Korea. Taiwanese wives spend
five times what men do on household responsibilities and South Korean wives are solely
responsible for nearly the entire management of the household. Therefore, it is not
surprising that wives in Taiwan and South Korea believe that men should share in the
housework. Peng and Wong (2004) attribute the increase in divorce in Taiwan, in part,
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to changes in attitudes regarding the burden of familial care. For example, thirty four
percent of married women are unemployed in Taiwan in order to take care of their
families (Westley, 1998). In South Korea, a vast majority of women are unemployed to
manage the household and care for children. In accordance with Westley (1998), if it is
a continued expectation that women have a greater workload than their husbands, it
might also be expected that women are more likely to feel hesitancy regarding marriage,
thus increasing marital instability. In Taiwan and South Korea where wives are more
likely to be unemployed and have significantly smaller income shares as compared to
their husbands, women lack the bargaining leverage over chores. Gender, thus,
functions as an ideological device that produces, reproduces, and legitimates behavior
and activities based on gender (West & Zimmerman, 1987; Zuo, 2003). Consequently,
for women who might seek a more equitable division, gender ideology as “hidden
power,” reduces their bargaining power (Ferree, 1990, p. 876). Additionally, women’s
egalitarian attitudes may lead to tension between spouses because women with these
attitudes are less likely to take traditional roles for granted, and more often will discuss
family and household tasks with their husbands (Amato & Booth, 1995; Greenstein,
1990; Lye & Biblarz, 1993).
Non-traditional views about marriage, that life can be fulfilling without marriage,
were positively associated with marital instability for all three societies. Broken down
by gender, the marital instability effects of non-traditional marital views held true for
both men and women in South Korea but only for women in China and Taiwan. At the
same time, all three societies, especially China, have undergone dramatic changes
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toward egalitarianism, particularly among women. The traditional role of women as
subordinate to men has lost substantial acceptance and has given way to ideals of gender
equality and women’s greater independence. New norms of gender equality and
independence make it possible for women to leave, forego, or confront unsatisfying
marriages, thus creating increased marital instability.
In China, the legacy of socialism and its emphasis on egalitarianism continues to
improve women’s chances for equality. In Taiwan, women’s income and educational
attainment have steadily increased, as more women have increasingly participated in the
paid labor force (Chou, 1994; Lu, 1984; Tsai & Yi, 1997; Xu & Lai, 2004), and both men
and women, especially the younger generation, have gradually moved away from
Confucian family values (Chia, Allred, & Jerzak, 1997; Farris, 1994; Tsai & Yi, 1997).
As Taiwanese women become less traditional in gender beliefs than Taiwanese men (Xu
& Lai, 2004), they are more likely than their male counterparts to report higher levels of
marital instability. Consistent with attitudinal changes regarding marriage, the rates of
marriage have declined from nearly universal marriage at the beginning of the last
century to many spending a significant part of their adulthood as single persons at the end
of the century (Xu & Lai, 2004). In accordance with gender theory, traditional wives are
less likely to believe in their abilities to establish self-sufficient households than are
egalitarian-minded women who place greater emphasis on independence (Kalmijn, De
Graaf, & Poortman, 2004). In addition, women with egalitarian beliefs are more tolerant
of different forms of family arrangements than their traditional counterparts, and
egalitarian women are less likely than traditional women to think it is morally wrong to
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leave a husband and marriage of discontent (Lupetow, Guss, & Hyden, 1989; Lye &
Biblarz, 1993).
South Korea, however, paints a different picture. As stated earlier, the South
Korean husband-wife relationship is based on difference; that is, the two different
elements become one. Either of the two alone is incomplete and unfinished, hence, a
single man or single woman would not be recognized as a whole person in Korean
culture (Joe, 2000). It is no wonder then that for both men and women in South Korea,
the belief that life could be fulfilling without marriage would increase marital instability.
In modern South Korea, the perpetuation of traditional gender roles and ideologies
remain a family structure mainstay (Bedeski, 1994). Therefore, this gender system sets
boundaries for attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s gender category. Once
again, since gender serves as an ideological device which legitimates gender-based
behavior and activities (West & Zimmerman, 1987; Zuo, 2003), when one fails to follow
culturally approved gender norms, marital instability will increase.
In China, the non-traditional view of childbearing that life can be fulfilling for
women without children is negatively associated with marital instability. In other words,
believing that children are not needed in order for women to have satisfying lives
stabilizes marriage. However, in South Korea, the same belief is positively associated
with marital instability, namely, destabilizing marriage. The gender specific findings
indicate that the effect is washed out for China but persists for women in South Korea.
Despite tremendous declines in family size (Banister, 1987; Bumpass & Choe, 2004),
both marriage and having children remain nearly universal in China and South Korea.
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Pimentel (2000) found that in China, having children does affect the marriage, but
the effects vary by gender. For women, young children affect the marriage by increasing
the gender stereotyped behaviors and interactions between the husband and wife yielding
greater marital disharmony, whereas men felt they lost their wives’ attention, therefore
the decline in marital closeness is sharper for men (Pimentel, 2000). Therefore, not
viewing children as a necessary component in order to have a fulfilling life, increases
stability in Chinese marriages. Moreover, this expected result can be contextually linked
to the well-know fertility control policies implemented in the 1970s, especially, the “one
child per family” policy, which have undermined the Chinese traditional ideal of having
several generations living under the same roof. This ideational shift in childbearing
seems to be more salient among Chinese women than among Chinese men.
The opposite is revealed in the case of South Korea in that South Korean men
and women who believe that children are needed for women to have fulfilling lives, have
increased marital instability. Though the traditional orientation toward the necessity of
having children is prevalent, women are less likely than men to feel that women need
children for a satisfying life (Bumpass & Choe, 2004). In this study, gender specific
analysis found that having the non-traditional view of childbearing for women increased
marital instability among women but not men. While the role of motherhood is highly
respected, mothers in South Korea undergo immense pressures to successfully educate
their children. The expectation that mothers are solely responsible for children’s
educational success is deeply rooted in Confucian cultural heritage and norms in South
Korean society (Brinton, 2001). Mothers must work in order to pay for the heavy costs
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of tutoring or after-school programs, or provide the additional tutelage themselves. Most
mothers cannot afford the heavy costs of tutoring because of cultural expectations that
deny women suitable employment opportunities. And yet when mothers do work in
order to pay the tutoring cost, cultural expectations do not allow women to successfully
balance the burden of work and family obligations (Tsuya & Choe, 2004). It is no
wonder then that women in South Korea are less likely than men to feel that women
need children for a satisfying life. The desired fertility among married women is very
low; in fact, the fertility rate has declined to below-replacement levels in Korea (Tsuya
& Choe, 2004). A fertility rate increase is hardly anticipated unless the stress of having
children is reduced via the formal education system or cultural expectations and beliefs
regarding women’s responsibilities as sole caretaker and educator of children.
Hypothesis 4: Relative resources, gender roles, and gender beliefs on marital
instability will differ by gender regardless of cultural and societal differences. Consistent
with the findings from Western industrialized societies, it is anticipated that the effects
will be stronger for women than for men as economically independent and egalitarianminded women will have higher levels of demand in marital relationship which may lead
to higher levels of marital instability.
For China, only men produced significant correlations of relative resources on
marital instability. Wives’ sole employment destabilized the marriage while wives’
higher earnings than husband stabilized the marriage. In South Korea, for men, husband
having more education than wife; for women, having non-applicable income or not
knowing their spouses income, both increased marital instability. For Taiwan, there were
no gender differences as there were no significant correlations of relative resources on
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marital instability. Relative resources on marital instability differed by gender regardless
for China and South Korea, but not for Taiwan.
In terms of marital roles, there were no gender differences across the board. For
China and South Korea, there were no significant correlations of martial roles on marital
instability. While for Taiwan, equal decision-making power as a stabilizing factor for
marriage was highly significant, for both men and women. Marital roles on marital
instability did not differ by gender for any of the societies studied.
Among gender beliefs, the belief that a husbands’ career success is not that of his
wife’s, is significant for men only in China and Taiwan and it increased marital
instability for both. The belief that husbands should share in housework, is only
significant for women in Taiwan and South Korea and it increased marital instability for
both. Also increasing marital instability is having non-traditional views of marriage
which is significant only for women in China and Taiwan and significant for both men
and women in South Korea. Having non-traditional views for childbearing for women is
significant for women only in South Korea, increasing marital instability. Therefore,
gender beliefs on marital instability differed by gender regardless of cultural and societal
differences.
In Western societies, economic resources, gender role practices, and gender
beliefs are more significantly correlated with marital instability for women than for men.
Similar gender differences were revealed by my data for Taiwan and South Korea, but
not for China. In China, my survey data reversed the Western model by producing
significant correlations of marital instability for men but not for women.
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Of all the variables measured in my study, gender beliefs had the greatest overall
effect on marital instability. As predicted, because of China’s decades-long commitment
to institutionalized gender egalitarianism, the findings were least robust for China in
comparison to Taiwan and South Korea. The implication here is quite clear: gender
occupies a central place in cross-cultural studies on marital instability.

Theoretical Implications
This study made an explicit endeavor to provide a linkage between macro-level
theories and micro-level theories in the context of comparative family studies. For
example, the structural determinants of marital instability are illuminated in this study by
applying existing socioeconomic and sociopolitical structural theories on marital
instability developed in the West to the three East Asian societies. The macro-level
resource theory suggests that structural resources, such as socioeconomic development
and sociopolitical systems, influence structural resources at the individual level in that
resources available and obtainable through the macro-level become the family member’s
owed resources within the marriage. The findings lend limited support to the resources
based theory that is explanatory of marital instability in Western industrialized societies.
However, there are cross-society differences in socioeconomic resources, suggesting that
the relationship between resources and marital instability vary not only as a product of
society but also as a product of gender and cultural influences. As such, an integration of
structural and cultural perspectives as well as resource and gender theory serves to best
explain the effects of relative resources in China, Taiwan, and South Korea.
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The findings show that the differential levels of social and economic development
and political climates across the three societies have shaped structural resources and
marital instability at the macro-level. In China where egalitarianism was promoted by the
state, thus insuring women’s rights, the findings are the least robust across the board. In
Taiwan, the government attempted to overturn the pattern of unemployment among
married women because Taiwan’s small firms are highly labor-intensive and employers
are exhausting the supply of males and single females. Therefore, greater flexibility in
work demands and work hours became prevalent in Taiwan and this was complemented
by relatively weaker patriarchal values in the family (Brinton, 2001). In line with
findings from the Netherlands (Kalmijn, Graaf, & Poortman, 2004), this study found that
in societies that promote egalitarian or progressive attitudes, women’s labor force
participation does not increase marital instability, suggesting that as female labor force
participation rates continue to increase, marital instability may in fact decline.
This study also examines the cultural determinants of marital instability in societies that
have been historically and contemporarily influenced by Confucianism. Because of this
shared cultural tradition in Confucianism, this study investigated cultural roots of marital
(in)stability and examined them through the lens of gendered marital roles and gender
beliefs in the different societies. In so doing, the many understudied cultural nuances,
either Chinese, Taiwanese, or Korean, were revealed. It appears that the legacy of
egalitarianism and family collectivism prevail in China despite the influence of Western
individualism. In South Korea, traditional patriarchy denoted by the perpetuation of
traditional gender roles and ideologies remain a family structure mainstay (Bedeski,
1994). And in Taiwan, couples are attempting to maintain a balance between family and
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individual values. As such, marital power in Taiwanese marriages is in transition with an
apparent gradual shift toward egalitarianism (Xu & Lai, 2002; Yi & Yang, 1995).
Lastly, this study adopts a holistic structural-cultural approach under which sociocultural specific analyses are retained. For example, in contrast to previous studies which
have grouped China and Taiwan together, it is evident here that they should be studied
separately. Each is characterized by a distinctive history, pathway of socio-economic
development, and resulting variations in patterns of marital instability. Special attention
is given to China, a state socialist society under reform. With the collapse of the former
Soviet Union and the Eastern Blocks, comparative family studies involving state
socialism are rare. In this sense, this study is timely. It engages a society that is at its
historical cross-road; that is, not only does China try very hard to hold unto a socialist
political system but is undergoing a profound capitalistic economic transformation from a
socialist redistributive economy (a centralized system) with an emphasis on strategies of
equality to a system that is incorporating a growing private sector. At this historical
juncture, a study such as this is both sociologically and historically significant.

Study Limitations and Directions for Future Research
There are several limitations in this study. First, the EASS data were collected in
the later part of the 1990s (1996-97), a period of great changes in urban unemployment in
the People’s Republic of China. Beginning in 1997, however, the Chinese government
implemented more aggressive policies to shut down large-sized, state-owned enterprises
that were not efficient and unprofitable, which led to massive layoffs (Giles, Park & Cai,
2006). While the cross-sectional data allowed me to explore the effects of
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(un)employment on marital instability, the data did not capture more dramatic changes in
the labor market in reforming China. More attention should be given to the relationship
between unemployment and marital instability in future research.
Second, because the EASS data are cross-sectional, the lack of longitudinal
information is an obvious limitation. While socialist egalitarianism thrives in China, it
does so under a cloud of patriarchy and traditional Confucian ideals. China’s newly
developed decentralized sector has company managers setting wages rather than
government. Because of this, cultural influence is important and has led to gender bias
(Meng, 1992). By collecting data over time, it could be determined whether the state’s
authority decline in a market-based, privately-owned economy will undermine socialist
egalitarianism. This could imply that as China follows the path taken by both Taiwan
and South Korea in which an increasingly formalized private sector overwhelmed what
was once a dominant state-enterprise sector (Amsden, 1985; Ranis, 1992), a system
could develop that is market and class-based, as predicted by Tang and Parish (2000).
According to Gunderson (1994), countries that have decentralized, market-oriented wage
determination such as Taiwan and South Korea, also emphasize traditional roles for
women in the labor market. Thus, China may find itself in a position whereby women’s
occupations and wages have greater gender bias, implying that the reactions of
egalitarian minded women would likely result in increased marital instability.
In addition, with longitudinal data, the effects of socio-economic goals and
traditional ideals on marital instability in South Korea could be determined over time. A
relatively low number of South Korean married women are in the labor force (27%), and
at the same time, South Korean is facing serious foreign competition. Without the
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benefit of having a greater number of women in the workforce, they are missing a huge
labor pool. This implies that in the future, the economic strength of South Korea may be
undermined if married women do not work. This also implies that South Korea may
follow the path taken by Taiwan by providing greater flexibility in work demands and
work hours for women and subsequent weaker patriarchal values in the family. In the
future, South Korean socio-economic goals and traditional ideals may be at odds with
one another. In this study, husband’s sole employment decreases martial instability, and
non-traditional beliefs regarding marriage increase marital instability. It will be
interesting to see how couples negotiate their marital roles and beliefs in light of any
changes in the labor market. The future of China and South Korea will continue to
answer questions regarding the effect of institutionalized gender egalitarianism and labor
market characteristics. In other words, by examining change over time in the “big
structures” and “large processes” as described by Charles Tilly (1984), it can be better
understood how social and economic development and political climates, shape the
relationship between structural resources and marital instability.
Third, because gender beliefs had the strongest effects, this research should be
extended to study the process through which gender beliefs moderate the effects of
resources and marital roles on marital instability. Greenstein (1995) suggests that gender
ideology functions as a lens through which inequalities in employment and marital roles
are viewed. While inequalities are presumed to increase marital instability, Greenstein
(1995) posits that it is only when the inequalities are perceived as unfair. Therefore, the
perception of fairness may be a better predictor of marital instability than the extent of
the inequalities among couples identified by gender beliefs as traditional, transitional, and
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egalitarian. Additionally, role fit, the fit between actual and desired roles (Townsend &
Gurin, 1981), could be examined in order to determine if role-fit, or lack thereof, is also a
better predictor of marital instability as opposed to the traditional employment and
marital roles measures alone.
Fourth, as described previously, the EASS did not interview married couples. As
a result, many important spousal characteristics were reported by respondents. This
could have caused two types of difficulties in the relative measures used in this
dissertation, such as relative resources. First of all, spousal reports tend to have reporting
biases (Kamo, 2000). Secondly, several relative measures, such as relative dependency,
could not be ascertained as the questions were not asked of the respondent on behalf of
their spouse. Couple data are clearly preferred in future research.
Fifth, because the data came from secondary source, some of the measures used in
the study may not be ideal. For example, while the religion measures are available in the
Taiwanese and South Korean data, they were not collected in China. This is unfortunate
because the relationship between religiosity and marital instability has been well
established in the West (e.g., Call & Heaton, 1997). It would be very intriguing to see if
this relationship holds cross-culturally in future research.
Sixth, a reciprocal analysis of how changes in income, education, and
employment can affect marital instability and how marital instability can affect changes
in socioeconomic resources is needed. Previous studies have largely ignored a
possibility that marital instability can causally determine the changes in one’s
educational attainment, employment, and income. Obviously, this is not attainable
without longitudinal studies on marital instability in these societies.
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Finally, the effects of marital instability on families and children should be
investigated in future research. As Amato and DeBoer (2001) found, children with
martially distressed parents who remained married did not have an elevated risk of
divorce and that divorce was most likely to be transmitted across generations if parents
reported a low, rather than high, level of discord prior to marital dissolution. Also,
Amato, Loomis, and Booth (1995) found that parental marital conflict is negatively
associated with children’s well-being. Specifically, in high-conflict marriages, children
had higher well-being if their parents divorced than remained married; in low-conflict
marriages, children had higher well-being if their parents remained married than if they
divorced. With longitudinal data, the intergenerational transmission of marital instability,
including but not limited to, marital discord, conflict, and dissolution, could be studied
cross-culturally.
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Survey Questions
1. Have you actually considered divorce after getting married? 1 = No 2 = Hard to
Say 3 = Yes 9=not applicable
2. In what year were you born?
3. How old are you?
4. Have you ever been married? 1=yes 2=no
5. Have you ever been separated or divorced? 1=yes 2=no
6. How many times married?
7. Age current marriage began.
8. Do you have children? 1=yes 2=no
9. How old were you when each of your children was born?
10. Which type of household registration do you have? 1=rural (agriculture) 2=urban
(non-agriculture) 3=other, please indicate
11. Type of place where R lives at time of survey (South Korea)
a.
b.
c.
d.
8.

Rural/small town
Small-medium city
Large city
Other
DK

12. Gender 1=male 2=female
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13. What is the highest level of education you have attained? (China)
a. Illiterate or barely literate
b. Elementary school
c. Junior high school
d. Senior high school
e. Vocational school
f. Vocational high school
g. Middle technological school
h. Higher technological school
i. University
j. Graduate school
k. Other, please describe
98. Don’t know
14. Highest education (South Korea)
a. No formal school
b. Primary school
c. Middles school
d. Any type of high school
e. General high school
f. Vocational high school
g. Two-year college
h. University
i. Graduate school
j. other
15. What is your spouse’s type of household registration? 1=city and town (nonagriculture) 2= rural (agriculture) 3=other, please describe
16. Spouse’s education (South Korea/Taiwan)
a. No formal school
b. Primary school
c. Middles school
d. Any type of high school
e. General high school
f. Vocational high school
g. Two-year college
h. University
i. Graduate school
j. other
98. DK
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17. What is the highest level of education your spouse attained? (China)
a. Illiterate or barely literate
b. Elementary school
c. Junior high school
d. Senior high school
e. Vocational school
f. Vocational high school
g. Middle technological school
h. Higher technological school
i. University
j. Graduate school
k. Other, please describe
98. Don’t know
18. Does your spouse currently have a job? 1=yes 2=no (China)
19. Spouse currently working? (South Korea/Taiwan) 1=yes 2=no
20. Approximately how much was his (her) salary income last year? Yuan
21. Approximately how much was his (her) annual bonus income last year? Yuan
22. Approximately how much was his (her) annual other income last year? Yuan
23. If spouse had a job during last 12 months his/her annual earnings last year? (in
10,000 won) (South Korea)
24. Is the respondent currently working? 1=yes 2=no
25. Is R working now? (South Korea/Taiwan) 1=yes 2=no
26. How much is your annual salary at present?
27. How much is your annual bonus at present?
28. How much is your annual other income at present?
29. What is your current average monthly income including bonus income and other
allowances? (China)
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30. Regarding household chores, on average how many hours each of the following
people spend on each listed item every week? (South Korea)
a. grocery:self:hours
k. repair:spouse:hours
l. repair:spouse:minutes
b. grocery:self:minutes
c. grocery:spouse:hours
m. caring:self:hours
d. grocery:spouse:minutes
n. caring:self:minutes
e. cook:self:hours
o. caring:spouse:hours
f. cook:self:minutes
p. caring:spouse:minutes
g. cook:spouse:hours
q. clean:self:hours
h. cook:spouse:minutes
r. clean:self:minutes
i. repair:self:hours
s. clean:spouse:hours
j. repair:self:minutes
t. clean:souse:minutes
31. Who is responsible for the following household chores in your family? On
average how long do they spend doing them every week?1=myself 2=spouse
3=my parents 4=my parents-in-laws 5=children 6=others
a. Shopping (grocery, necessities)
b. Cooking
c. Dish washing
d. Repairing appliances and other things in the house
e. Taking care of children and elderly
f. Laundry and daily cleaning
32. Who decides the following matters within the household? (South Korea) 1=self
2=spouse 3=parents 4=parents-in-laws 5=children 6=mutual decision 7=other
8=DK
a. who decides: household expenses
b. who decides: buying a house or moving
c. who decides: purchasing high-priced goods
33. Whose opinion is the most important in your family in making decisions about the
following matters? 1=myself 2= my spouse 3=my parents 4 =my parents-in-laws
5=my children 6=everyone 7=other 8=don’t know
a. Allocation of family budget
b. Matter of buying a house
c. Purchase of high priced consumer goods
34. In general, are you satisfied with your marriage? 1=very satisfied 2=satisfied
3=unsatisfied 4=very unsatisfied 5=hard to say 9=not applicable
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35. Generally speaking, is R satisfied with R’s marriage? 1=very satisfied 2=satisfied
3=unsatisfied 4=very unsatisfied 5=hard to say 8=not applicable (South
Korea/Taiwan)
36. Do you agree with the following statements? 1=strongly agree 2=agree
3=disagree 4=strongly disagree 5=no opinion
a. For married couples, husbands should be charge of matters outside the
home while wives are in charge of things inside the home.
b. By nature women are more suitable for taking care of the family than men.
c. Even without marriage women can have a fulfilling life.
d. If a wife has a job, the husband should try to share the housework.
e. The success of husband’s job is also the success of the wife.
f. Women must have children to have a fulfilling life.
g. Men can have a fulfilling life without marriage
h. Men can have a fulfilling life without children.
37. At present, who is/are living with you?
a. Spouse
b. Grandfather
c. Grandmother
d. Maternal grandfather
e. Maternal grandmother
f. My father
g. My mother
h. Spouse’s father
i. Spouse’s mother
j. Single son(s) ___number
k. Single daughter(s) ___
number
l. Married son(s) ___
number
m. Married daughter(s) ___
number

n. My brother(s) ___
number
o. My sister(s) ___ number
p. Spouse’s brother(s) ___
number
q. Spouse’s sister(s) ___
number
r. Grandson(s) ___ number
s. Granddaughter(s) ___
number
t. Daughter’s son(s) ___
number
u. Daughter’s daughter(s)
___ number
v. Other relatives ___
number
w. Other ___ number

38. Do you need consent from family members in doing the following things? 1=yes
2=no 3=don’t know 4=not applicable
a. Buying expensive clothes (1000 yuan)
b. Going on a trip (including staying out of the house for one or more days)
c. Choosing jobs or work places
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39. In the past 12 months, have you (1) participated in any activity, or (2) been a
member of any organization listed below? 0=no 1=yes (South Korea/Taiwan)
a.
temple: participation
b.
temple: being a member
c.
church: participation
d.
church: being a member
e.
other religious group: participation
f.
other religious group: being a member
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